China's proposing behavior in Global Governance: the cases of the WTO Doha Round negotiation and G-20 process

This article examines China's proposals on the reform of global governance, and discusses the main features of China's proposing behavior in the cases of the WTO Doha Round negotiation and G-20 Process. The main findings are: (1) in the critical junctures of global governance reform, China engaged the reform of the global governance institutions proactively, and put forward a series of reform proposals; (2) in proposing behavior, China argued the global governance institutions should be properly adjusted without intention to change the basic principles, refrained from playing a leadership role while proposing jointly with other countries, and upheld the principled idea of pro-development.

Opportunities and constraints in schistosomiasis vaccine development: infection characteristics and industry realities

The notes provided in this article relate to two components of the development of vaccines against schistosomiasis: (1) The characteristics of schistosome infections (eg. features of the schistosome life cycle), and the parasite itself, that have implications for vaccination strategies; (2) The characteristics of the biopharmaceutical industry that have implications for product development. As will be seen, these two topic areas are not vastly disparate.

Compositional Constraints in the Extremely GC-poor Genome of Plasmodium falciparum

We have analyzed the compositional properties of coding (protein encoding) and non-coding sequences of Plasmodium falciparum, a unicellular parasite characterized by an extremely AT-rich genome. GC% levels, base and dinucleotide frequencies were studied. We found that among the various factors that contribute to the properties of the sequences analyzed, the most relevant are the compositional constraints which operate on the whole genome

The theory of constraints in manufacturing

In this paper, a systematic and quantitative view is presented for the application of the theory of constraints in manufacturing. This is done employing the operational research technique of mathematical programming. The potential of the theory of constraints in automated manufacturing is demonstrated.

MHC-restricted antigen presentation and recognition: constraints on gene, recombinant and peptide vaccines in humans

The target of any immunization is to activate and expand lymphocyte clones with the desired recognition specificity and the necessary effector functions. In gene, recombinant and peptide vaccines, the immunogen is a single protein or a small assembly of epitopes from antigenic proteins. Since most immune responses against protein and peptide antigens are T-cell dependent, the molecular target of such vaccines is to generate at least 50-100 complexes between MHC molecule and the antigenic peptide per antigen-presenting cell, sensitizing a T cell population of appropriate clonal size and effector characteristics. Thus, the immunobiology of antigen recognition by T cells must be taken into account when designing new generation peptide- or gene-based vaccines. Since T cell recognition is MHC-restricted, and given the wide polymorphism of the different MHC molecules, distinct epitopes may be recognized by different individuals in the population. Therefore, the issue of whether immunization will be effective in inducing a protective immune response, covering the entire target population, becomes an important question. Many pathogens have evolved molecular mechanisms to escape recognition by the immune system by variation of antigenic protein sequences. In this short review, we will discuss the several concepts related to selection of amino acid sequences to be included in DNA and peptide vaccines.

Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage; and the Stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case.