Sport-Specific Practice and the Development of Expert Decision-Making in Team Ball Sports

The role of sport-specific practice in the development of decision-making expertise in the sports of field hockey, netball, and basketball was examined. Fifteen expert decision-makers and 13 experienced non-expert athletes provided detailed information about the quantity and type of sport-specific and other related practice activities they had undertaken throughout their careers. Experts accumulated more hours of sport-specific practice from age 12 years onwards than did non-experts, spending on average some 13 years and 4,000 hours on concentrated sport-specific practice before reaching international standard. A significant negative correlation existed between the number of additional activities undertaken and the hours of sportspecific training required before attaining expertise, suggesting a functional role for activities other than sport-specific training in the development of expert decision-making.

Systematic Observation of Youth Ice Hockey Coaches During Games

The behaviors of youth ice hockey coaches during games are examined using the Coaches Observation System for Games. This tool identifies 16 types of coach behaviors and eight targets of such behaviors. Findings reveal that coaches spend 51.2% of their time simply observing the game. Other common coach behaviors are organizing (15%), directing the game (8.1%) and giving information (6.1%). Targets of these behaviors include players in action (40.9%), on the bench (30.4%) and in transition (22.3%).

Systematic Observation of Ice Hockey Referees During Games

A study analyzed the behaviors of eight youth ice hockey referees during 15 different games. The results support the potential educational role that referees can have during games.

A Review on Repeated Games and Reputations with Incomplete Information

In this project we review the effects of reputation within the context of game theory. This is done through a study of two key papers. First, we examine a paper from Fudenberg and Levine: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (1989). We add to this a review Gossner’s Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation (2011). We look specifically at scenarios in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run opponents, and how the former may develop a reputation. In turn, we show how reputation leads directly to both lower and upper bounds on the long-run player’s payoffs.