Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage; and the Stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case.

The political role of the State in Cambridge theories of growth and distribution

In this paper we extend Kaldor’s Neo-Pasinetti theorem to the scope of budgetary interventions based on political orientations. First, we take into account a system of taxes and expenditures. Second, we introduce different reaction functions for public spending showing the political role of the State in Cambridge theory of distribution. It turns out that the validity of Kaldorian results depends on the political orientation adopted by government, which diminishes the range of application of the Neo-Pasinetti theorem.

Democracia e eficiência: a difícil relação entre política e economia no debate contemporâneo

Democracy and efficiency: hard relations between politics and economy. Many economists see politics as an irrational activity. They also think state action usually generates market inefficiencies and democratic institutions, such as elections, often work as obstacles to sound economic measures. Showing that vision has been embedded into the main currents of economic thought since the last century, we also argue those ideas are exported to great part of contemporary political science, including the area of public policies. Examining the literature, we show that rational choice political scientists, as the economists, claim governability and effective decisions will be guaranteed mainly through concentrated arenas or through insulated arrangements able to protect policy makers from political interference. In other words, governability depends on the reduction of the political arenas. On the contrary, we reject this technocratic solution of splitting politics from economy. With the support of classical pluralist thinkers, we stand another conception, arguing politics is the privileged social space for building interests and values in an institutionalized way. The difficulties to surpass current international crises since 2008 reveal this is a crucial problem: reducing politics would prevent societies from improving institutional solutions which are the only ones able to give space to emerging conflicts and, then, reach eventual consensus around them.

Education and development projects in Brazil (1932-2004): political economy perspective

This paper discusses the long-run history of education policies in Brazil. It is suggested that the main reason for the educational backwardness was the existence of strong political interests over education. It is also defended that these interests can be empirically observed in the allocation of public resources between the different levels of education, with political choices favouring specific groups in society. It was not a matter of lack of investment in education, but of inadequate allocation of resources. This pattern of political-based policies created a strong negative path dependence of misallocation of resources in education in Brazil, particularly with significant underinvestment in secondary education.

A Critical Analysis of the Philosophical-Political Element of the Master-Slave Dialectic

ABSTRACT:The section “Lordship and Bondage” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit offers us, through the criticism of slavery, some indications regarding Hegel’s conception of human nature. In this paper some consequences of this conception for Hegel’s political philosophy are identified and presented. The analysis shows problems may emerge when we analyze some fundamental Hegelian concepts – “recognition” and shows that some “men” – if we take into consideration the way these concepts were defined in the master-slave dialectic. In light of these problems it is pointed out that Hegel’s political philosophy, and also his position regarding slavery, become less cogent and more susceptible to criticism. The last part of the text analyzes some consequences of problems related to the possibility of defining the concepts “recognition” and “men” in terms of Hegel’s model of state.