Direct effects of soybean seed vigor on weed competition

Seed vigor is one of the factors that determines the speed and uniformity of seedling emergence and initial plant growth, which are crucial aspects in the competition against weeds. The objective of this study was to verify the direct effects of soybean seed vigor on weed competition and grain yield. A field experiment was conducted with three seed lots of the "Conquista" cultivar, previously characterized by physiological tests as having high, intermediate and low vigor. The experiment was divided into weeded and unweeded plots with six treatments. Crop plant height, weed dry mass accumulation and crop grain yield data were recorded. Seed vigor did not affect plant height and grain yield. Plants which developed from seeds with high and intermediate vigor showed the best results for competition against weeds, reducing weed dry mass accumulation. Plants which developed from high vigor seeds give the best results for grain yield for both weeded and unweeded treatments.

Innovation, competition and financial vulnerability in economic development

The financial sector has been viewed traditionally as either providing the "oil" for the "wheels of commerce" or as a parasite on the real sector of the economy where real productivity gains provide for increasing real wages and per capita incomes. The present paper takes a different route and attempts to an analysis of financial institutions on a par with the production sector of the economy. It also develops a link which amalgamates "the knowledge-based" perspective on firms' operations with Schumpeterian financial leverage to exploit productivity enhancing innovations, and Minsky's tendency towards financial fragility. The analysis also leads to some policy recommendations concerning financial regulation, risk management and financial institution's building.

Inter-jurisdictional fiscal competition: a review of the literature and policy recommendations

This paper surveys the literature on fiscal competition. We consider tax and expenditure competition in a more general set up where different jurisdictions within a federation may compete in the provision of public goods in order to attract some residents (Tiebout, 1956) and expel others (Brueckner, 1999); and/or for business. We address the vast literature on welfare gains or losses of these types of competition. Then, we discuss the empirical evidence, focusing on estimates of the sensitiveness of production factors to tax differentials and on the importance of the strategic interdependence among jurisdictions. We combine econometric studies with some case studies. Last we discuss the design of mechanisms to cope with fiscal competition, especially under a more global environment where factors become more mobile.

Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage; and the Stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case.

The political role of the State in Cambridge theories of growth and distribution

In this paper we extend Kaldor’s Neo-Pasinetti theorem to the scope of budgetary interventions based on political orientations. First, we take into account a system of taxes and expenditures. Second, we introduce different reaction functions for public spending showing the political role of the State in Cambridge theory of distribution. It turns out that the validity of Kaldorian results depends on the political orientation adopted by government, which diminishes the range of application of the Neo-Pasinetti theorem.

Globalization, nation-state and catching up

Globalization and nation-states are not in contradiction, since globalization is the present stage of capitalist development, and the nation-state is the territorial political unit that organizes the space and population in the capitalist system. Since the 1980s, Global Capitalism constitutes the economic system characterized by the opening of all national markets and a fierce competition between nation-states. Developing countries tend to catch up, while rich countries try to neutralize such competitive effort, using globalism as an ideology, and conventional orthodoxy as a strategy. Middle-income countries that are catching up in the realm of globalization are the ones that count with a national development strategy. This is broadly the case of the dynamic Asian countries. In contrast, Latin American countries have no longer their own strategy, and grow less. To add data to the argument, the author conducts an econometric test comparing these two groups of countries, and three variables: the rate of investment, the current account deficit or surplus that would indicate or not a competitive exchange rate, and public deficit.

Education and development projects in Brazil (1932-2004): political economy perspective

This paper discusses the long-run history of education policies in Brazil. It is suggested that the main reason for the educational backwardness was the existence of strong political interests over education. It is also defended that these interests can be empirically observed in the allocation of public resources between the different levels of education, with political choices favouring specific groups in society. It was not a matter of lack of investment in education, but of inadequate allocation of resources. This pattern of political-based policies created a strong negative path dependence of misallocation of resources in education in Brazil, particularly with significant underinvestment in secondary education.

A Critical Analysis of the Philosophical-Political Element of the Master-Slave Dialectic

ABSTRACT:The section “Lordship and Bondage” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit offers us, through the criticism of slavery, some indications regarding Hegel’s conception of human nature. In this paper some consequences of this conception for Hegel’s political philosophy are identified and presented. The analysis shows problems may emerge when we analyze some fundamental Hegelian concepts – “recognition” and shows that some “men” – if we take into consideration the way these concepts were defined in the master-slave dialectic. In light of these problems it is pointed out that Hegel’s political philosophy, and also his position regarding slavery, become less cogent and more susceptible to criticism. The last part of the text analyzes some consequences of problems related to the possibility of defining the concepts “recognition” and “men” in terms of Hegel’s model of state.