Histological comparison of the alar nasal cartilages in unilateral cleft lip

Patients with unilateral cleft lip display characteristic nasal changes that are independent of the degree of deformity. Defenders of the intrinsic theory consider these deformities to be due to embryogenic alterations of the alar nasal cartilages. Those that propose the extrinsic theory defend the thesis that the deformity is due to disorganization of the perioral muscles deformed by the cleft. The purpose of this study is to contribute histological evidence to help clarify the issue. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Specimens of the lateral portion of both the healthy and the cleft side of the alar cartilages were obtained from 18 patients. These uniformly cut specimens were stained by hematoxylin and eosin. Samples from 2 patients were excluded due to imperfections. The same pathologist examined all the slides. He was unaware of the origins of the specimens; he counted the number of chondrocytes and quantified the cartilage matrixes. RESULTS: All data was analyzed statistically, and no significant statistical differences were apparent, either in the number of chondrocytes or the cartilage matrix between the healthy side and the cleft side. DISCUSSION: These results apparently support the group that defend the extrinsic theory; nevertheless, the doubt about the composition of the cartilage matrix remains, not only concerning the glycosaminoglycans that compose them, but also regarding elastin and collagen and its linkages that can cause different degrees of collagen consistency.

Truth, laws and the progress of science

In this paper I analyze the difficult question of the truth of mature scientific theories by tackling the problem of the truth of laws. After introducing the main philosophical positions in the field of scientific realism, I discuss and then counter the two main arguments against realism, namely the pessimistic meta-induction and the abstract and idealized character of scientific laws. I conclude by defending the view that well-confirmed physical theories are true only relatively to certain values of the variables that appear in the laws.

On the institution of the moral subject: on the commander and the commanded in Nietzsche's discussion of law

The article discusses how Nietzsche understands the institution of law and morals in distinction to Kant and the Christian tradition. It argues that Nietzsche to a large extent is inspired by the paradigm-shift toward a evolutionary biological thinking introduced by several of his peers in the late 19th century, among else F. A. Lange, who sees this shift as a sobering scientific-materialistic alternative to Kant. In Nietzsche, the Kantian moral imperative is replaced with a notion of a morality emerging thanks to historical, or pre-historical, civilizational processes, imposed on a feebleminded human without any inherent rational dispositions to obey Law. It is also a process, which rather than universalizing the human, splits it in a duality where one part obeys old immediate self-interests and another part obeys new 'commands,' having been shouted 'into the ear' by a so-called 'commander.' The compliance with law takes two radically different forms in Nietzsche: servile and mediocre individuals need to be exposed to discipline and punishment in order to adopt Law; while so-called 'sovereign' individuals are able to impose law upon themselves. The figure of the 'sovereign' has consequently been an issue for vigorous debate in especially the Anglo-Saxon tradition of Nietzsche research, since his apparent 'respect for law' and 'sense of duty' reiterate typical Kantian qualities. Relating to these discussions, I suggest that Nietzsche's 'sovereign' (in one context) is identical his 'commander' (in other contexts). When the 'sovereign' as such imposes law upon himself and others, his act is conventional and arbitrary (like language in Saussure), and is rather irrational than rational as in Kant. His will is not a good will, nor a rational will with a vision of human autonomy. His command of himself and others is a performative, thus without truth-value (like illocutionary speech-acts in Austin and Searle).