Dois métodos ou duas antropologias?

This is a commentary to a well-known paper of Bresser-Pereira: The two methods and the hard core of economics. Therefore, it target a very suggestive article that seeks to examine the conceptions of man of classical political economy and Keynesian economics in contrast to the reductive conception of man found in positive economic theory, especially in neoclassical theory. It shows that both conceptions at large think with abstracts economic men. However, the first one reasons with individuals who are determined by the historical and social structures of the capitalistic economic system. The second one seeks to present them in a formal way, as if they were mere pieces of a large automaton, i.e., the mercantile system as a large and standardized mechanism. In the end, Marx is distinguished because he does not reflect based on a static anthropological foundation. For him, men are subjects that become because they can realize themselves only in the course of history.

Bulgakov's sophiology as philosopheme: non-ontology and ontogenesis

The text examines Sergej Nikolajeviè Bulgakov's description of the philosopheme as thoroughly "immanent" (viz., the immanence of man qua being, such that ontology in Bulgakov becomes a conceptual analogue for immanence) and the corollary that such immanence necessarily excludes the problematic of the "creation of the world." Because of this resolute immanence and the notion that the creation of the world in the form of creatio ex nihilo requires a non-immanent or non-ontological thought and concept, the problematic for Bulgakov is approached only by a theologeme. Appropriating this argument as material for a cursory philosopheme, the text attempts to transform Bulgakov's theologeme into a philosopheme through an elision of God and dogma that overdetermines the theologeme. This philosopheme (nascent within Bulgakov's work itself, in both his hesitation to the overdetermination of immanence and the commitment to the problem of creation) would be a thoroughly non-ontological philosopheme, one that allows for the treatment of the problematic of "creation" or singular ontogenesis, yet with the corollary that this philosopheme must rely on an "ontological zero" Such a philosopheme qua ontologically empty formula nevertheless remains ontologically significant insofar as it is to evince the limit of ontology, in the ontological zero's non-relationality to ontology.