The Brazilian and patagonian fishes of the wilkes expedition: 1838-1842

Na viagem efetuada à volta do mundo pela U. S. Exploring Expedition mais conhecida pelo nome de Expedição Wilkes e durante o período em que a mesma operava no Atlântico Ocidental, foram visitadas as regiões do Rio de Janeiro e da Patagônia. Por ocasião da festa comemorativa do centenário da The American Philosophical Society, de Filadélfia, ocorrida a 23 de Fevereiro de 1930, o autor teve a oportunidade de apresentar uma nota prévia da qual constava uma lista de peixes capturados durante o cruzeiro da Expedição. Teve, então, o ensejo de examinar o diário redigido pelo Dr. Charles Pickering, botânico da Expedição, nele encontrando anotações valiosas para a História Natural, considerada em seu sentido amplo, detalhes a respeito das localidades percorridas e relações extensas de animais e plantas, além de diversos representantes pertencentes a outros grupos. Sob o ponto de vista histórico, os comentários aí constantes são de importância significativa. Em muitos casos, essas apreciações fornecem base sólida para a efetivação de estudos faunísticos, de caráter comparativo, muito instrutivos e úteis. O autor examinou a coleção de peixes da Expedição Wilkes que se encontra no Museu Nacional dos Estados Unidos, em Washington, acervo esse gentilmente posto à sua disposição para estudo. Dessa maneira, no presente trabalho, fornece matéria de amplo interesse histórico, visando com isso lançar alguma luz sobre a imensa fauna do Brasil e da Argentina. Baseando-se nos dados fornecidos por Pickering, o autor divulga dados curiosos a respeito da baía do Rio de Janeiro e adjacências, no ano de 1838. Segue-se uma lista contendo a diagnose de 82 espécimes de água doce, salobra e salgada, estudados e comparados com outros de várias procedências. Referindo-se ao Rio Negro, descreve o autor o aspeto da região patagônica, durante certo período de 1839, fazendo comentários a respeito de 7 espécies de peixes nela, encontradas.

The literary arts in Hume's science of the fancy

Philosophers have long disagreed about whether poetry, drama, and other literary arts are important to philosophy; and among those who believe that they are important, explanations of that importance have differed greatly. This paper aims to explain and illustrate some of the reasons why Hume found literature to be an important topic for philosophy and philosophers. Philosophy, he holds, can help to explain general and specific literary phenomena, to ground the science of criticism, and to suggest and justify ";principles of art,"; while at the same time literature can provide valuable ";experiments"; for philosophical theorizing and provide it with a model for the science of morals and (in some ways) for philosophy itself. Moreover, the literary arts can not only help one to write better philosophy, in Hume's view; they can also help one to write philosophy better.

A melancholy skeptic

Hume variously viewed the association of philosophy and melancholy in different stages of his development. In this essay I propose to follow this progress, beginning with his youthful belief that a philosophical life would shelter its pursuer from melancholy. In my hypothesis, for the mature Hume knowledge in the broad sense of wide experience alone can ease melancholy states, while knowledge as narrow rational speculation proves itself untenable, as it triggers a state of melancholy despair in the agent.

BRUNO BAUCH AND THE COMPREHENSIBILITY OF NATURE

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to discuss how Bruno Bauch deals with the problem of the coordination between empirical concepts and spatiotemporal objects. We shall argue that Bauch reformulates the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions by means of a philosophical consideration of differential calculus and that he thereby explains the possibility of such coordination, avoiding certain difficulties of the Kantian doctrine.

NĀGĀRJUNA AND SCHELLING: OUTLINES OF A DIALOGUE ON SELF, WORLD, AND VIEWPOINTS

ABSTRACT The paper intends to build a dialogue between Nāgārjuna and Schelling on Self, world, and standpoints, taking as main references Nāgārjuna's The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way and Schelling's Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. Whereas Nāgārjuna criticizes the substantialization of beings by resorting to the discourse of the dependent co-origination in order to overcome suffering, Schelling, on his turn, refutes the fanaticism based on dogmatism's tenets in favor of the criticism interpreted according to its spirit, and not according to its letter, in order to emancipate humanity. Starting with a succint contextualization of the Eastern and Western philosophical discourse, proceeding further to discuss the philosophies of both thinkers, the paper is concluded by assessing their theories.

BUDDHISM AND MODERNITY: IN THE MARGIN OF DONALD S. LOPEZ JR.'S "BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE

ABSTRACT The present article aims at setting the issue of the relationship between Buddhism and science in a historical and philosophical frame wider than that one taken into account by the international scholarship so far. The historical point of view allows us to conclude that the narrative that connects Buddhism with science is not based on features intrinsic to Buddhist thought. In fact, such narrative prospered thanks to the development of a dialectic, typical of the 18th and 19th centuries, between science and religion. The philosophical point of view allows us to conclude that such narrative is backed by a metaphysical-like thought that denies the specificity of both science and Buddhism.

