State legislative term limits and the law of unintended consequences: An examination of member behavior, power structures, and legislative organization in Florida

The implementation of term limits on state legislators has provided a wealth of data for study. Florida, the second largest state in the Union with term limits, has not been comprehensively studied. This research examines the effects of term limits on electoral competition, member composition, legislator career paths, legislative leadership, and intra- and inter-governmental influences on Florida's legislature. This study looks at the Florida legislature from 1992 when term limits were enacted through 2004, three electoral cycles in which term limits have been in effect. This study uses both quantitative and qualitative data where appropriate. Electoral data is used to assess electoral and demographic effects, as well as member career trajectories. Interview data with current and former legislators, lobbyists, and executive branch officials is used to analyze both changes in legislative organization and intra- and inter-governmental influences on the legislative process. Term limits has only created greater competition when a legislative seat opens and has actually created a greater advantage for incumbents. Women and minorities have only made minimal gains in winning seats post-term limits. Newly elected legislators are not political novices with a vast majority having previous elective experience. Leadership is more centralized under term limits and the Senate has gained an advantage over the more inexperienced House. Lastly, the influence of staff, lobbyists, and most importantly, the governor has greatly increased under term limits. This research finds that term limits have not produced the consequences that proponents had envisioned.^

Soviet and Western bloc competition in the less developed world and the collapse of Détente

The purpose of my dissertation was to examine the competition between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet bloc in the less developed world during Détente. I assessed whether or not the Soviet bloc pushed for strategic gains in the less developed world in the middle-to-late 1970's and whether this contributed to the U.S. decision to abandon Détente in 1979. I made the attempt to test the international relations theory of balance of threat realism (Walt, 1992). I accomplished the test in two ways. First, I measured the foreign aid allocations (military and economic) made by each respective bloc towards the Third World by using a quantitative approach. Second, I examined U.S. archives using the process-tracing/historical method. The U.S. archives gave me the ability to evaluate how U.S. decision-makers and U.S. intelligence agencies interpreted the actions of the Soviet bloc. They also gave me the chance to examine the U.S. response as we evaluated the policies that were pushed by key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies. On the question of whether or not the Soviet bloc was aggressive, the quantitative evidence suggested that it was not. Instead, the evidence found the Western-bloc to have been more aggressive in the less developed world. The U.S. archives also showed Soviet actions to have been defensive. Key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies attested to this. Finally, the archives show that U.S. officials pushed for aggressive actions against the Third World during the final years of Détente. Thus, balance of threat realism produced an incorrect assessment that U.S. aggression in the late 1970's was a response to Soviet aggression during Détente. The evidence suggests structural Marxism and domestic politics can better explain U.S./Western actions. The aggressive foreign aid allocations of the West, coupled with evidence of U.S. decision-makers/agencies vehemently concerned about the long-term prospects of the West, strengthened structural Marxism. Domestic politics can also claim to explain the actions of U.S. decision-makers. I found extensive archival evidence of bureaucratic inter-agency conflict between the State Department and other intelligence agencies in areas of strategic concern to the U.S.

"Unfair'' Restaurant Reviews:To Sue Or Not To Sue

In their discussion entitled - “Unfair” Restaurant Reviews: To Sue Or Not To Sue - by John Schroeder and Bruce Lazarus, Assistant Professors, Department of Restaurant, Hotel and Institutional Management at Purdue University, the authors initially state: “Both advantages and disadvantages exist on bringing lawsuits against restaurant critics who write “unfair” reviews. The authors, both of whom have experience with restaurant criticism, offer practical advice on what realistically can be done by the restaurateur outside of the courtroom to combat unfair criticism.” Well, this is going to be a sticky wicket no matter how you try to defend it, reviews being what they are; very subjective pieces of opinionated journalism, especially in the food industry. And, of course, unless you can prove malicious intent there really is no a basis for a libel suit. So, a restaurateur is at the mercy of written opinion and the press. “Libel is the written or published form of slander which is the statement of false remarks that may damage the reputation of others. It also includes any false and malicious publication which may damage a person's business, trade, or employment,” is the defined form of the law provided by the authors. Anecdotally, Schroeder and Lazarus offer a few of the more scathing pieces reviewers have written about particular eating establishments. And, yes, they can be a bit comical, unless you are the owner of an establishment that appears in the crosshairs of such a reviewer. A bad review can kneecap even a popular eatery. “Because of the large readership of restaurant reviews in the publication (consumer dining out habits indicate that nearly 50 percent of consumers read a review before visiting a new restaurant) your business begins a very dangerous downward tailspin,” the authors reveal, with attribution. “Many restaurant operators contend that a bad review can cost them an immediate trade loss of upward of 50 percent,” Schroeder and Lazarus warn. “The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a restaurant owner can collect damages only if he proves that the statement or statements were made with “actual malice,” even if the statements were untrue,” the authors say by way of citation. And that last portion of the statement cannot be over-emphasized. The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution does wield a heavy hammer, indeed, and it should. So, what recourse does a restaurateur have? The authors cautiously give a guarded thumbs-up to a lawsuit, but you better be prepared to prove a misstatement of fact, as opposed to the distinguishable press protected right of opinion. For the restaurateur the pitfalls are many, the rewards few and far between, Schroeder and Lazarus will have you know. “…after weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a lawsuit against a critic...the disadvantages are overwhelming,” the authors say. “Chicago restaurant critic James Ward said that someone dumped a load of manure on his yard accompanied by a note that read - Stop writing that s--t! - after he wrote a review of a local restaurant.” Such is a novel if not legally measurable tack against an un-mutual review.

The World Trade Organization, competition policy, and developing countries: A cross -country examination of domestic policy actions

This dissertation addresses the following research question: in a particular policy area, why do countries that display unanimity in their international policy behavior diverge from each other in their domestic policy actions? I address this question in the context of the divergent domestic competition policy actions undertaken by developing countries during the period 1996-2007, after these countries had quite conspicuously displayed near-unanimity in opposing this policy measure at the World Trade Organization (WTO). This divergence is puzzling because (a) it does not align with their near-unanimous behavior at the WTO over competition policy and (b) it is at variance with the objectives of their international opposition to this policy at the WTO. Using an interdisciplinary approach, this dissertation examines the factors responsible for this divergence in the domestic competition policy actions of developing countries. ^ The theoretical structure employed in this study is the classic second-image-reversed framework in international relations theory that focuses on the domestic developments in various countries following an international development. Methodologically, I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis to ascertain the nature of the relationship between the dependent variable and the eight explanatory variables that were identified from existing literature. The data on some of the key variables used in this dissertation was uniquely created over a multi-year period through extensive online research and represents the most comprehensive and updated dataset currently available. ^ The quantitative results obtained from logistic regression using data on 131 countries point toward the significant role played by international organizations in engineering change in this policy area in developing countries. The qualitative analysis consisting of three country case studies illuminate the channels of influence of the explanatory variables and highlight the role of domestic-level factors in these three carefully selected countries. After integrating the findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses, I conclude that a mix of international- and domestic-level variables explains the divergence in domestic competition policy actions among developing countries. My findings also confirm the argument of the second-image-reversed framework that, given an international development or situation, the policy choices that states make can differ from each other and are mediated by domestic-level factors. ^