Survey, survival and control of Alternaria alternata in wheat seeds

The fungus Alternaria alternata was quantified in 75 wheat seed samples collected from three different regions of southern Brazil for Cropping and Use Value (CUV) I, II and III. Fungal presence was evaluated in two hundred disinfested seeds per sample before sowing in a potato-dextrose-agar medium + antibiotic (PDA+A). Fungus survival was evaluated every 45 days for 180 days for three seed batches from six wheat cultivars stored in propylene bags in a storehouse, with air temperature varying between 18 to 22 °C and relative air humidity around 60%. The efficacy of carboxin+thiram, difenoconazol, thiram, triadimenol, triticonazol and triticonazol + iprodione fungicides to control A. alternata was determined. A. alternata was detected in all the samples with an incidences of 39.6 %, 38.8% and 35.9% for the CUV I, CUV II and CUV III regions, respectively. The highest mean incidence of the fungus was found in the CUV I region, the coolest and most humid, and was significantly different from the other two regions. The average reduction in A. alternata viability in the wheat cultivar seeds was 49.5% during the 180 days of storage (inter-harvest period), demonstrating that infected seeds are the primary inoculum source for the fungus. The triticonazol + iprodione fungicide mixture efficiently controls A. alternata.

Social control of public expenditures in a multilevel principal-agent approach

ABSTRACTThis study enhances the principal-agent model by incorporating a multilevel perspective and differences among agency situations. A theoretical discussion is developed using a proposed intersection of methodological focuses and a descriptive-exemplificative hypothetical analysis. The analysis is applied to public expenditure social control in representative democracies, and as a result, a principal-agent model unfolds that incorporates a decision-making perspective and focuses on formulation, negotiation, articulation, and implementation competencies. Thus, it is possible to incorporate elements into the principal-agent model to make it more permeable to individual, group, and societal idiosyncrasies with respect to public expenditure social control.