Resource allocation in multi-user telecommunication networks

This dissertation discussed resource allocation mechanisms in several network topologies including infrastructure wireless network, non-infrastructure wireless network and wire-cum-wireless network. Different networks may have different resource constrains. Based on actual technologies and implementation models, utility function, game theory and a modern control algorithm have been introduced to balance power, bandwidth and customers' satisfaction in the system. ^ In infrastructure wireless networks, utility function was used in the Third Generation (3G) cellular network and the network was trying to maximize the total utility. In this dissertation, revenue maximization was set as an objective. Compared with the previous work on utility maximization, it is more practical to implement revenue maximization by the cellular network operators. The pricing strategies were studied and the algorithms were given to find the optimal price combination of power and rate to maximize the profit without degrading the Quality of Service (QoS) performance. ^ In non-infrastructure wireless networks, power capacity is limited by the small size of the nodes. In such a network, nodes need to transmit traffic not only for themselves but also for their neighbors, so power management become the most important issue for the network overall performance. Our innovative routing algorithm based on utility function, sets up a flexible framework for different users with different concerns in the same network. This algorithm allows users to make trade offs between multiple resource parameters. Its flexibility makes it a suitable solution for the large scale non-infrastructure network. This dissertation also covers non-cooperation problems. Through combining game theory and utility function, equilibrium points could be found among rational users which can enhance the cooperation in the network. ^ Finally, a wire-cum-wireless network architecture was introduced. This network architecture can support multiple services over multiple networks with smart resource allocation methods. Although a SONET-to-WiMAX case was used for the analysis, the mathematic procedure and resource allocation scheme could be universal solutions for all infrastructure, non-infrastructure and combined networks. ^

Defense against node compromise in sensor network security

Recent advances in electronic and computer technologies lead to wide-spread deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSNs have wide range applications, including military sensing and tracking, environment monitoring, smart environments, etc. Many WSNs have mission-critical tasks, such as military applications. