The growing competition in Brazilian science: rites of passage, stress and burnout

Brazil's scientific community is under pressure. Each year there is an increase in its contribution to international science and in the number of students who are trained to do research and teach at an advanced level. Most of these activities are carried out in state and federal universities, but with government funding that has decreased by more than 70% since 1996. Interviews with graduate students, post-doctoral fellows and professors in one university department with a strong research tradition illustrate the level of stress engendered by the conflict between increasing competition and diminishing resources, and serve to underscore the negative effects on creativity and on the tendency to choose science as a career.

Effect of naloxone on food competition aggression in food-restricted high and low aggression pigeons (Columba livia)

We determined the effect of the opiate receptor antagonist naloxone on aggression, emotion, feeder control, and eating behavior in high and low aggression female pigeons maintained at 80% of their normal weight and exposed to food competition interactions. Pigeons were divided into pairs by previously ranked high aggression (total time spent in offensive aggression exceeding 60 s/5 min; N = 6 pairs) and low aggression females (time spent in offensive aggression less than 10 s/5 min; N = 6 pairs). A pigeon in each pair received an sc dose of naloxone (1 mg kg-1 ml saline-1) and the other animal received the vehicle. Trials (10 min) were performed 30 min after the naloxone/vehicle administration. The naloxone group of high aggression pigeons showed lower scores of total time spent in offensive aggression (control: 98.6 ± 12.0; naloxone: 46.8 ± 6.6 s; P < 0.05) and higher scores of time spent in emotional responses (control: 3.5 ± 0.6; naloxone: 10.8 ± 2.4 s; P < 0.05) than controls. The other behaviors scored, feeder control and eating behavior, were not affected in this group. The naloxone group of low aggression pigeons, however, showed higher scores of offensive aggression than their controls (5.3 ± 1.3; naloxone: 28.7 ± 8.0 s; P < 0.05). The present results suggest that opiate receptor mechanisms are implicated in offensive aggression responses in high and low aggression pigeons. However, as reported for brain 5-hydroxytryptamine manipulation and GABA-A-benzodiazepine receptor manipulation, the effect of the opiate receptor antagonist on food competition aggression in pigeons was related to their pretreatment level of aggression.

Effects of sodium valproate and carbamazepine on food competition aggression in pigeons

Valproate and carbamazepine (CAR) have been proposed as adjunct alternatives for the control of aggression in psychiatric patients, although no definite conclusions have been reached. We examined the effects of these drugs on food competition offensive aggression and other behaviors in high- and low-aggression food-restricted pigeons. These were divided into pairs containing previously ranked high-aggression (N = 10 pairs) and low-aggression females (N = 10 pairs). In Experiment 1, a pigeon in each pair of high- and low-aggression subjects was treated daily with an oral dose of sodium valproate (50 mg kg-1 mL saline-1) for 15 days. The other animal received the vehicle. On days 1, 7, and 15, food competition trials (10 min) were performed 60 min after treatment. In Experiment 2, one pigeon in each pair was treated daily with an oral dose of CAR (20 mg kg-1 mL saline-1) for 15 days. Each pair was submitted to a food competition trial on days 1, 7, and 15 of treatment. Valproate (15 days of treatment) selectively decreased the time spent in offensive aggression (control: 102.7 ± 9.3 vs valproate: 32.7 ± 9.2 s; P < 0.001, ANOVA-2-TAU) of high-aggression pigeons. This was also the case for 7 and 15 days of CAR treatment (control: 131.5 ± 8.9 vs CAR: 60.4 ± 5.3, P < 0.01, and control: 122.7 ± 7.1 vs CAR: 39.1 ± 5.2; P < 0.001, ANOVA-2-TAU, respectively). Thus, the two anticonvulsive drugs have a similar effect on food competition aggression in pigeons.

Direct effects of soybean seed vigor on weed competition

Seed vigor is one of the factors that determines the speed and uniformity of seedling emergence and initial plant growth, which are crucial aspects in the competition against weeds. The objective of this study was to verify the direct effects of soybean seed vigor on weed competition and grain yield. A field experiment was conducted with three seed lots of the "Conquista" cultivar, previously characterized by physiological tests as having high, intermediate and low vigor. The experiment was divided into weeded and unweeded plots with six treatments. Crop plant height, weed dry mass accumulation and crop grain yield data were recorded. Seed vigor did not affect plant height and grain yield. Plants which developed from seeds with high and intermediate vigor showed the best results for competition against weeds, reducing weed dry mass accumulation. Plants which developed from high vigor seeds give the best results for grain yield for both weeded and unweeded treatments.

Innovation, competition and financial vulnerability in economic development

The financial sector has been viewed traditionally as either providing the "oil" for the "wheels of commerce" or as a parasite on the real sector of the economy where real productivity gains provide for increasing real wages and per capita incomes. The present paper takes a different route and attempts to an analysis of financial institutions on a par with the production sector of the economy. It also develops a link which amalgamates "the knowledge-based" perspective on firms' operations with Schumpeterian financial leverage to exploit productivity enhancing innovations, and Minsky's tendency towards financial fragility. The analysis also leads to some policy recommendations concerning financial regulation, risk management and financial institution's building.

Inter-jurisdictional fiscal competition: a review of the literature and policy recommendations

This paper surveys the literature on fiscal competition. We consider tax and expenditure competition in a more general set up where different jurisdictions within a federation may compete in the provision of public goods in order to attract some residents (Tiebout, 1956) and expel others (Brueckner, 1999); and/or for business. We address the vast literature on welfare gains or losses of these types of competition. Then, we discuss the empirical evidence, focusing on estimates of the sensitiveness of production factors to tax differentials and on the importance of the strategic interdependence among jurisdictions. We combine econometric studies with some case studies. Last we discuss the design of mechanisms to cope with fiscal competition, especially under a more global environment where factors become more mobile.

Why budget accountability fails? The elusive links between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of the budget

ABSTRACTParliaments and audit agencies have critical and complementary roles in the oversight of the budget and the enforcement of government accountability. Yet, the nexus between parliaments and audit agencies is one of the weakest links in the accountability chain, generating an accountability gap in the budget process. This articles analyses the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of government finances during the latter stages of the budget process. Using proxies to evaluate the quality of those linkages, such as the follow-up to audit findings and the discharge of government, it shows important dysfunctions in the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies due to a combination of technical capacity constraints and political economy disincentives. It suggests that the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances in public budgeting critically hinges on the agility of the linkages between accountability institutions. As such, the failure of budget accountability is due to systemic dysfunctions in the systems of accountability, rather than the failure of an individual accountability institution acting in isolation. In addition, the effectiveness of the horizontal accountability architecture depends on the political economy incentives shaping the budget process, which are generated by the interactions between the choice of institutional design and budget rules, with the degree of political competition and electoral rules.