On the institution of the moral subject: on the commander and the commanded in Nietzsche's discussion of law

The article discusses how Nietzsche understands the institution of law and morals in distinction to Kant and the Christian tradition. It argues that Nietzsche to a large extent is inspired by the paradigm-shift toward a evolutionary biological thinking introduced by several of his peers in the late 19th century, among else F. A. Lange, who sees this shift as a sobering scientific-materialistic alternative to Kant. In Nietzsche, the Kantian moral imperative is replaced with a notion of a morality emerging thanks to historical, or pre-historical, civilizational processes, imposed on a feebleminded human without any inherent rational dispositions to obey Law. It is also a process, which rather than universalizing the human, splits it in a duality where one part obeys old immediate self-interests and another part obeys new 'commands,' having been shouted 'into the ear' by a so-called 'commander.' The compliance with law takes two radically different forms in Nietzsche: servile and mediocre individuals need to be exposed to discipline and punishment in order to adopt Law; while so-called 'sovereign' individuals are able to impose law upon themselves. The figure of the 'sovereign' has consequently been an issue for vigorous debate in especially the Anglo-Saxon tradition of Nietzsche research, since his apparent 'respect for law' and 'sense of duty' reiterate typical Kantian qualities. Relating to these discussions, I suggest that Nietzsche's 'sovereign' (in one context) is identical his 'commander' (in other contexts). When the 'sovereign' as such imposes law upon himself and others, his act is conventional and arbitrary (like language in Saussure), and is rather irrational than rational as in Kant. His will is not a good will, nor a rational will with a vision of human autonomy. His command of himself and others is a performative, thus without truth-value (like illocutionary speech-acts in Austin and Searle).

DISAGREEING OVER EVALUATIVES: PREFERENCE, NORMATIVE AND MORAL DISCOURSE

Abstract Why would we argue about taste, norms or morality when we know that these topics are relative to taste preferences, systems of norms or values to which we are committed? Yet, disagreements over these topics are common in our evaluative discourses. I will claim that the motives to discuss rely on our attitudes towards the standard held by the speakers in each domain of discourse, relating different attitudes to different motives -mainly, conviction and correction. These notions of attitudes and motives will allow me to claim that different domains of evaluative discourse have a different distribution of disagreements driven by them.

Psychometric properties of the Portuguese version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory applied to college students: factor analysis and relation to the Beck Depression Inventory

The psychometric properties of the Portuguese version of the trait form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T) and its relation to the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) were evaluated in a large Brazilian college student sample containing 845 women and 235 men. STAI-T scores tended to be higher for women, singles, those who work, and subjects under 30 years. Factor analysis of the STAI-T for total sample and by gender yielded two factors: the first representing a mood dimension and the second being related to worrying or cognitive aspects of anxiety. In order to study the relation between anxiety and depression measures, factor analysis of the combination of the 21 BDI items and the 20 STAI-T items was also carried out. The analysis resulted in two factors that were analyzed according to the tripartite model of anxiety and depression. Most of the BDI items (measuring positive affectivity and nonspecific symptoms of depression) were loaded on the first factor and four STAI-T items that measure positive affectivity. The remaining STAI-T items, all of them measuring negative affect, remained in the second factor. Thus, factor 1 represents a depression dimension and factor 2 measures a mood-worrying dimension. The findings of this study suggest that, although widely used as an anxiety scale, the STAI-T in fact measures mainly a general negative affect.