Budgeting and resource allocation in universities: a public choice approach

The calls for colleges and universities to improve their productivity are coming thick and fast in Brazil. Many studies are suggesting evaluation systems and external criteria to control the quality of teaching and research in universities. Since universities and colleges are not profit-oriented organizations (considering only the legitimate and serious research and teaching organizations, of course), the traditional microeconomics and administrative variables used to measure efficiency do not have any direct function. An alternative would be to create an "as if" market control system to evaluate performance in universities and colleges. Internal budget and resources allocation mechanism can be used as incentive instruments to improve quality and productivity. It will be the main issue of this article.

Beyond budgeting: inovação ou resgate de antigos conceitos do orçamento empresarial?

O estudo tem por objetivo analisar a abordagem conhecida pela expressão "beyond budgeting", que faz o questionamento do que é denominado abordagem "tradicional" do orçamento empresarial, e avaliar se ela constitui uma inovação. A estratégia do desenvolvimento do trabalho é orientada por uma pesquisa bibliográfica, a partir da qual a análise se desenvolve. Esta trata as questões levantadas por críticos e confronta os clássicos do tema no sentido de tentar identificar possíveis inovações e novos problemas que possam derivar da nova abordagem. Em termos gerais, sugere-se que se trata de um novo ciclo que tenta recuperar os aspectos qualitativos clássicos do orçamento, que, uma vez cumpridos, não precisariam de um novo rótulo para serem administrativamente efetivos. Adicionalmente, afirma-se que a abordagem, além de não resolver alguns problemas que a ausência do orçamento pode acarretar, cria outros que não existiriam sem a referida proposta.

STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING INDUCES SOPHISTICATION OF CAPITAL BUDGETING

This article compares capital budgeting techniques employed in listed and unlisted companies in Brazil. We surveyed the Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) of 398 listed companies and 300 large unlisted companies, and based on 91 respondents, the results suggest that the CFOs of listed companies tend to use less simplistic methods more often, for example: NPV and CAPM, and that CFOs of unlisted companies are less likely to estimate the cost of equity, despite being large companies. These findings indicate that stock exchange listing may require greater sophistication of the capital budgeting process.

Why budget accountability fails? The elusive links between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of the budget

ABSTRACTParliaments and audit agencies have critical and complementary roles in the oversight of the budget and the enforcement of government accountability. Yet, the nexus between parliaments and audit agencies is one of the weakest links in the accountability chain, generating an accountability gap in the budget process. This articles analyses the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of government finances during the latter stages of the budget process. Using proxies to evaluate the quality of those linkages, such as the follow-up to audit findings and the discharge of government, it shows important dysfunctions in the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies due to a combination of technical capacity constraints and political economy disincentives. It suggests that the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances in public budgeting critically hinges on the agility of the linkages between accountability institutions. As such, the failure of budget accountability is due to systemic dysfunctions in the systems of accountability, rather than the failure of an individual accountability institution acting in isolation. In addition, the effectiveness of the horizontal accountability architecture depends on the political economy incentives shaping the budget process, which are generated by the interactions between the choice of institutional design and budget rules, with the degree of political competition and electoral rules.