Steroid-resistant idiopathic nephrotic syndrome in children: long-term follow-up and risk factors for end-stage renal disease

INTRODUTION: Steroid resistant idiopathic nephrotic syndrome (SRINS) in children is one of the leading causes of progression to chronic kidney disease stage V (CKD V)/end stage renal disease (ESRD). OBJECTIVE: The aim of this retrospective study is to evaluate the efficacy of immunosuppressive drugs (IS) and to identify risk factors for progression to ESRD in this population. METHODS: Clinical and biochemical variables at presentation, early or late steroid resistance, histological pattern and response to cyclosporine A (CsA) and cyclophosfamide (CP) were reviewed in 136 children with SRINS. The analyzed outcome was the progression to ESRD. Univariate as well as multivariate Cox-regression analysis were performed. RESULTS: Median age at onset was 5.54 years (0.67-17.22) and median follow up time was 6.1 years (0.25-30.83). Early steroid-resistance was observed in 114 patients and late resistance in 22. Resistance to CP and CsA was 62.9% and 35% respectively. At last follow-up 57 patients reached ESRD. The renal survival rate was 71.5%, 58.4%, 55.3%, 35.6% and 28.5% at 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years respectively. Univariate analysis demonstrated that older age at onset, early steroid-resistance, hematuria, hypertension, focal segmental glomerulosclerosis (FSGS), and resistance to IS were risk factors for ESRD. The Cox proportional-hazards regression identified CsAresistance and FSGS as the only predictors for ESRD. CONCLUSION: Our findings showed that CsA-resistance and FSGS were risk factors for ESRD.

Immunosupressive therapy in children with steroid-resistant nephrotic syndrome: single center experience

INTODUCTION: Nephrotic syndrome is one of the most frequent glomerular diseases among children, and steroid therapy remains as the treatment choice. In spite of this, 10 to 15% of the patients are steroidresistant, and the best therapy for such cases has never been defined. Mycophenolate acid (MA) is one of the treatments used in such situations. OBJECTIVE: To describe the clinical behavior of children diagnosed with steroid-resistant nephrotic syndrome (SRNS) and to assess the therapeutic response to MA. METHODS: This was a retrospective and descriptive study. RESULTS: 26 clinical records of patients with SRNS; 70% male and 30% female. All patients underwent kidney biopsies, which showed a predominance of focal segmental glomerulosclerosis (FSGS). The immunosuppresive drugs used were: Mycophenolate mofetil (MMF) 100%, Cyclosporine 69.2%, Cyclophosphamide 23.1%, and Rituximab 23%. One month after treatment initiation with MMF 61.5% achieved remission. The median of relapses per year for the patients was 3 (p25: 2.75 - p75: 4). This median became 1 (p25: 1 - p75: 3.25) after using this medication (p = 0.08). Furthermore, prior to the start of the MMF treatment, the median of the steroid dose was 1 (p25: 0.5- p75: 1.62) mg/k/day. After using MMF, this median became 0.07 (p25: 0 - p75: 0.55) mg/k/day (p < 0.001), in 8 patients prednisolone was stopped. CONCLUSION: In our experience, treatment with MMF showed positive results such as decrease in the frequency of relapses, less proteinuria, and reduction in the dose of steroids administered without deterioration of glomerular filtration rates. However, more studies are needed to assess efficacy, safety, and optimal dosage.

Rationality in children: the first steps

Not all categorization is conceptual. Many of the experimental findings concerning infant and animal categorization invite the hypothesis that the subjects form abstract perceptual representations, mental models or cognitive maps that are not composed of concepts. The paper is a reflection upon the idea that conceptual categorization involves the ability to make categorical judgements under the guidance of norms of rationality. These include a norm of truth-seeking and a norm of good evidence. Acceptance of these norms implies willingness to defer to cognitive authorities, unwillingness to commit oneself to contradictions, and knowledge of how to reorganize one's representational system upon discovering that one has made a mistake. It is proposed that the cognitive architecture required for basic rationality is similar to that which underlies pretend-play. The representational system must be able to make room for separate 'mental spaces' in which alternatives to the actual world are entertained. The same feature underlies the ability to understand modalities, time, the appearance-reality distinction, other minds, and ethics. Each area of understanding admits of degrees, and mastery (up to normal adult level) takes years. But rational concept-management, at least in its most rudimentary form, does not require a capacity to form second-order representations. It requires knowledge of how to operate upon, and compare, the contents of different mental spaces.