AU COMMENCEMENT ÉTAIT LA MÉTAPHORE: UNE INTUITION PRÉCOCE DE NIETZSCHE SUR LA PRIMAUTÉ DE LA MÉTAPHORE COMME MATRICE COGNITIVE

RÉSUMÉ Cette étude met en perspective le précédent constitué par les travaux précoces du jeune Nietzsche où ce dernier fait valoir la force structurante de la métaphore comme matrice des facultés cognitives. Nous offrons d’abord une brève esquisse des postulats et des acquis des grammaires cognitives associées aux travaux d’Eleanor Rosch, ensuite de George Lakoff et Mark Johnson, ainsi qu’à la notion d’inscription corporelle de l’esprit développée par Francesco Varela. Cet exercice sert de propédeutique à une série de lectures tangentes mobilisant divers angles d’approche appelés à faciliter noter évaluation des contributions de Nietzsche au domaine de la cognition. Les travaux examinés nous situent dans la période contemporaine de la publication de son premier grand ouvrage, La naissance de la tragédie (1872) : les notes pour le cours intitulé Présentation de la rhétorique ancienne (Darstellung der antiken Rhetorik), prononcé au semestre d’hiver 1872-1873 à l’Université de Bâle, ensuite ses Theoretische Studien, datant de l’été 1873, avec un renvoi aux développements plus tardifs dans le Gai Savoir (1882). La thèse de Nietzsche peut être résumée comme suit : tous les éléments de l’appareil catégorial et du régime conceptuel à l’aide desquels nous appréhendons la réalité, a fortiori la notion de vérité qui en est le garant, sont le « précipité » ou le résidu d’un faisceau de métaphores qui constituent la force structurante des facultés cognitives. Si chez Kant nous n’avons accès qu’aux phénomènes et non au noumène, chez Nietzsche nous n’avons affaire qu’à des perspectives ou des points de vues alors que la réalité nous est monnayée sous forme de vérités qui sont des fictions ou des métaphores usées. Il ressort de cet examen que le tropisme endogène de la langue constitue une force majeure dans l’implémentation d’une conceptualité qui a la vertu d’oblitérer sa préhistoire et de se ménager un statut qui est incessamment implosé par le reflux de l’imagination créatrice nourrie par la force métaphorique qui répond à une impulsion foncière que Nietzsche associe à une « force artiste » (Kunstkraft) qui tend à démultiplier les perspectives dont la généalogie se conjugue à l’exponentiel.

Faux Pas Test in schizophrenic patients

ABSTRACT Objective The aim of this study is to validate the adult version of “Faux Pas Recognition Test” created by Stone and colleagues (1998) as a reliable instrument assess and discriminate social cognition among schizophrenia patients and healthy controls. Methods This is a cross-sectional study with a total of 196 participants (mean age = 26.45; CI (95%) [25.10; 27.83]) 51% male. From those, 44 (22.4%) patients with schizophrenia and 152 (77.6%) healthy controls. The participants answered a short version of the Faux Pas Recognition Test, composed by 10 stories. Results Significant differences were found between both groups regarding their scores on Faux Pas Recognition Test (p = 0.003). Patients with schizophrenia had lower score, compared to healthy controls. Story 14 was the best to distinguish both groups, and Story 16, the worst. Among the questions of Faux Pas stories, the one related to intuition presented the most significant difference between the groups (p = 0.001), followed by the one related to understanding (p = 0.003). Conclusion The Brazilian version of the Faux Pas Recognition Test is a valid test to assess social cognition in schizophrenia and can be an important instrument to be used on the clinical practice.

Numbers and sets

In this paper I discuss the intuition behind Frege's and Russell's definitions of numbers as sets, as well as Benacerraf's criticism of it. I argue that Benacerraf's argument is not as strong as some philosophers tend to think. Moreover, I examine an alternative to the Fregean-Russellian definition of numbers proposed by Maddy, and point out some problems faced by it.

BRUNO BAUCH AND THE COMPREHENSIBILITY OF NATURE

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to discuss how Bruno Bauch deals with the problem of the coordination between empirical concepts and spatiotemporal objects. We shall argue that Bauch reformulates the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions by means of a philosophical consideration of differential calculus and that he thereby explains the possibility of such coordination, avoiding certain difficulties of the Kantian doctrine.

HILBERT BETWEEN THE FORMAL AND THE INFORMAL SIDE OF MATHEMATICS

Abstract: In this article we analyze the key concept of Hilbert's axiomatic method, namely that of axiom. We will find two different concepts: the first one from the period of Hilbert's foundation of geometry and the second one at the time of the development of his proof theory. Both conceptions are linked to two different notions of intuition and show how Hilbert's ideas are far from a purely formalist conception of mathematics. The principal thesis of this article is that one of the main problems that Hilbert encountered in his foundational studies consisted in securing a link between formalization and intuition. We will also analyze a related problem, that we will call "Frege's Problem", form the time of the foundation of geometry and investigate the role of the Axiom of Completeness in its solution.

An MD-PhD program in Brazil: students’ concepts of science and of common sense

In 1995, a pioneering MD-PhD program was initiated in Brazil for the training of medical scientists in experimental sciences at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. The program’s aim was achieved with respect to publication of theses in the form of papers with international visibility and also in terms of fostering the scientific careers of the graduates. The expansion of this type of program is one of the strategies for improving the preparation of biomedical researchers in Brazil. A noteworthy absence of interest in carrying out clinical research limits the ability of young Brazilian physicians to solve biomedical problems. To understand the students’ views of science, we used qualitative and quantitative triangulation methods, as well as participant observation to evaluate the students’ concepts of science and common sense. Subjective aspects were clearly less evident in their concepts of science. There was a strong concern about "methodology", "truth" and "usefulness". "Intuition", "creativity" and "curiosity" were the least mentioned thematic categories. Students recognized the value of intuition when it appeared as an explicit option but they did not refer to it spontaneously. Common sense was associated with "consensus", "opinion" and ideas that "require scientific validation". Such observations indicate that MD-PhD students share with their senior academic colleagues the same reluctance to consider common sense as a valid adjunct for the solution of scientific problems. Overcoming this difficulty may be an important step toward stimulating the interest of physicians in pursuing experimental research.

Of empty thoughts and blind intuitions Kant's answer to McDowell

This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell's neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden.2 The focus is on Kant's twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions to conceptual determination is not due some pre-existing, absolute conceptuality of the real but to the "work of the subject."3 On a more programmatic level, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a selective appropriation of Kant and the philosophical potential of a more comprehensive and thorough consideration of his work. Section 1 addresses the unique balance in Kant's philosophy between the work on particular problems and the orientation toward a systematic whole. Section 2 outlines McDowell's take on the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept in the context of the Kant readings by Sellars and Strawson. Section 3 exposes McDowell's relapse into the Myth of the Given. Section 4 proposes a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy as an epistemology of metaphysical cognition. Section 5 details Kant's original account of sensible intuition in the Inaugural-Dissertation of 1770. Section 6 presents the transition from the manifold of the senses to the synthesis in the imagination and the unification through the categories in the Critique of pure reason (1781 and 1787). Section 7 addresses Kant's formalism in epistemology and metaphysics.