Truth, laws and the progress of science

In this paper I analyze the difficult question of the truth of mature scientific theories by tackling the problem of the truth of laws. After introducing the main philosophical positions in the field of scientific realism, I discuss and then counter the two main arguments against realism, namely the pessimistic meta-induction and the abstract and idealized character of scientific laws. I conclude by defending the view that well-confirmed physical theories are true only relatively to certain values of the variables that appear in the laws.

Formal semantics for propositional attitudes

Contemporary logic is confined to a few paradigmatic attitudes such as belief, knowledge, desire and intention. My purpose is to present a general model-theoretical semantics of propositional attitudes of any cognitive or volitive mode. In my view, one can recursively define the set of all psychological modes of attitudes. As Descartes anticipated, the two primitive modes are those of belief and desire. Complex modes are obtained by adding to primitive modes special cognitive and volitive ways or special propositional content or preparatory conditions. According to standard logic of attitudes (Hintikka), human agents are either perfectly rational or totally irrational. I will proceed to a finer analysis of propositional attitudes that accounts for our imperfect but minimal rationality. For that purpose I will use a non standard predicative logic according to which propositions with the same truth conditions can have different cognitive values and I will explicate subjective in addition to objective possibilities. Next I will enumerate valid laws of my general logic of propositional attitudes. At the end I will state principles according to which minimally rational agents dynamically revise attitudes of any mode.

Book review of Consciousness by Christopher Hill

Christopher S. Hill advances a theory of conscious experience that employs the idea of representation to unify and explain a wide range of subjective phenomena, including emotions and pain. The theory shows the relevance of philosophical thought in a multidisciplinary view of the mind.

A puzzle for philosophers

In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.

A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH

In 'An undermining diagnosis of relativism about truth', Horwich claims that the notion of relative truth is either explanatorily sterile or explanatorily superfluous. In the present paper, I argue that Horwich's explanatory demands set the bar unwarrantedly high: given the philosophical import of the theorems of a truth-theoretic semantic theory, Horwich's proposed explananda, what he calls acceptance facts, are too indirect for us to expect a complete explanation of them in terms of the deliverances of a theory of meaning based on the notion of relative truth. And, to the extent that there might be such an explanation in certain cases, there is no reason to expect relative truth to play an essential, ineliminable role, nor to endorse the claim that it should play such a role in order to be a theoretically useful notion.

Transduction and BRICS

Abstract BRICS has philosophical significance. It creates new pressure on cross-cultural skill. This is analysed here as requiring transduction: a variety of defeasible practical reasoning. This replaces a simplistic model of the relation between knowledge and action with a more realistic and contemporary model. The transduction format has utility in cross-cultural training.

Respostas a uma crítica marxista às perspectivas retórica e pragmática em economia

Answers to a marxist critic of the rhetorical and pragmatic perspectives in economics. Based on recent discussions regarding the rhetorical perspective in economics, this paper presents an interpretation of the philosophical approach of Habermas which attempts to rescue the so called 'modern spirit', forgotten in the annals of the 19th century, similar to that presented by Marshall Berman in 1982. Following the reconstructive approach of Habermas's project of modernity, we attempt to show how a 'rhetorical approach' could be applied in the field of economics, and yet still be clearly modern by taking into account intersubjectivities, given the expanded sphere of human communication (as defended in the theory of communicative action of Habermas). In this sense, we will seek to demonstrate the philosophical limits of the anti-rhetorical critiques of, for example, Paulani (1996, 2003, 2005, 2006), which seem to underestimate the linguistic and intersubjective aspect of Habermas's philosophical project that can also be found in McCloskey’s methodological approach.

Science and the values of popular movements

First an overall view is provided of Lacey’s ideas concerning science in its relation with the values of popular movements, and of the World Social Forum. Then, as an exercise in the building of conceptual bridges betweeen philosophical and political discourses about science, an analysis is provided of a speech delivered by Brazil’s new minister for science and technology in the occasion of his taking office.

Of empty thoughts and blind intuitions Kant's answer to McDowell

This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell's neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden.2 The focus is on Kant's twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions to conceptual determination is not due some pre-existing, absolute conceptuality of the real but to the "work of the subject."3 On a more programmatic level, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a selective appropriation of Kant and the philosophical potential of a more comprehensive and thorough consideration of his work. Section 1 addresses the unique balance in Kant's philosophy between the work on particular problems and the orientation toward a systematic whole. Section 2 outlines McDowell's take on the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept in the context of the Kant readings by Sellars and Strawson. Section 3 exposes McDowell's relapse into the Myth of the Given. Section 4 proposes a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy as an epistemology of metaphysical cognition. Section 5 details Kant's original account of sensible intuition in the Inaugural-Dissertation of 1770. Section 6 presents the transition from the manifold of the senses to the synthesis in the imagination and the unification through the categories in the Critique of pure reason (1781 and 1787). Section 7 addresses Kant's formalism in epistemology and metaphysics.