5 resultados para trade liberalization
em Digital Commons at Florida International University
Resumo:
This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.
Resumo:
This dissertation studies the political economy of trade policy in a developing country, namely Turkey, under different economic and political regimes. The research analyzes the effects of these different regimes on the import structure, the trade policy and the industrialization process in Turkey and derives implications for aggregate welfare. ^ In the second chapter, the effects of trade liberalization policies on import demand are examined. Using disaggregated industry-level data, import demand elasticities for various sectors have been computed, analyzed under different economic regimes, and compared with those of developed countries. The results are statistically significant and reliable, and conform to the predictions of economic theory. Estimation of these elasticities is also a necessary ingredient for the third chapter of the dissertation. ^ The third chapter examines the predictions of the state-of-the-art “Protection For Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Employing advanced econometric methods and a unique data set, strong support is found for the fundamental predictions of the model in the context of Turkey. Specifically, the government is found to attach a much higher weight to social welfare than to political contributions. This weight is higher under the democratic regime than under the dictatorship, a result potentially of interest to all researchers in the area of political economy. ^ The fourth chapter looks at the effects of industry concentration and import price shocks on protection, promotion and the choice of policy instruments in Turkey. In this context, it examines and finds support for the predictions of some well-known models in the literature. ^
Resumo:
Globalization is eroding the livelihoods of small farmers, a significant and vulnerable class, particularly in the developing world. The cost-price squeeze stemming from trade liberalization places farmers in a race to the bottom that leads to displacement, poverty, and environmental degradation. Scholars and activists have proposed that alternative trade initiatives offer a unique opportunity to reverse this trend by harnessing the power of the markets to reward producers of goods with embedded superior cultural, environmental, and social values. Alternative trade via certification schemes have become a de facto prescription for any location where there is a need to conciliate economic interest with conservation imperatives. Partnerships among commodity production farmers, elite manufacturers and wealthy northern consumers/activists do not necessarily have win-win outcomes. Paradoxically, the partnerships of farmers with external agencies have unexpected results. These partnerships develop into dependent relationships that become unsustainable in the absence of further transfers of capital. The institutions born of these partnerships are fragile. When these fledging institutions fail, farmers are left in the same situation that they were before the partnership, with only minor improvements to show after spending considerable amounts of social and financial capital. I hypothesize that these failures are born out of a belief in a universal understanding of sustainability. A discursive emphasis on consensus, equity and mutual benefit hides the fact that what for consumers it is a matter of choice, for producers is a matter of survival. The growth in consumers’ demand for certified products creates a race for farmers to meet these standards. My findings suggest that this race generates economically perverse effects. First, producers enter into a certification treadmill. Second, the local need for economic sustainability is ignored. Third, commodity based alternative trade schemes increase the exposure of communities to global shocks. I conclude by calling for a careful reassessment of sustainable development projects that promote certification schemes. The designers and implementers of these programs must include farmers’ agenda in the planning of these programs.
Resumo:
This dissertation examines the relationship between the degree of openness to international trade and the level of growth experienced by a country. More precisely, it explores how trade liberalization and economic integration can lead to specialization in production, affect national levels of welfare, productivity, and competition and at the same time reinforce deflationary efforts. A large part of this investigation is carried out using industry-level data from Spain. ^
Resumo:
This dissertation consists of three theoretical essays on immigration, international trade and political economy. The first two essays analyze the political economy of immigration in developed countries. The third essay explores new ground on the effects of labor liberalization in developing countries. Trade economists have witnessed remarkable methodological developments in mathematical and game theoretical models during the last seventy years. This dissertation benefits from these advances to analyze economic issues related to immigration. The first essay applies a long run general equilibrium trade model similar to Krugman (1980), and blends it with the median voter ala-Mayer (1984) framework. The second essay uses a short run general equilibrium specific factor trade model similar to Jones (1975) and incorporates it with the median voter model similar to Benhabib (1997). The third essay employs a five stage game theoretical approach similar to Vogel (2007) and solves it by the method of backward induction. The first essay shows that labor liberalization is more likely to come about in societies that have more taste for varieties, and that workers and capital owners could share the same positive stance toward labor liberalization. In a dynamic model, it demonstrates that the median voter is willing to accept fewer immigrants in the first period in order to preserve her domestic political influence in the second period threatened by the naturalization of these immigrants. The second essay shows that the liberalization of labor depends on the host country's stock and distribution of capital, and the number of groups of skilled workers within each country. I demonstrate that the more types of goods both countries produce, the more liberal the host country is toward immigration. The third essay proposes a theory of free movement of goods and labor between two economies with imperfect labor contracts. The heart of my analysis lies in the determinants of talent development where individuals' decisions to emigrate are related to the fixed costs of emigration. Finally, free trade and labor affect income via an indirect effect on individuals' incentives to invest in the skill levels and a direct effect on the prices of goods.