Transplants: bioethics and justice

Bioethics, as a branch of philosophy that focuses on questions relative to health and human life, is closely tied to the idea of justice and equality. As such, in understanding the concept of equality in its original sense, that is, in associating it to the idea to treat "unequals" (those who are unequal or different, in terms of conditions or circumstances) unequally (differentially), in proportion to their inequalities (differences), we see that the so-called "one-and-only waiting list" for transplants established in law no. 9.434/97, ends up not addressing the concept of equality and justice, bearing upon bioethics, even when considering the objective criteria of precedence established in regulation no. 9.4347/98, Thus, the organizing of transplants on a one-and-only waiting list, with a few exceptions that are weakly applicable, without a case by case technical and grounded analysis, according to each particular necessity, ends up institutionalizing inequalities, condemning patients to happenstance and, consequently, departs from the ratio legis, which aims at seeking the greatest application of justice in regards to organ transplants. We conclude, therefore, that from an analysis of the legislation and of the principles of bioethics and justice, there is a need for the creation of a collegiate of medical experts, that, based on medical criteria and done in a well established manner, can analyze each case to be included on the waiting list, deferentially and according to the necessity; thus, precluding that people in special circumstances be treated equal to people in normal circumstances.

JUSTIFYING LIBERAL RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, CRIMINALIZATION, AND HOLISTIC RETRIBUTIVISM

ABSTRACT In this article I explore whether liberal retributive justice should be conceived of either individualistically or holistically. I critically examine the individualistic account of retributive justice and suggest that the question of retribution – i.e., whether and when punishment of an individual is compatible with just treatment of that individual – must be answered holistically. By resorting to the ideal of sensitive reasons, a model of legitimacy at the basis of our best normative models of democracy, the article argues that in modern liberal democracies, punishment of an offender A for f is compatible with just treatment of A only if punishment of an individual for f can be legitimate in A's and A's fellow citizens' eyes. Only once retributive justice is understood in this holistic fashion the imposition of punishment can be made compatible with just treatment of individuals.

Has social justice any legitimacy in Kant's theory of right? The empirical conditions of the legal state as a civil union

This paper aims at shedding light on an obscure point in Kant's theory of the state. It discusses whether Kant's rational theory of the state recognises the fact that certain exceptional social situations, such as the extreme poverty of some parts of the population, could request institutional state support in order to guarantee the attainment of a minimum threshold of civil independence. It has three aims: 1) to show that Kant's Doctrine of Right can offer solutions for the complex relation between economics and politics in our present time; 2) to demonstrate the claim that Kant embraces a pragmatic standpoint when he tackles the social concerns of the state, and so to refute the idea that he argues for an abstract conception of politics; and 3) to suggest that a non-paternalistic theory of rights is not necessarily incompatible with the basic tenets of a welfare state.