Processing of Brazil-nut flour: characterization, thermal and morphological analysis

The Brazil nut (Bertholletia excelsea H. B. K.) is noteworthy for its high content of lipids and proteins of elevated biological value and these factors justify the need for further research and incentives for the manufacturing of new trade products. In the present study we sought new forms of technological use of these nuts by the food industry, through their processing as flour, with no alteration in its energy content. The results after its elaboration showed a product with high energy value (431.48 kcal.100 g-1), protein content of 45.92 g.100 g-1, and fiber of 17.14%. The thermal analyses indicate that the introduction of another protein component, such as soy protein isolate, does not alter the reactions or thermal behavior. On the other hand, morphological analyses revealed granular structures similar to the structure of globular proteins. It was observed that after processing to obtain the flour, the product maintains its protein-energy content, as well as its characteristics when subjected to high temperatures.

Escravidão "suave" no Brasil: Gilberto Freyre tinha razão?

This article examines the question of the supposedly benign character of Brazilian slavery in contrast with North America slavery. In economic analyses of slavery, coercion toward slaves is viewed as a means to achieve maximum output, especially in large-scale agriculture. In small slave holdings, however, coercion was generally inefficient for that purpose, and positive incentives tended to be preferred. It is argued that, as recent evidence on Brazil has shown that small slave holdings prevailed in various regions and periods, this may lend empirical support to the notion of a relatively benign slavery, using more incentives than coercion.

Política industrial e compromissos críveis: uma proposta de análise e de ação governamental

This paper analyses the question of the counterparts that governments should claim from firms and/or economic sectors supported by vertical industrial policy. This is a discussion that still have to advance because everything indicate that the set of current counterparts (goals of costs, productivity, exportation, etc.) still may be increased and improved, what will facilitate the assessment of industrial policy execution by society and the verification of its efficacy in order to yielding more possibilities of economic growth for a country or region. To reinforce the commitment credibility of the agents supported by industrial policy, this paper proposes to maintain the counterparts meant before and that such agents will be stimulated to commit specific assets in their activities that are supported by govern. It is shown that, without use more public resources than the used currently, this new counterpart may reinforce substantially the incentives that the firms supported by vertical industrial policy have it to execute the traditional counterparts assumed by them, and with it guarantee the best possible use of public resources.

O efeito da intenção de reeleição sobre gastos em saúde: uma análise com base no modelo de reputação política

The effect of reelection intention on public health expenditures: An analysis based on reputation models. The political model of reputational-building argues that if the incumbent politician aspires to be reassigned, he/she must act in the voters' interest to obtain their approval and consequently their votes. Considering that voters are sensitive to public health expenditures, we check how reputational incentives shift municipal spending patterns in electoral years. The empirical tests for 3.004 Brazilian municipalities show an increase of health expenditures in those cities in which incumbents are trying to maintain their jobs. In addition, we find an increment in health expenditures where mayors forfeit their chance of being reelected to the benefit of a party mate.

Instituições e políticas regionais: uma proposta para a nova Sudene

Sudene is the Brazilian Federal Agency for Northeast development. The Agency was recreated last year and this article discusses the possibility of its success. The main point argued here is that financial incentives per se are not the best way for a sustained economical and social progress. It is necessary a change in the institutions which maintain the status quo of the underdevelopment. The article shows the Sudene history and the motives of its failure.

A política industrial chinesa como determinante de sua estratégia going global

China has experienced not only high rates of economic growth as well as an unprecedented competitive international insertion since the turn of the century. This process was not guided solely by market forces or influenced by Government intervention in the economy. Although much has been argued that China's "going global" strategy is rooted in state action, and especially its policy of exchange rate depreciation and trade policy incentives for exports and investments abroad, we argue that the major determinant of this strategy, which established the basic conditions for industrial competitiveness, was its industrial policy. The focus of this article is on the changes in China's industrial structure, emphasizing that Chinese industrial policy is a central determinant of its international insertion strategy.

Why budget accountability fails? The elusive links between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of the budget

ABSTRACTParliaments and audit agencies have critical and complementary roles in the oversight of the budget and the enforcement of government accountability. Yet, the nexus between parliaments and audit agencies is one of the weakest links in the accountability chain, generating an accountability gap in the budget process. This articles analyses the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of government finances during the latter stages of the budget process. Using proxies to evaluate the quality of those linkages, such as the follow-up to audit findings and the discharge of government, it shows important dysfunctions in the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies due to a combination of technical capacity constraints and political economy disincentives. It suggests that the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances in public budgeting critically hinges on the agility of the linkages between accountability institutions. As such, the failure of budget accountability is due to systemic dysfunctions in the systems of accountability, rather than the failure of an individual accountability institution acting in isolation. In addition, the effectiveness of the horizontal accountability architecture depends on the political economy incentives shaping the budget process, which are generated by the interactions between the choice of institutional design and budget rules, with the degree of political competition and electoral rules.