Britain outside Europe? Fewer EU concessions to UK post-Brexit. EPC Commentary, 12 May 2014

Despite their differences and the difficulties in the EU-UK relationship, the UK has played a significant role in many areas of EU integration for more than 40 years. While determining the exact impact of a British withdrawal from the EU is difficult, one can list a number of areas in which undoubtedly Brexit would have a profoundly negative impact on the EU, and an even greater negative impact on the UK itself. Brexit would also radically change the way the EU functions by changing the EU’s main institutions, creating a series of alterations that would not in the end necessarily be wholly detrimental to the union.

Brexit or not? Time for the EU to move. EPC Commentary, 8 September 2014

The deteriorating relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the rest of the EU, including the prospect of a referendum on EU membership, would have dominated the Union’s agenda had it not been for the economic/financial crisis, followed by the external crisis which we are now facing in the East. Precisely because of these crises, it is now time for the incoming European Commission to take the bull by the horns and ensure that the EU can move on from a potential referendum and its possible outcomes. The June European Council noted that “the UK raised some concerns related to the future development of the EU. These concerns will need to be addressed. In this context, the European Council noted that the concept of ever closer union allows for different paths of integration for different countries, allowing those that want to deepen integration to move ahead, while respecting the wish of those who do not want to deepen any further.” While the EU has, arguably, successfully developed at different speeds for decades, to address the UK’s (fundamental) concerns, it is now time to work out whether and how the UK can be accommodated, and what this would mean in practice. UK membership is desirable but not at any price, so the aim should be to keep the UK in, while also ensuring that the principles on which the EU is built are protected. There will need to be a modus operandi which enables the EU and in particular, the Eurozone, to continue to make progress in addressing the shortcomings of European integration and European Monetary Union (EMU) in particular, while at the same time offering a reform package that can satisfy the UK. This does not necessarily mean that all EMU reforms have to be within the EU framework: additional intergovernmental arrangements could also be a possibility. However, this could add to the complexity and inefficiency of the system, as well as sidelining the supranational element of EU governance which will be needed to make EMU function.

Brexit – lessons from four referenda on the European Union (EU) in Denmark. EU Centre, Policy Brief No. 8, June 2015

From 1972 to 1993 Denmark staged four referenda on the EU. Two of them in particular hold valuable lessons for Britain seeking new terms - in June 1992 on the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the Danes voted “NO” with a slim majority; this was followed by another vote on the treaty in May 1993 on the Edinburgh Agreement with a “YES” vote. Joergen Oerstroem Moeller was directly involved in all four referenda and served 1989-1997 as State-Secretary in the Royal Danish Foreign Ministry. The result of a referendum may and often will be decided by policy decisions shaping the electorates’ perception long before the voting takes place. The majority votes according to instinct and intuition and is often guided by emotions. The Danish case highlights the importance of defining clearly specific exceptions, working hard to explain the case (at home and abroad), establishing good-will, and conveying that exceptions are in principle temporary and do not require treaty changes. The objectives laid out at the start of the process must be achievable. The member state in question should not manoeuvre itself into humiliating back-pedalling at the final negotiation round: if so it arouses suspicion among the electorate that it is being manipulated and deceived. During the campaign media attention will primarily focus on dissent and scepticism presenting the establishment with the tedious task of confuting accusations of all kinds. The YES camp will be pushed into the defensive by the NO camp setting the agenda. Time and effort and political capital needed to be invested for the positive outcome.

The EU deal to avoid Brexit: Take it or leave. CEPS Special Report No. 131/February 2016

Beyond the drama of the European Council summit of 18-19 February 2016, what became clear was the fundamental desire on the part of the leaders of all 28 EU member states to agree a deal on the British government’s demands for a renegotiated settlement on the UK’s relationship within the European Union. The deal has provided David Cameron with the political capital he needed to call a date for the in/out referendum and to lead a campaign for the UK to stay in the EU. Yet, for all the technical reforms packed into it, the deal is neither a crowd pleaser nor a vote winner. It does, however, mark a watershed acknowledgement that EU integration is not a one-directional process of ‘ever closer union’. In this CEPS Special Report, Stefani Weiss and Steven Blockmans analyse the substance of the “Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union” and shed light on its legal character. They contextualise this EU deal to avoid Brexit, and draw on the conclusions reached in a simulation of European Council negotiations between representatives of think tanks in the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), conducted by CEPS and the Bertelsmann Stiftung in October 2015.

Brexit averted through EU reform? EPC Post-Summit Commentary, 22 February 2016

After some drama, the EU Summit produced the expected result: an agreement on the UK-EU relationship that broadly reflects the demands Prime Minister Cameron set out in his letter to President Tusk in November 2015. This reveals that no other EU leader wants to see the UK leave, given the political and economic costs this implies for the EU as a whole, especially in such a crises-dominated period.

Brexit – potential economic consequences if the UK exits the EU. Policy Brief #2015/05

If the United Kingdom (UK) exits the EU in 2018, it would reduce that country’s exports and make imports more ex-pensive. Depending on the extent of trade policy isolation, the UK’s real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita would be between 0.6 and 3.0 percent lower in the year 2030 than if the country remained in the EU. If we take into ac-count the dynamic effects that economic integration has on investment and innovation behavior, the GDP losses could rise to 14 percent. In addition, it will bring unforeseeable political disadvantages for the EU – so from our perspective, we must avoid a Brexit.

