Expertise in Ultra-Endurance Triathletes Early Sport Involvement, Training Structure, and the Theory of Deliberate Practice

The theory of deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993) is predicated on the concept that the engagement in specific forms of practice is necessary for the attainment of expertise. The purpose of this paper was to examine the quantity and type of training performed by expert UE triathletes. Twenty-eight UE triathletes were stratified into expert, middle of the pack, and back of the pack groups based on previous finishing times. All participants provided detailed information regarding their involvement in sports in general and the three triathlon sports in particular. Results illustrated that experts performed more training than non-experts but that the relationship between training and performance was not monotonic as suggested by Ericsson et al. Further, experts' training was designed so periods of high training stress were followed by periods of low stress. However, early specialization was not a requirement for expertise. This work indicates that the theory of deliberate practice does not fully explain expertise development in UE triathlon.

A Review on Repeated Games and Reputations with Incomplete Information

In this project we review the effects of reputation within the context of game theory. This is done through a study of two key papers. First, we examine a paper from Fudenberg and Levine: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (1989). We add to this a review Gossner’s Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation (2011). We look specifically at scenarios in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run opponents, and how the former may develop a reputation. In turn, we show how reputation leads directly to both lower and upper bounds on the long-run player’s payoffs.