The study of public administration in India, the Philippines, Canada and Australia: the universal struggle against epistemic colonization, and toward critical assimilation

The study of public administration has been characterized as a strong international focus, as both governments and scholars have sought to learn from the experience of other societies. While in a perfect world, one would expect a sort of pragmatic universalism, instead, many scholars tend to bring lessons from one country, or from a single cultural reality. This modest contribution lies in showing a series of national experiences rarely brought to the discourse about public administration in Brazil: Canada, Australia, India and the Philippines. Special emphasis will be given to the following: the origins and the development of public administration; the influence of ideology; and the complex tension between global theory and local practices.

Consistency from the perspective of an experimental systems approach to the sciences and their epistemic objects

It is generally accepted that the development of the modern sciences is rooted in experiment. Yet for a long time, experimentation did not occupy a prominent role, neither in philosophy nor in history of science. With the 'practical turn' in studying the sciences and their history, this has begun to change. This paper is concerned with systems and cultures of experimentation and the consistencies that are generated within such systems and cultures. The first part of the paper exposes the forms of historical and structural coherence that characterize the experimental exploration of epistemic objects. In the second part, a particular experimental culture in the life sciences is briefly described as an example. A survey will be given of what it means and what it takes to analyze biological functions in the test tube.

Book citations: influence of epidemiologic thought in the academic community

Whilst their 'death' has often been certified, books remain highly important to most professions and academic disciplines. Analyses of citations received by epidemiologic texts may complement other views on epidemiology. The objective was to assess the number of citations received by some books of epidemiology and public health, as a first step towards studying the influence of epidemiological thought and thinking in academia. For this purpose, Institute for Scientific Information/ Thomson Scientific - Web of Science/ Web of Knowledgedatabase was consulted, in May 2006. The book by Rothman & Greenland appeared to have received the highest number of citations overall (over 8,000) and per year. The books by Kleinbaum et al, and by Breslow & Day received around 5,000 citations. In terms of citations per year the book by Sackett et al ranks 3rd, and the one by Rose, 4th of those included in this preliminary study. Other books which were influential in the classrooms collected comparatively less citations. Results offer a rich picture of the academic influences and trends of epidemiologic methods and reasoning on public health, clinical medicine and the other health, life and social sciences. They may contribute to assess epidemiologists' efforts to demarcate epidemiology and to assert epistemic authority, and to analyze some historical influences of economic, social and political forces on epidemiological research.

CASOS INVESTIGATIVOS E A RELAÇÃO COM O SABER: TRAJETÓRIA E PROCESSO DE APRENDIZAGEM DE ESTUDANTES DO ENSINO SUPERIOR NO TOCANTINS

In light of the theory of relationship with know of Bernard Charlot, aiming to understand the unique stories of the subject through a positive lecture, i.e., understanding the reality and the way the subjects read and interpret the world, this article attempts identify how higher education students solve an investigative case and learn the scientific knowledge using this theory. For this, we used narrative as a discourse genre to collect the data of 34 students who participated in the small group activities. After content analysis, the results showed that all groups of students solve the case in a similar way and in three stages, prevailing relations with know with the world, with others and with yourself. However, even if the resolution is similar, chemical learning differs between different groups and differs between the scientific content present in the case. From these results it is possible to identify the effectiveness of learning depends on the epistemic and identity relationships with know of each subject (relationship with yourself) because to learn the student must enter into an intellectual activity (investigative case), stay on it and develop the relationships with known necessary to master the normativity (chemical language).

Love and rationality: on some possible rational effects of love

In this paper I defend the idea that rather than disrupting rationality, as the common-sense conception has done it, love may actually help us to develop rational ways of thinking and acting. I make the case for romantic or erotic love, since this is the kind of love that is more frequently associated with irrationality in acting and thinking. I argue that this kind of love may make us develop epistemic and practical forms of rationality. Based on an analysis of its characteristic action tendencies, I argue that love may help us to develop an instrumental form of rationality in determining the best means to achieve the object of love. It may also narrow down the number of practical considerations that may help us to achieve our goals. Finally, love may generate rational ways of belief-formation by framing the parameters taken into account in perception and attention, and by bringing into light only a small portion of the epistemic information available. Love may make us perceive reality more acutely.

The relativity of evaluative sentences: disagreeing over disagreement

Evaluative sentences (moral judgments, expressions of taste, epistemic modals) are relative to the speaker's standards. Lately, a phenomenon has challenged the traditional explanation of this relativity: whenever two speakers disagree over them they contradict each other without being at fault. Hence, it is thought that the correction of the assertions involved must be relative to an unprivileged standard not necessarily the speaker's. I will claim instead that so far, neither this nor any other proposal has provided an explanation of the phenomenon. I will point out several problems presented by them and I will hint to how this phenomenon could be explained by making minor adjustments to our semantic theory.

A puzzle for philosophers

In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.

Putting the horse before the cart: a pragmatist analysis of knowledge

The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have. However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse. Within a pragmatic approach, I argue that by doing away with a priori truth, namely by submitting truth to justification, and by accordingly altering the canonical analysis of knowledge, this is a fruitful definition. So fruitful indeed that it renders the Gettier counterexamples vacuous, allowing positive work in epistemology and related disciplines.

RELIABILITY AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGERELEVANT RESPONSIBILITY

Knowledge seems to need the admixture of de facto reliability and epistemic responsibility. But philosophers have had a hard time in attempting to combine them in order to achieve a satisfactory account of knowledge. In this paper I attempt to find a solution by capitalizing on the real and ubiquitous human phenomenon that is the social dispersal of epistemic labour through time. More precisely, the central objective of the paper is to deliver a novel and plausible social account of knowledge-relevant responsibility and to consider the merits of the proposed combination of reliability and responsibility with respect to certain cases of unreflective epistemic subjects.