Optimization of the HS-SPME-GC/MS technique for determining volatile compounds in red wines made from Isabel grapes (Vitis labrusca)

Abstract Brazilian wine production is characterized by Vitis labrusca grape varieties, especially the economically important Isabel cultivar, with over 80% of its production destined for table wine production. The objective of this study was to optimize and validate the conditions for extracting volatile compounds from wine with the solid-phase microextraction technique, using the response surface method. Based on the response surface analysis, it can be concluded that the central point values maximize the process of extracting volatile compounds from wine, i.e., an equilibrium time of 15 minutes, an extraction time of 35 minutes, and an extraction temperature of 30 °C. Esters were the most numerous compounds found under these extraction conditions, indicating that wines made from Isabel cultivar grapes are characterized by compounds that confer a fruity aroma; this finding corroborates the scientific literature.

Coping with globalization: Asian versus Latin American strategies of development, 1980-2010

When compared to Latin America, Asian economies since 1980 have grown faster and have done so with relatively modest inequalities. Why? A comparison of Asia and Latin America underlines the superiority of the nationalist capitalist model of development, which has often been pursued more explicitly in Asia, over that of a dependent capitalist model, which has often been pursued in Latin America. In comparison to Latin America, the Asian model has facilitated higher and less volatile rates of economic growth and a greater political room to pursue social democratic policies. The "tap root" of these alternate pathways is relative autonomy from global constraints: states and economies in Asia have been more nationalist and autonomous than in Latin America.

Why budget accountability fails? The elusive links between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of the budget

ABSTRACTParliaments and audit agencies have critical and complementary roles in the oversight of the budget and the enforcement of government accountability. Yet, the nexus between parliaments and audit agencies is one of the weakest links in the accountability chain, generating an accountability gap in the budget process. This articles analyses the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of government finances during the latter stages of the budget process. Using proxies to evaluate the quality of those linkages, such as the follow-up to audit findings and the discharge of government, it shows important dysfunctions in the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies due to a combination of technical capacity constraints and political economy disincentives. It suggests that the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances in public budgeting critically hinges on the agility of the linkages between accountability institutions. As such, the failure of budget accountability is due to systemic dysfunctions in the systems of accountability, rather than the failure of an individual accountability institution acting in isolation. In addition, the effectiveness of the horizontal accountability architecture depends on the political economy incentives shaping the budget process, which are generated by the interactions between the choice of institutional design and budget rules, with the degree of political competition and electoral rules.