Bilateral repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation for treatment-resistant depression: a systematic review and meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials

There has been concern regarding the use of controversial paradigms for repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to manage treatment-resistant depression (TRD). This meta-analysis assessed the efficacy of bilateral rTMS compared with unilateral and sham rTMS in patients with TRD. PubMed, Embase, CENTRAL, PsycINFO, Web of Science, EAGLE and NTIS databases were searched to identify relevant studies, and randomized controlled trials (RCTs) on bilateral rTMS for TRD patients were included. The response was defined as the primary outcome, and remission was the secondary outcome. Ten RCTs that included 634 patients met the eligibility criteria. The risk ratio (RRs) of both the primary and secondary outcomes of bilateral rTMS showed non-significant increases compared to unilateral rTMS (RR=1.01, P=0.93; odds ratio [OR]=0.77, P=0.22). Notably, the RR of the primary bilateral rTMS outcome was significantly increased compared to that for sham rTMS (RR=3.43, P=0.0004). The results of our analysis demonstrated that bilateral rTMS was significantly more effective than sham rTMS but not unilateral rTMS in patients with TRD. Thus, bilateral rTMS may not be a useful paradigm for patients with TRD.

Of empty thoughts and blind intuitions Kant's answer to McDowell

This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell's neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden.2 The focus is on Kant's twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions to conceptual determination is not due some pre-existing, absolute conceptuality of the real but to the "work of the subject."3 On a more programmatic level, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a selective appropriation of Kant and the philosophical potential of a more comprehensive and thorough consideration of his work. Section 1 addresses the unique balance in Kant's philosophy between the work on particular problems and the orientation toward a systematic whole. Section 2 outlines McDowell's take on the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept in the context of the Kant readings by Sellars and Strawson. Section 3 exposes McDowell's relapse into the Myth of the Given. Section 4 proposes a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy as an epistemology of metaphysical cognition. Section 5 details Kant's original account of sensible intuition in the Inaugural-Dissertation of 1770. Section 6 presents the transition from the manifold of the senses to the synthesis in the imagination and the unification through the categories in the Critique of pure reason (1781 and 1787). Section 7 addresses Kant's formalism in epistemology and metaphysics.