A puzzle for philosophers

In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.

Os três princípios e as doenças: a visão de dois filósofos químicos

Paracelsus (1493 - 1541) developed a theory about three principles (sulphur, mercury, and salt) that would constitute matter, and whose mutual interactions within man's body could cause diseases. This paper discusses the influence of this theory on the work of two chemical philosophers. Oswald Crollius (1560 - 1609) considered that the conceptions of matter and disease were strongly related because of the macro - microcosm analogy, and classified diseases in sulphurean, mercurial and saline. On the other hand, J. B. Van Helmont (1579 - 1644) stated that sulphur, mercury, and salt were not true principles, and that every disease would have a specific origin. Instead of the principles, Van Helmont put the Archeus at the center of both his medical and matter theories.

Os primeiros desenvolvimentos do conceito helmontiano de gás: parte II

This paper focuses on the early interpretations of the concept of gas, originally created by J. B. Van Helmont (1579 ¾ 1644). Our main interest is on the ideas of English physicians and chemical philosophers of the seventeenth century. Gas was usually associated with the material cause of diseases, with the vital spirit, or with a volatile spirit produced in some kinds of material transformations. As a general trend, however, the authors who did not want to embrace the details of the medico-chemical system proposed by Van Helmont preferred to use more well-known words (such as vapours, exhalations, effluvia, odours, spirits), avoiding the use of the neologism.

Numbers and sets

In this paper I discuss the intuition behind Frege's and Russell's definitions of numbers as sets, as well as Benacerraf's criticism of it. I argue that Benacerraf's argument is not as strong as some philosophers tend to think. Moreover, I examine an alternative to the Fregean-Russellian definition of numbers proposed by Maddy, and point out some problems faced by it.

The literary arts in Hume's science of the fancy

Philosophers have long disagreed about whether poetry, drama, and other literary arts are important to philosophy; and among those who believe that they are important, explanations of that importance have differed greatly. This paper aims to explain and illustrate some of the reasons why Hume found literature to be an important topic for philosophy and philosophers. Philosophy, he holds, can help to explain general and specific literary phenomena, to ground the science of criticism, and to suggest and justify ";principles of art,"; while at the same time literature can provide valuable ";experiments"; for philosophical theorizing and provide it with a model for the science of morals and (in some ways) for philosophy itself. Moreover, the literary arts can not only help one to write better philosophy, in Hume's view; they can also help one to write philosophy better.

THE SKEPTICAL CARTESIAN BACKGROUND OF HUME'S "OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY" (FIRST INQUIRY, SECTION 12)

ABSTRACT In section XII of the First Inquiry, Hume refers to the two Hellenistic schools of skepticism (Academic and Pyrrhonian) to present his own view of skepticism, which, however, depends on the ancient skeptics mainly indirectly. Hume's view of skepticism depends crucially on Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophers such as Pascal, Huet, Foucher and Bayle, who reacted skeptically to major Cartesian doctrines but followed one version or other of Descartes's methodical doubt. Although all these post-Cartesian philosophers are relevant in section XII, I focus on the topics in which Descartes himself-besides his skeptical followers-seems directly relevant. After an introductory section (I) on Julia Annas' and Richard Popkin's views of Hume's relation to, respectively, ancient and modern skepticism, I turn to section XII and examine what Hume calls (II) "consequent skepticism about the senses," (III) "antecedent skepticism," and (IV) "Academic skepticism."

Varieties of the generality constraint

Since its introduction by Evans (1982), the generality constraint (GC) has been invoked by various philosophers for different purposes. Our purpose here is, first, to clarify what precisely the GC states by way of an interpretive framework, the GC Schema, and second, to demonstrate in terms of this framework some problems that arise if one invokes the GC (or systematicity) without clearly specifying an appropriate interpretation. By utilizing the GC Schema these sorts of problems can be avoided, and we thus propose it as a tool to facilitate argumentation that appeals to the GC.

RELIABILITY AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGERELEVANT RESPONSIBILITY

Knowledge seems to need the admixture of de facto reliability and epistemic responsibility. But philosophers have had a hard time in attempting to combine them in order to achieve a satisfactory account of knowledge. In this paper I attempt to find a solution by capitalizing on the real and ubiquitous human phenomenon that is the social dispersal of epistemic labour through time. More precisely, the central objective of the paper is to deliver a novel and plausible social account of knowledge-relevant responsibility and to consider the merits of the proposed combination of reliability and responsibility with respect to certain cases of unreflective epistemic subjects.