24 resultados para Baillie, Joanna
Resumo:
Regulatory agencies such as Europol, Frontex, Eurojust, CEPOL as well as bodies such as OLAF, have over the past decade become increasingly active within the institutional architecture constituting the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and are now placed at the forefront of implementing and developing the EU’s internal security model. A prominent feature of agency activity is the large-scale proliferation of ‘knowledge’ on security threats via the production of policy tools such as threat assessments, risk analyses, periodic and situation reports. These instruments now play a critical role in providing the evidence-base that supports EU policymaking, with agency-generated ‘knowledge’ feeding political priority setting and decision-making within the EU’s new Internal Security Strategy (ISS). This paper examines the nature and purpose of knowledge generated by EU Home Affairs agencies. It asks where does this knowledge originate? How does it measure against criteria of objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability and accuracy? And how is it processed in order to frame threats, justify actions and set priorities under the ISS?
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This paper examines the performance of the European Parliament in EU AFSJ law and policy-making from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty until the end of the first half of 2013. The paper situates the EP in the new post-Lisbon institutional setting, documenting its transition to ‘AFSJ decision-maker’, and its new powers to shape and make policy covering the EU’s internal and external security agenda. While the paper finds that the EP has become an active co-owner of the EU AFSJ post-Lisbon, with the Parliament demonstrating a dynamic adjustment to its new post-Lisbon role and powers, the authors identify a set of new developments and challenges that have arisen in the conduct of democratic accountability by the EP in the AFSJ since 2009, which call for critical reflection ahead of the new parliamentary term 2014-2019 and the post-2014 phase of the EU’s AFSJ.
Resumo:
This report evaluates the performance of long-term care (LTC) systems in Europe, with a special emphasis on four countries that were selected in Work Package 1 of the ANCIEN project as representative of different LTC systems: Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland. Based on a performance framework, we use the following four core criteria for the evaluation: the quality of life of LTC users, the quality of care, equity of LTC systems and the total burden of LTC (consisting of the financial burden and the burden of informal caregiving). The quality of life is analysed by studying the experience of LTC users in 13 European countries, using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Older persons with limitations living at home have the highest probability of receiving help (formal or informal) in Germany and the lowest in Poland. Given that help is available, the sufficiency of the help is best ensured in Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands. The indirectly observed properties of the LTC system are most favourable in France. An older person who considers all three aspects important might be best off living in Belgium or Switzerland. The horizontal and vertical equity of LTC systems are analysed for the four representative countries. The Dutch system scores highest on overall equity, followed by the German system. The Spanish and Polish systems are both less equitable than the Dutch and German systems. To show how ageing may affect the financial burden of LTC, projections until 2060 are given for LTC expenditures for the four representative countries. Under the base scenario, for all four countries the proportions of GDP spent on public and private LTC are projected to more than double between 2010 and 2060, and even treble in some cases. The projections also highlight the large differences in LTC expenditures between the four countries. The Netherlands spends by far the most on LTC. Furthermore, the report presents information for a number of European countries on quality of care, the burden of informal caregiving and other aspects of performance. The LTC systems for the four representative countries are evaluated using the four core criteria. The Dutch system has the highest scores on all four dimensions except the total burden of care, where it has the second-best score after Poland. The German system has somewhat lower scores than the Dutch on all four dimensions. The relatively large role for informal care lowers the equity of the German system. The Polish system excels in having a low total burden of care, but it scores lowest on quality of care and equity. The Spanish system has few extreme scores. Policy implications are discussed in the last chapter of this report and in the Policy Brief based on this report.
Resumo:
This document provides statistical appendices underpinning the research presented in ENEPRI Research Report No. 117, “Performance of Long-Term Care Systems in Europe”, December 2012. Esther Mot is Senior Researcher in the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) and Riemer Faber is researcher at CPB. Joanna Geerts is researcher and Peter Willemé is health economist in the Social Security Research Group at the Federal Planning Bureau (FPB).
Resumo:
In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this paper assesses the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of these practices, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the paper contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of the balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The paper argues that these programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be analysed from an EU law perspective via i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights and judicial oversight constitute key norms; ii) the risks posed to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners and iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The paper then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.
