Executive characteristics and going concern opinions

Auditors have come under increased scrutiny over the past several years about the growing number of client failures without a warning in the form of a going-concern modified (GCM) audit opinion. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 59 requires auditors to evaluate whether substantial doubt exists on an audit client’s ability to continue as a going concern (AICPA 1988). My dissertation consists of three essays. ^ For the three essays, I empirically investigate issues related to GCM audit opinions and executive characteristics. Specifically, I examine the impact of executive tenure and gender on the issuance of GCM audit opinions. In addition, my dissertation addresses two other unique issues. Given that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents an important watershed event in the history and regulation of the accounting profession, I provide evidence about auditors’ propensities to issue GCM audit opinions in the post-SOX period. Further, I also expand extant research in this area by using multiple outcomes and thus go beyond the traditional use of bankruptcy alone as a tool to evaluate auditors’ GCM opinion. ^ The results indicate that, after controlling for other financial characteristics, GCM audit opinions are significantly more likely for firms that have CFOs with short tenure and/or for firms with a female CFO or CEO. However, when examining the association between executive characteristics and two types of reporting errors, the results vary with the type of reporting error. Overall, the results provide evidence that executive characteristics are associated with auditors' reporting decisions. ^

Shareholder ratification of the auditor and audit market competition

In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.

Shareholder Ratification of The Auditor and Audit Market Competition

In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.

Executive Characteristics and Going Concern Opinions

Auditors have come under increased scrutiny over the past several years about the growing number of client failures without a warning in the form of a going-concern modified (GCM) audit opinion. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 59 requires auditors to evaluate whether substantial doubt exists on an audit client’s ability to continue as a going concern (AICPA 1988). My dissertation consists of three essays. For the three essays, I empirically investigate issues related to GCM audit opinions and executive characteristics. Specifically, I examine the impact of executive tenure and gender on the issuance of GCM audit opinions. In addition, my dissertation addresses two other unique issues. Given that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents an important watershed event in the history and regulation of the accounting profession, I provide evidence about auditors’ propensities to issue GCM audit opinions in the post-SOX period. Further, I also expand extant research in this area by using multiple outcomes and thus go beyond the traditional use of bankruptcy alone as a tool to evaluate auditors’ GCM opinion. The results indicate that, after controlling for other financial characteristics, GCM audit opinions are significantly more likely for firms that have CFOs with short tenure and/or for firms with a female CFO or CEO. However, when examining the association between executive characteristics and two types of reporting errors, the results vary with the type of reporting error. Overall, the results provide evidence that executive characteristics are associated with auditors' reporting decisions.