27 resultados para Failure of IndyMac Bank
Resumo:
In his reflections on the intervening century since the start of the First World War, Erwan Fouéré acknowledges that the EU has brought enormous benefits to its citizens by extending the frontiers of peace and security to include 28 member countries. At the same time, however, he warns that the voices of populism are trying to destroy its very foundations and calls upon the European Union to work much harder at showing that the integration project is both vital and necessary for continued peace and prosperity in Europe.
Resumo:
Institutional integration processes in the post-Soviet area have ended in failure. It proved impossible to transform the Commonwealth of Independent States into an instrument of real co-operation, even though Russia, which was the most interested in integrating the post-Soviet space, made repeated efforts to this end. The CIS never managed to accomplish its declared objectives and, from this point of view, it does not exist as an integration organisation and de facto never did.
Resumo:
Summary: Overall the monetary pillar of the EMU project has worked well so that it is incorrect to speak of a 'euro' crisis though it is at the epicentre of the present crisis. The origins of the problems it is facing have more to do with the economic component, particularly because of the breach of budgetary rules which points to a failure of politics. Hence the solution must be political, namely a strong commitment by governments to achieve balanced budgets and implement structural reforms so as to lay the basis for improved competitiveness, job creation and sustainable growth.
Resumo:
If introduced successfully, national Golden Rules will completely overturn fiscal governance in the eurozone. Golden Rules would almost always be more stringent than EU-level fiscal norms. EU fiscal norms will hence evolve into a safety net in case a Golden Rule fails. The possibility of such a failure is, indeed, not to be dismissed. Because of the severity of the Golden Rules, eurozone leaders should reflect on their design. There is a real risk that they will undercut public investment, which would be at the cost of the EU’s other long-term challenges.
Resumo:
This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.
Resumo:
This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. According to Article 220 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) “each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed”. The “pre-Nice” allocation of jurisdiction between the two Community courts can be summarized as follows. At Court of Justice level, mention should first of all be made of references for a preliminary ruling. A national court, in a case pending before it, can - or in some circumstances must - refer to the Court of Justice a question relating to the interpretation of provisions of the EC Treaty or of secondary Community law, or relating to the validity of provisions of secondary Community law.1 Moreover, the Court of Justice ensures the observance of the law in the context of actions for annulment or failure to act brought before it by the Community institutions, the European Central Bank (hereinafter ECB) and the Member States.2 These actions concern, respectively, the legality of an act of secondary Community law and the legality of the failure of the institution concerned to adopt such act. The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction in actions brought by the Commission or by a Member State relating to the infringement of Community law by a Member State (hereinafter infringement actions)3 and in actions relating to compensation for non-contractual damage brought by Member States against the Community.4 Finally, as regards the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, mention should be made of appeals which can be lodged on points of law only against rulings of the CFI.5
Resumo:
In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis both the EU and the US have implemented resolution procedures for their largest and most systemic financial institutions. This Commentary examines the main differences between the two frameworks. The EU framework allows, inter alia, action to prevent the failure of a credit institution, while the US regulatory framework requires that all systemic banks subject to resolution must be closed and resolved. The greater flexibility under the EU resolution framework allows action to be taken to preserve a credit institution without putting it through an insolvency process, which makes limiting moral hazard less obvious. Moreover, the scope of the EU framework is still narrow, since it does not allow the recovery of non-bank financial institutions, whereas the US framework does.