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In the last 30 years, a clear trend has come to define modern immigration law and policy. A set of seemingly disparate developments concerning the constant reinforcement of border controls, tightening of conditions of entry, expanding capacities for detention and deportation and the proliferation of criminal sanctions for migration offences, accompanied by an anxiety on the part of the press, public and political establishment regarding migrant criminality can now be seen to form a definitive shift in the European Union towards the so-called ‘criminalisation of migration’. This paper aims to provide an overview of the ‘state-of-the-art’ in the academic literature and EU research on criminalisation of migration in Europe. It analyses three key manifestations of the so-called ‘crimmigration’ trend: discursive criminalisation; the use of criminal law for migration management; and immigrant detention, focusing both on developments in domestic legislation of EU member states but also the increasing conflation of mobility, crime and security which has accompanied EU integration. By identifying the trends, synergies and gaps in the scholarly approaches dealing with the criminalisation of migration, the paper seeks to provide a framework for on-going research under Work Package 8 of the FIDUCIA project.
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A majority of national governments across the EU have long tried to cordon off their practices of mass interception of communications data and cyber-hacking of foreign companies and diplomats from supranational scrutiny by the EU institutions and courts, arguing that they remain within the remit of their ‘exclusive competence’ on grounds of national security. In light of the revelations that some EU member states (namely the UK, France, Germany and Sweden) are running their own secret interception programmes, however, the question of whether the EU can and should intervene becomes more pressing. This commentary, by a team of JHA specialists at CEPS, offers four important legal reasons why the covert surveillance programmes of member states should not be regarded as falling outside the scope of EU intervention.
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The premise of this study is simple: before discussing what defence strategy the EU should adopt at Brussels-level, member states should clarify what they expect individually from the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Inspired by the confusion about EU defence policy in most European capitals, this authoritative study inverts the usual analytical approach applied to the debate on European strategy. Rather than initiating the enquiry from the perspective of common interests guiding CSDP, it analyses how seven prominent member states see CSDP as a tool to pursue their strictly national interests. Five researchers immersed themselves in the foreign policy worlds of Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Stockholm and Madrid, looking at CSDP through national lenses and away from the potentially distorting influence of ‘Brussels’ rhetoric.
Resumo:
While the geopolitics of the Ukraine crisis have dominated headlines, little attention has been paid to the potential challenges arising from the movement of people from the region to the EU. Yet recent history should tell us this could be a grave oversight. As we witnessed during the Arab Spring in 2011, political upheaval can result in people fleeing their state in fear of persecution or seeking to leave their state in search of new horizons and economic opportunities. The EU would do well to learn from that experience and the policy failures that resulted from the Union’s response of closing its borders and returning people to Africa. This Commentary argues that it is critical that – independently of the still uncertain outcome of the Ukraine crisis – the EU formulates and implements a credible policy strategy addressing the potential impact and benefits of mobility between Ukraine and the EU.
Resumo:
The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated.
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The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.
Resumo:
Membership of NATO and the EU is a priority of the foreign policies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The main stimulus that drives these membership aspirations is the will to ensure the security of these countries and to ultimately separate them from the post-Soviet space. Additionally, the authorities of the Baltic States believe that membership of both these organisations will make their counties more attractive for Western investors. The way to implement these priorities is not only through consistent adjustments to the standards prevailing in NATO and the EU, but it also involves refusing to join the post-Soviet structures and seeking out states that are willing to strongly support the Baltic States aspirations. The implementation of this policy has resulted in the status of the Baltic States preparations for membership in both international structures being assessed as good, and they are reckoned to be realistic candidates for NATO and EU enlargement.
Resumo:
Russians or so-called Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia pose a significant problem for both countries. Russian-speakers are a numerous minority in Latvia and Estonia, which causes deep division in these countries from the ethnical point of view. The problem of highest importance in the legal aspect is the unregulated status of the Russian-speakers. Though they are permanent residents of Latvia and Estonia many of them still do not have these countries' citizenship. The complex naturalisation procedure introduced by Latvia and Estonia soon after restoring independence in 1991 is considered to be main responsible for this.