Contemporary issues in the government and administration of Latin American megacities

This paper is the first to systematically analyze and compare the structures of city governance and administration for seven major cities in Latin America, four of which are megacities (population of over 10 million), and three others are large national capitals. U.S. and U. K. models of city administration are reviewed as baseline models against which differences in Latin American may be explored. Structures of Government in Latin America show several important features and trends: 1) the lack of metropolitan (cross jurisdictional) authority; 2) the existence of strong mayors and weak councils"; 3) high levels of partisanship; 4) overlapping rather than interlocking bureaucracies; 5) pressures towards the privatization of city services, but continuing tension over the desirability of public versus private control; 6) greater fiscal responsibility and autonomy; and 7), a continuing marginalization of public participation in megacity governance.In spite of these features, many cities throughout the region (regardless of whether they are megacity size or national capitals), are actively intensifying their efforts to develop more effective, accountable and democratic governance structures.

Reelection incentives and political budget cycle: evidence from Brazil

This article tests the presence of political budget cycle (PBC) in municipal elections in Brazil and checks whether mayors who adopt such policy have greater probability of reelection. Based on fiscal and electoral data of 5,406 Brazilian municipalities and applying the difference-in-differences econometric method as well as logistic regressions, the results provide some evidence of PBC in Brazil, although its magnitude and consistency varies depending on the years used as electoral and non-electoral years. On average, reelectable mayors spend close to 3% more in election years than nonreelectables. Moreover, reelectables who do run for reelection present a variation in spending which is close to 5% superior to that of non-reelectables and non-runners. Additionally, the results suggest that mayors who increase public spending during electoral periods have greater chances of being reelected, as long as such spending is done within deficit limits acceptable by voters.

Federalismo e endividamento subnacional: uma discussão sobre a sustentabilidade da dívida estadual

The subnational debt in Brazil was marked by successive bailouts by the federal government. The path of subnational debt induced some locals and state authorities to claim for further renegotiations. More specifically, some governors and mayors demanded a revision of the refinancing contracts. This article intends to present arguments sustained by simulations of the evolution of the path of the subnational debt, denying the necessity of changes in legal framework, which rules the state debt. The first section consists of a brief overview. The following section treats the institutional framework designed to safeguard the fiscal intertemporal balance. In the third section, the implications of new institutional framework on the subnational debt are approached; in the fourth, the possible causes that distorted the expected path of the debt are discussed. The fifth section analyses the future perspectives for the debt in general terms and focuses some specific cases, while the sixth section discusses the problem under a federal optics. Finally, the conclusion is presented.

O efeito da intenção de reeleição sobre gastos em saúde: uma análise com base no modelo de reputação política

The effect of reelection intention on public health expenditures: An analysis based on reputation models. The political model of reputational-building argues that if the incumbent politician aspires to be reassigned, he/she must act in the voters' interest to obtain their approval and consequently their votes. Considering that voters are sensitive to public health expenditures, we check how reputational incentives shift municipal spending patterns in electoral years. The empirical tests for 3.004 Brazilian municipalities show an increase of health expenditures in those cities in which incumbents are trying to maintain their jobs. In addition, we find an increment in health expenditures where mayors forfeit their chance of being reelected to the benefit of a party mate.