Reelection incentives and political budget cycle: evidence from Brazil

This article tests the presence of political budget cycle (PBC) in municipal elections in Brazil and checks whether mayors who adopt such policy have greater probability of reelection. Based on fiscal and electoral data of 5,406 Brazilian municipalities and applying the difference-in-differences econometric method as well as logistic regressions, the results provide some evidence of PBC in Brazil, although its magnitude and consistency varies depending on the years used as electoral and non-electoral years. On average, reelectable mayors spend close to 3% more in election years than nonreelectables. Moreover, reelectables who do run for reelection present a variation in spending which is close to 5% superior to that of non-reelectables and non-runners. Additionally, the results suggest that mayors who increase public spending during electoral periods have greater chances of being reelected, as long as such spending is done within deficit limits acceptable by voters.

Budget impact from the incorporation of positron emission tomography – computed tomography for staging lung cancers

OBJECTIVE To estimate the budget impact from the incorporation of positron emission tomography (PET) in mediastinal and distant staging of non-small cell lung cancer.METHODS The estimates were calculated by the epidemiological method for years 2014 to 2018. Nation-wide data were used about the incidence; data on distribution of the disease´s prevalence and on the technologies’ accuracy were from the literature; data regarding involved costs were taken from a micro-costing study and from Brazilian Unified Health System (SUS) database. Two strategies for using PET were analyzed: the offer to all newly-diagnosed patients, and the restricted offer to the ones who had negative results in previous computed tomography (CT) exams. Univariate and extreme scenarios sensitivity analyses were conducted to evaluate the influence from sources of uncertainties in the parameters used.RESULTS The incorporation of PET-CT in SUS would imply the need for additional resources of 158.1 BRL (98.2 USD) million for the restricted offer and 202.7 BRL (125.9 USD) million for the inclusive offer in five years, with a difference of 44.6 BRL (27.7 USD) million between the two offer strategies within that period. In absolute terms, the total budget impact from its incorporation in SUS, in five years, would be 555 BRL (345 USD) and 600 BRL (372.8 USD) million, respectively. The costs from the PET-CT procedure were the most influential parameter in the results. In the most optimistic scenario, the additional budget impact would be reduced to 86.9 BRL (54 USD) and 103.8 BRL (64.5 USD) million, considering PET-CT for negative CT and PET-CT for all, respectively.CONCLUSIONS The incorporation of PET in the clinical staging of non-small cell lung cancer seems to be financially feasible considering the high budget of the Brazilian Ministry of Health. The potential reduction in the number of unnecessary surgeries may cause the available resources to be more efficiently allocated.

Partial budget analysis of prepartum antimicrobial therapy and Escherichia coli J5 vaccination of dairy heifers and their effect on milk production and milk quality parameters

Abstract: This study aimed to determine whether prepartum antimicrobial and/or Escherichia coli J5 vaccination in dairy heifers influence the milk production, milk quality, and estimate their economic benefit. Thus, 33 dairy heifers were enrolled in four groups using a split-splot design. Groups were: (G1) prepartum antimicrobial infusion and vaccination with an E. coli J5 bacterin, (G2) prepartum antimicrobial infusion, (G3) vaccination with an E. coli J5 bacterin, and (G4) control heifers. Composite milk samples for somatic cell count, total bacteria count and milk composition were collected 15 days after calving and every 15 days until the end of the experiment. Bacteriological analysis was carried out at the end of study. The milk production and the incidence of clinical cases of mastitis, as well as the costs associated with them were recorded. The results demonstrate a reduction on clinical mastitis rates by preventive strategies, which implicated in lower volume of discarded milk (0.99, 1.01, 1.04 and 3.98% for G1, G2, G3 and G4, respectively) and higher economic benefit. Thus, in well-managed dairy herds the prevention of heifer mastitis by vaccination or antimicrobial therapy can reduce the amount of antimicrobials needed to treat clinical mastitis cases and the days of discarded milk.

Why budget accountability fails? The elusive links between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of the budget

ABSTRACTParliaments and audit agencies have critical and complementary roles in the oversight of the budget and the enforcement of government accountability. Yet, the nexus between parliaments and audit agencies is one of the weakest links in the accountability chain, generating an accountability gap in the budget process. This articles analyses the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of government finances during the latter stages of the budget process. Using proxies to evaluate the quality of those linkages, such as the follow-up to audit findings and the discharge of government, it shows important dysfunctions in the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies due to a combination of technical capacity constraints and political economy disincentives. It suggests that the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances in public budgeting critically hinges on the agility of the linkages between accountability institutions. As such, the failure of budget accountability is due to systemic dysfunctions in the systems of accountability, rather than the failure of an individual accountability institution acting in isolation. In addition, the effectiveness of the horizontal accountability architecture depends on the political economy incentives shaping the budget process, which are generated by the interactions between the choice of institutional design and budget rules, with the degree of political competition and electoral rules.