81 resultados para Banking
Resumo:
This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.
Resumo:
In this new CEPS Commentary, Jacopo Carmassi, Carmine Di Noia and Stefano Micossi present a rationale and detailed outline for the creation of a banking union in Europe. They argue that it is essential to clearly distinguish between what is needed to address a ‘systemic’ confidence crisis hitting the banking system – which is mainly or solely a eurozone problem – and ‘fair weather’ arrangements to prevent individual bank crises and, when they occur, to manage them in an orderly fashion so as to minimise systemic spillovers and the cost to taxpayers, which is of concern for the entire European Union.
Resumo:
As the banking crisis in the eurozone becomes even more acute, CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo exhorts the EU to not lose further precious time in creating a fully functional bank union, which would entail three main steps: creating a single supervisory authority, a common deposit protection and a harmonised bank resolution and liquidation system.
Resumo:
In this Commentary, Daniel Gros applauds the decision taken by Europe’s leaders at the eurozone summit at the end of June to transfer responsibility for banking supervision in the eurozone to the European Central Bank. It represents explicit recognition of the important fact that problems might originate at the national level, but, owing to monetary union, they can quickly threaten the stability of the entire eurozone banking system. In his view, the next small, incremental step, although one not yet officially acknowledged, will necessarily be the creation of a common bank rescue fund.
Resumo:
The proposal to move to a full banking union in the eurozone means a radical regime shift for the EU, since the European Central Bank will supervise the eurozone banks and effectively end ‘home country rule’. But how this is implemented raises a number of questions and needs close monitoring, explains CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary.
Resumo:
The European Commission has published its proposals for the transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the European Central Bank (ECB),1 under Article 127(6) of the TFEU, providing a comprehensive and courageous ‘first step’ towards a European banking Union, the other steps being European deposit insurance and resolution procedures. However, on a number of issues the Commission’s chosen path raises questions that should be brought out in the open and fully recognized before final deliberation by the Council.
Resumo:
Systemic banking crises are a threat to all countries whatever their development level. They can entail major fiscal costs that can undermine the sustainability of public finances. More than anywhere else, however, a number of euro-area countries have been affected by a lethal negative feedback loop between banking and sovereign risk, followed by disintegration of the financial system, real economic fragmentation and the exposure of the European Central Bank. Recognising the systemic dimension of the problem, the Euro-Area Summit of June 2012 called for the creation of a banking union with common supervision and the possibility for the European Stability Mechanism to recapitalise banks directly.
Resumo:
Problems in the banking system are at the core of the current crisis. The establishment of a banking union is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for eventual crisis resolution that respects the integrity of the euro. The European Commission’s proposal for the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism and related reform of the European Banking Authority (EBA) do not and cannot create a fully-fledged banking union, but represent a broadly adequate step on the basis of the leaders’ declaration of 29 June 2012 and of the decision to use Article 127(6) of the treaty as legal basis. The proposal rightly endows the European Central Bank (ECB) with broad authority over banks within the supervisory mechanism’s geographical perimeter; however, the status of non-euro area member states willing to participate in this mechanism, and the governance and decision-making processes of the ECB in this respect, call for further elaboration. Further adjustments are also desirable in the proposed reform of the EBA, even though they must probably retain a stopgap character pending the more substantial review planned in 2014.
Resumo:
Despite their surprising similarities – in size and their housing booms – Ireland and the American state of Nevada sharply parted company when it came to who bore responsibility for bailing out their failed banks when the booms turned to bust. This latest Commentary by Daniel Gros vividly illustrates the importance of that difference and thus the shock-absorbing capacity of an integrated banking system and a banking union.
Resumo:
Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.
Resumo:
The European Council has outlined the creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), complementing the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The thinking on the SRM’s legal basis, design and mission is still preliminary and depends on other major initiatives, including the European Stability Mechanism’s involvement in bank recapitalisations and the Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR) Directive. The SRM should also not be seen as the final step creating Europe’s future banking union. Both the BRR Directive and the SRM should be designed to enable the substantial financial participation of existing creditors in future bank restructurings. To be effective, the SRM should empower a central body. However, in the absence of Treaty change and of further fiscal integration, SRM decisions will need to be implemented through national resolution regimes. The central body of the SRM should be either the European Commission, or a new authority. This legislative effort should not be taken as an excuse to delay decisive action on the management and resolution of the current European banking fragility, which imposes a major drag on Europe’s growth and employment.