Developmental Activities That Lead to Dropout and Investment in Sport

Background: Studies suggest that expert performance in sport is the result of long-term engagement in a highly specialized form of training termed deliberate practice. The relationship between accumulated deliberate practice and performance predicts that those who begin deliberate practice at a young age accumulate more practice hours over time and would, therefore, have a significant performance advantage. However, qualitative studies have shown that a large amount of sport-specific practice at a young age may lead to negative consequences, such as dropout, and is not necessarily the only path to expert performance in sport. Studies have yet to investigate the activity context, such as the amount of early sport participation, deliberate play and deliberate practice within which dropout occurs. Purpose: To determine whether the nature and amount of childhood-organized sport, deliberate play and deliberate practice participation influence athletes' subsequent decisions to drop out or invest in organized sport. It was hypothesized that young athletes who drop out will have sampled fewer sports, spent less time in deliberate play activities and spent more time in deliberate practice activities during childhood sport involvement. Participants: The parents of eight current, high-level, male, minor ice hockey players formed an active group. The parents of four high-level, male, minor ice hockey players who had recently withdrawn from competitive hockey formed a dropout group. Data collection: Parents completed a structured retrospective survey designed to assess their sons' involvement in organized sport, deliberate play and deliberate practice activities from ages 6 to 13. Data analysis: A complete data-set was available for ages 6 through 13, resulting in a longitudinal data-set spanning eight years. This eight-year range was divided into three levels of development corresponding to the players' progress through the youth ice hockey system. Level one encompassed ages 6–9, level two included ages 10–11 and level three covered ages 12–13. Descriptive statistics were used to report the ages at which the active and dropout players first engaged in select hockey activities. ANOVA with repeated measures across the three levels of development was used to compare the number of sports the active and dropout players were involved in outside of hockey, the number of hours spent in these sports, and involvement in various hockey-related activities. Findings: Results indicated that both the active and dropout players enjoyed a diverse and playful introduction to sport. Furthermore, the active and dropout players invested similar amounts of time in organized hockey games, organized hockey practices, specialized hockey training activities (e.g. hockey camps) and hockey play. However, analysis revealed that the dropout players began off-ice training at a younger age and invested significantly more hours/year in off-ice training at ages 12–13, indicating that engaging in off-ice training activities at a younger age may have negative implications for long-term ice hockey participation. Conclusion: These results are consistent with previous research that has found that early diversification does not hinder sport-specific skill development and it may, in fact, be preferable to early specialization. The active and dropout players differed in one important aspect of deliberate practice: off-ice training activities. The dropout players began off-ice training at a younger age, and participated in more off-ice training at ages 12 and 13 than their active counterparts. This indicates a form of early specialization and supports the postulate that early involvement in practice activities that are not enjoyable may ultimately undermine the intrinsic motivation to continue in sport. Youth sport programs should not focus on developing athletic fitness through intense and routine training, but rather on sport-specific practice, games and play activities that foster fun and enjoyment.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.