Consistency from the perspective of an experimental systems approach to the sciences and their epistemic objects

It is generally accepted that the development of the modern sciences is rooted in experiment. Yet for a long time, experimentation did not occupy a prominent role, neither in philosophy nor in history of science. With the 'practical turn' in studying the sciences and their history, this has begun to change. This paper is concerned with systems and cultures of experimentation and the consistencies that are generated within such systems and cultures. The first part of the paper exposes the forms of historical and structural coherence that characterize the experimental exploration of epistemic objects. In the second part, a particular experimental culture in the life sciences is briefly described as an example. A survey will be given of what it means and what it takes to analyze biological functions in the test tube.

THE CONCEPT OF 'NATURE' IN ARISTOTLE, AVICENNA AND AVERROES

This study is concerned with 'nature' specifically as the subject-matter of physics, or natural science, as described by Aristotle in his "Physics". It also discusses the definitions of nature, and more specifically physical nature, provided by Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198) in their commentaries on Aristotle's "Physics". Avicenna and Averroes share Aristotle's conception of nature as a principle of motion and rest. While according to Aristotle the subject matter of physics appears to be nature, or what exists by nature, Avicenna believes that it is the natural body, and Averroes holds that the subject matter of physics or natural science consists in the natural things, in what constitutes a slight shift in focus.

BRUNO BAUCH AND THE COMPREHENSIBILITY OF NATURE

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to discuss how Bruno Bauch deals with the problem of the coordination between empirical concepts and spatiotemporal objects. We shall argue that Bauch reformulates the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions by means of a philosophical consideration of differential calculus and that he thereby explains the possibility of such coordination, avoiding certain difficulties of the Kantian doctrine.

The demonism of creation in Goethe's philosophy

Goethe's philosophy of creativity revolves around what he called das Dämonische. This essay is not meant as a definition or an explanation of demonic creation, but instead presents a demonic work par excellence, as the term "demonic" is defined by Goethe in the Elegy from Marienbad. The process of the creation of this work, as it is described by Goethe, also represents a strange exorcism, as the entire daemonic creative force of the author is transposed in this lyrical masterpiece of German and universal literature. After writing the Elegy Goethe, it is no longer demonic.