Institutions, credibility and crisis: the inconsistencies of Argentine exchange rate policy (1991-2006)

The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is to explain the time inconsistencies of the convertibility regime that led to the 2001 crisis. The argument suggests that the credibility requirements for convertibility induced a dynamic of legal, fiscal, financial and external commitments that increased exit costs and time inconsistencies. The second objective is to explain the tensions of the floating regime that replaced convertibility in 2002. We describe the effects of a floating exchange rate on macroeconomic imbalance and the growing tension between competitiveness and inflation.

The boom and crisis of the Convertibility Plan in Argentina

This article analyses the relationship between state policies and economy in Argentina 1991-2001. In 1991 the currency board regime named 'convertibility' was implemented, within the framework of important neoliberal reforms introduced by the State. These neoliberal reforms facilitated capitalist restructuring, characterized by a leap in productivity, investment and profits. Likewise, these reforms generated imbalances which, along with the changes in the world market conditions from 1998, led to the deepest crisis in Argentina's history. The inefficiency of state neoliberal policies in managing the crisis, based on fiscal adjustment to guarantee the continuity of external financing, led to an economic depression and a financial crash, sparking a mass rebellion and the end of convertibility.