Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America

This article addresses the consequences of economic sanctions for the protection of human rights in Latin America. The literature on sanctions and compliance informs three hypotheses, which investigate the relationship between sanctions and the level of rights protection in two groups of countries: those that were targeted by sanctions and those that were not. Using data from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and from Freedom House, I find empirical evidence that sanctions do improve the level of protection in countries that were not targeted. This finding can be explained by the deterrent effect attributed to sanctions by the compliance literature, broadly interpreted. The presence of economic sanctions in a given year increases the probability of observing better human rights practices by almost 50%. These results hold for the 12 Latin American countries that were not subject to economic sanctions for the period 1976-2004.

Helmet use among motorcyclists: observational study in the city of Mar del Plata, Argentina

The objective of the study was to assess the use of helmets in a community where helmet use is mandatory but low as there is no police enforcement. A sample comprising 451 motorcyclists in the city of Mar del Plata, Argentina, was studied in 2006. The following variables were studied: gender, type of motorcycle, weather conditions, time of the day, city area and type of road where motorcyclists traveled. Data were analyzed through a multiple logistic regression model. An overall 40% prevalence (95% CI: 35.5;44.5) of helmet use was found. Higher rates of helmet use were seen among women, and under unfavorable weather conditions, lower rates were found in the city outskirts, and variable use was seen according to the type of motorcycle. There is a need to improve law enforcement and to promote education of motorcyclists.

Consumption of alcoholic beverages, driving vehicles, a balance of dry law, Brazil 2007-2013

The study analyzes the trend in frequency of adults who drive under the influence of alcohol in major Brazilian cities after the passing of laws, which prohibit drunk driving. Data from the Surveillance System for Risk and Protective Factors for Chronic Diseases by Telephone Survey (VIGITEL) between 2007 and 2013 were analyzed. The frequency of adults who drove after abusive alcohol consumption was reduced by 45.0% during this period (2.0% in 2007 to 1.1% in 2013). Between 2007 and 2008 (-0.5%) and between 2012 and 2013 (-0.5%), significant reductions were observed in the years immediately after the publication of these laws that prohibit drunk driving. These improvements towards the control of drunk driving show a change in the Brazilian population’s lifestyle.

Prevention of transfusional Trypanosoma cruzi infection in Latin America

Trypanosoma cruzi is a protozoan infection widely spread in Latin America, from Mexico in the north to Argentina and Chile in the south. The second most important way of acquiring the infection is by blood transfusion. Even if most countries of Latin America have law/decree/norms, that make mandatory the screening of blood donors for infectious diseases, including T. cruzi (El Salvador and Nicaragua do not have laws on the subject), there is usually no enforcement or it is very lax. Analysis of published serologic surveys of T. cruzi antibodies in blood donors done in 1993, indicating the number of donors and screening coverage for T. cruzi in ten countries of Central and South America indicated that the probability of receiving a potentially infected transfusion unit in each country varied from 1,096 per 10,000 transfusions in Bolivia, the highest, to 13.02 or 13.86 per 10,000 transfusions in Honduras and Venezuela respectively, where screening coverage was 100%. On the other hand the probability of transmitting a T. cruzi infected unit was 219/10,000 in Bolivia, 24/10,000 in Colombia, 17/10,000 in El Salvador, and around 2-12/10,000 for the seven other countries. Infectivity risks defined as the likelihood of being infected when receiving an infected transfusion unit were assumed to be 20% for T. cruzi. Based on this, estimates of the absolute number of infections induced by transfusion indicated that they were 832, 236, and 875 in Bolivia, Chile and Colombia respectively. In all the other countries varied from seven in Honduras to 85 in El Salvador. Since 1993, the situation has improved. At that time only Honduras and Venezuela screened 100% of donors, while seven countries, Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, did the same in 1996. In Central America, without information from Guatemala, the screening of donors for T. cruzi prevented the transfusion of 1,481 infected units and the potential infection of 300 individuals in 1996. In the same year, in seven countries of South America, the screening prevented the transfusion of 36,017 infected units and 7, 201 potential cases of transfusional infection.

Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector

ABSTRACT We propose a model to explain how contract terms are selected in the presence of a form of economic power: contract power. The orange juice sector is used to illustrate an analysis that demonstrates the effects of contract power on the economic organization of the sector. We define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps or failures of contractual provisions, which are strategically left incomplete. Empirical evidence from content analysis of antitrust documents supports the logic of contract power in the orange juice sector in three forms: avoiding changes to payment methods from weight to solid contents (quality); using information asymmetries to manipulate indexes that calculate the formula of orange prices; and deliberately harvesting oranges late in order to dehydrate the fruit, which consequently reduces weight and price. The paper contributes to understanding the selection of contract terms and the debate about how antitrust offices can deal with this issue.

Credibility, rules and power in the European Union institutions: a transactional analysis of the "Stability and Growth pact"

The credibility of the rules and the elements of power constitute fundamental keys in the analysis of the political institutions. This paper opens the "black box" of the European Union institutions and analyses the problem of credibility in the commitment of the Stability and Growth pact (SGP). This Pact (SGP) constituted a formal rule that tried to enforce budgetary discipline on the European States. Compliance with this contract could be ensured by the existence of "third party enforcement" or by the coincidence of the ex-ante and ex-post interests of the States (reputational capital). The fact is that states such as France or Germany failed to comply with the ruling and managed to avoid the application of sanctions. This article studies the transactions and the hierarchy of power that exists in the European institutions, and analyses the institutional framework included in the new European Constitution.

Knowledge governance, innovation and development

This paper aims to be a very preliminary effort to contribute to a better understanding of the interaction among innovation, competition and intellectual property policies from an evolutionary-developmental perspective. As such, it seeks to build a more coherent framework within which the discussions of both institution building and policy design for development can proceed. In order to accomplish that, the paper introduces the concept of "Knowledge Governance" as an alternative analytical and policy-oriented approach, and suggests that from a public policy/public interest perspective, and within an evolutionary framework, it is a better way to address the problems concerning the production, appropriability and diffusion of knowledge. In doing so, it also intends contribute to broaden the ongoing discussions on the "New Developmentalism".

Why budget accountability fails? The elusive links between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of the budget

ABSTRACTParliaments and audit agencies have critical and complementary roles in the oversight of the budget and the enforcement of government accountability. Yet, the nexus between parliaments and audit agencies is one of the weakest links in the accountability chain, generating an accountability gap in the budget process. This articles analyses the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of government finances during the latter stages of the budget process. Using proxies to evaluate the quality of those linkages, such as the follow-up to audit findings and the discharge of government, it shows important dysfunctions in the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies due to a combination of technical capacity constraints and political economy disincentives. It suggests that the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances in public budgeting critically hinges on the agility of the linkages between accountability institutions. As such, the failure of budget accountability is due to systemic dysfunctions in the systems of accountability, rather than the failure of an individual accountability institution acting in isolation. In addition, the effectiveness of the horizontal accountability architecture depends on the political economy incentives shaping the budget process, which are generated by the interactions between the choice of institutional design and budget rules, with the degree of political competition and electoral rules.