Why budget accountability fails? The elusive links between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of the budget

ABSTRACTParliaments and audit agencies have critical and complementary roles in the oversight of the budget and the enforcement of government accountability. Yet, the nexus between parliaments and audit agencies is one of the weakest links in the accountability chain, generating an accountability gap in the budget process. This articles analyses the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of government finances during the latter stages of the budget process. Using proxies to evaluate the quality of those linkages, such as the follow-up to audit findings and the discharge of government, it shows important dysfunctions in the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies due to a combination of technical capacity constraints and political economy disincentives. It suggests that the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances in public budgeting critically hinges on the agility of the linkages between accountability institutions. As such, the failure of budget accountability is due to systemic dysfunctions in the systems of accountability, rather than the failure of an individual accountability institution acting in isolation. In addition, the effectiveness of the horizontal accountability architecture depends on the political economy incentives shaping the budget process, which are generated by the interactions between the choice of institutional design and budget rules, with the degree of political competition and electoral rules.

Profits and votes: Entrepreneurs and the government in Brazilian housing policy

ABSTRACTAfter more than twenty years of low housing construction output, the housing policy recovered its momentum in the country with the ascent of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT) to the seat of the federal government. This article demonstrates - through the analysis of documents, interviews and research conducted with businessmen - that the impetus of such a state policy is a part of the PT electoral strategy, which is based on economic growth and the expansion of social programs. The research analyses the dovetailing of interests between the Lula (the Brazilian President from 2003 to 2010) administration and the civil construction business - the latter concerned with expanding its business, and the former with increasing the supply of jobs and the level of economic activity. This process culminated in the launching of the largest social housing program to be implemented in the country. Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My House, My Life), is a project in whose planning building companies played a key role, performing feasibility studies and carrying out social housing projects.