CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

A Minor Change?: A Case Study of Carleton Place's Integration of Minor Variance Procedures into Ontario's Development Permit System

The Development Permit System has been introduce with minimal directives for establishing a decision making process. This is in opposition to the long established process for minor variances and suggests that the Development Permit System does not necessarily incorporate all of Ontario’s fundamental planning principles. From this concept, the study aimed to identify how minor variances are incorporated into the Development Permit System. In order to examine this topic, the research was based around the following research questions: • How are ‘minor variance’ applications processed within the DPS? • To what extent do the four tests of a minor variance influence the outcomes of lower level applications in the DPS approval process? A case study approach was used for this research. The single-case design employed both qualitative and quantitative research methods including a review of academic literature, court cases, and official documents, as well as a content analysis of Class 1, 1A, and 2 Development Permit application files from the Town of Carleton Place that were decided between 2011 and 2015. Upon the completion of the content analysis, it was found that minor variance issues were most commonly assigned to Class 1 applications. Planning staff generally met approval timelines and embraced their delegated approval authority, readily attaching conditions to applications in order to mitigate off-site impacts. While staff met the regulatory requirements of the DPS, ‘minor variance’ applications were largely decided on impact alone, demonstrating that the principles established by the four tests, the defining quality of the minor variance approval process, had not transferred to the Development Permit System. Alternatively, there was some evidence that the development community has not fully adjusted to the requirements of the new approvals process, as some applications were supported using a rationale containing the four tests. Subsequently, a set of four recommendations were offered which reflect the main themes established by the findings. The first two recommendations are directed towards the Province, the third to municipalities and the fourth to developers and planning consultants: 1) Amend Ontario Regulation 608/06 so that provisions under Section 4(3)(e) fall under Section 4(2). 2) Change the rhetoric from “combining elements of minor variances” to “replacing minor variances”. 3) Establish clear evaluation criteria. 4) Understand the evaluative criteria of the municipality in which you are working.

An Integrative Case Study of Positive Youth Development in a Recreational Community Sport Program

Thesis (Ph.D, Kinesiology & Health Studies) -- Queen's University, 2016-07-21 14:22:50.954

UNDERSTANDING ESSAY RATING AS A SOCIALLY MEDIATED ACTIVITY: THE CASE OF A HIGH-STAKES ENGLISH TEST IN CHINA

Thesis (Ph.D, Education) -- Queen's University, 2016-09-22 22:05:24.246

TAKING ORGANIZATIONS SERIOUSLY: RESPONSIBLE AGENCY, ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

In the post-Enlightenment period, Anglo-American criminal law has been applied with increased force, and an ever expanding scope, to collective actors like corporations and other organizations. Recent scholarship has focused on developing “truly organizational” bases of liability that break with the conventional approach of imputing individual conduct to an organization and instead analyze culpable conduct and intent in a way that reflects the distinct and independent capacity of organizations to pursue their interests or goals collaboratively. In 2004, Canada enacted amendments inspired by these ideas in the hope they would lead to more effective criminal enforcement against organizations. Twelve years later, however, the promise of Bill C-45 is largely unfulfilled. In this thesis, I explore how much of this failure of law reform to deliver transformational change is attributable to an individualist bias that permeates how we think about what it means to be responsible and how this then shapes the responsibility ascription process. Using an analytical framework that combines criminal law theory with selected aspects of rational-structural theory and organization culture, I suggest that a promising way forward may lie in reframing the essential qualities required to be a subject of the criminal law in a way that captures the unique attributes that make organizations different from individuals. The resulting organizational concept of responsible agency allows for an integration of organizational reality into how we assess organizational culpability while keeping the ambit of criminal liability within the limits of what is practicable and fair. This better aligns with the spirit of Bill C-45: to impose criminal liability in a way that takes organizations – and their crimes – seriously.