Brexit - A last testament. CEPS Commentary, 23 May 2016

One month to go now, before the fateful decision will be made on 23 June 2016, to Remain or to Leave, that is the question – after four years of thinking about it by Prime Minister Cameron’s government.

EU-Spotlight: Keep calm and carry on. What Europeans think about a possible Brexit.

From the Executive Summary. A majority of Europeans would like the UK to remain a member of the European Union (EU), but at the same time they do not think that a Brexit would be the end of Europe. Whereas age or gender do not have a pronounced effect on how one views these matter, one factor clearly does: the more people support their own country’s membership in the EU, the more they want the UK to remain a member as well. The opposite is not true, however. Eurosceptics are not rooting for the UK to leave. These public opinion trends are demonstrated by the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s latest eupinions survey. eupinions conducts regular polls in all European member states to explore what European citizens think about current political issues. The latest wave of the survey is devoted to their views on the British referendum on membership in the EU.

Information Guide: The Brexit Debate

A guide to information sources on the 'Brexit Debate' in the United Kingdom - the decision to hold a referendum in the United Kingdom on the 23 June 2016 as to whether the country should remain or leave the European Union. The guide is a structured listing of information sources from the EU, the UK government, UK Parliament, the main campaigning groups, think tanks, news sources and other sources on this important topic. Note that the images within the guide are all hyperlinks to the full text of the sources. The guides is being constantly updated during 2016.

Brexit: a new beginning for the EU or the beginning of the end? EPC Commentary, 24 June 2016

Despite all the evidence presented by a range of respected figures and institutions, and the paucity of the arguments on the Brexit side, which failed to set out the alternative to EU membership, the emotional appeal for ‘independence’ has won. This is a bad day for Europe. The Bremain campaign has not connected with enough voters, with the perceived need to limit migration, the wish to make decisions independent of the EU and a vote against ‘the establishment’ all seemingly playing a role.

Estrangement Day: The implications of Brexit for the EU. CEPS Commentary, 27 June 2016

In a post-imperial burst to define the boundaries of its sovereignty, Britannia is ruling the waves again, albeit in the form of air time devoted to the fallout from its referendum vote rather than in a show of force from its flotilla. It was with disbelief and sorrow that the UK’s partners in Europe and the rest of the world woke up to the news of the British Leave vote in the referendum on its EU membership. The prospect of a Brexit has sent shock waves throughout the international financial and political system and is set to occupy media debate for months to come.

A Fresh Start for the European Union after Brexit. CEPS Commentary, 29 June 2016

I am still trying to process the shock of the UK referendum, which has dealt a historic blow to the European Union and has alerted us to the danger of the wave of anti-establishment and anti-elite sentiments shaking up developed nations, and bringing about disastrous decisions that cannot be easily reversed. These movements are present in many European countries; we cannot underestimate the dangers of tumbling down the slippery slope of nationalism, which could put the very survival of the Union into question. A response from the EU, or from a smaller circle of its founding or main members, is necessary – as long as we can identify meaningful goals.

Procedural steps towards Brexit. CEPS Commentary, 13 July 2016

Introduction. With the dust barely settled on the Brexit referendum, a messy legal picture has emerged. Among the many challenges are what, when and how exactly the UK’s withdrawal from the EU should be negotiated. In truth, the way the divorce procedure has been regulated under Article 50 TEU leaves much to be desired. Gaps left by the EU legislator will have to be filled rather swiftly by political elites and lawyers. To the EU and its member states, only the rudimentary aspects of withdrawal are clear. In the UK, however, even the staunchest proponents of Vote Leave seem to have been caught off-guard, with no actionable plan for how to handle Brexit – only visions of alternatives to EU membership that are unlikely to be acceptable to the EU27. The fact that alternatives to membership had not been considered seriously prior to the referendum is perplexing, and underlines the impression that the entire exercise was a stroke of irresponsible political chutzpah.

Brexit will deepen the fault lines within the EU over mobility. CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2016

Much has been made of the divide that opened up in 2015 between eastern and western member states as a result of acrimonious discussions on how to handle the refugee crisis and distribute asylum applicants across the EU. Against the prevailing political sentiment in certain member state capitals, Germany and France pushed through a plan devised by the European Commission to relocate 120,000 refugees, by a qualified majority vote in the Council. Rather than creating an east/west divide, however, the vote split the group of (relatively) new Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) of the EU into two factions: Romania, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary voted against the plan, whereas several other CEECs, namely Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, joined the controversial motion on the side of the other (northern, southern and western) member states. Finland abstained. Few member states have shifted their positions in the meantime. If anything, in fact, they have coalesced among the Visegrad 4, following a change of government in Poland; and they have hardened, as a result of new proposals by the Commission to fine member states that refuse to accept refugees. With Hungary’s referendum on the Commission’s relocation scheme scheduled for October 2nd, tensions are set to intensify even further.

Demographics and Brexit: A deeper problem for the EU? CEPS Commentary, 8 July 2016

There has been much debate about the demographic factors that contributed to the outcome of the UK’s referendum on its membership of the EU. Two aspects command special attention. First, there are marked differences between young and old generations in the preferences shown for remaining in the EU. While the former predominantly voted to remain, a great majority of the latter voted to leave. On the other hand, voter turnout revealed the opposite trend: about 83% of UK citizens aged 65 and older voted, whereas only 36% of those aged 18-24 cast their vote (Figure 1).