Dois teoremas sôbre a função gama

This paper proves the following theorems on the gamma function: Theorem I The integral ∫O∞ t u e-t dt = Γ ( u + 1 ) , where u, real or complex, is such that R (u) > -1, will not change its value if we substitute z = Q (cos φ + i sen φ) for the real variable t, being jconstant and such that - Π/2 < φ < Π/2 , Theorem II The integral ∫-∞∞ w2u + 1 e -w² dw = Γ ( u + 1 ) , where 2u + 1 is supposed to be a non negative even integer, will not change its value if we substitute z = w + fi, f being a real constant, for the real variable w. The proof of both theorems is obtained by means of the well known Cauchy theorem on contour integrals on the complex plane, as suggested by CRAMÉR (1, p. 126) and LEVY (3, p. 178).

Índices de reatividade química a partir da teoria do funcional de densidade: formalismo e perspectivas

The fundaments of the modern Density Functional Theory (DFT), its basic theorems, principles and methodology are presented. This review also discuss important and widely used concepts in chemistry but that had not been precisely defined until the development of the DFT. These concepts were proposed and used from an empirical base, but now their precise definition are well established in the DFT formalism. Concepts such as chemical potential (electronegativity), hardness, softness and Fukui function are presented and their consequences to the understanding of chemical reactivity are discussed.

A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH

In 'An undermining diagnosis of relativism about truth', Horwich claims that the notion of relative truth is either explanatorily sterile or explanatorily superfluous. In the present paper, I argue that Horwich's explanatory demands set the bar unwarrantedly high: given the philosophical import of the theorems of a truth-theoretic semantic theory, Horwich's proposed explananda, what he calls acceptance facts, are too indirect for us to expect a complete explanation of them in terms of the deliverances of a theory of meaning based on the notion of relative truth. And, to the extent that there might be such an explanation in certain cases, there is no reason to expect relative truth to play an essential, ineliminable role, nor to endorse the claim that it should play such a role in order to be a theoretically useful notion.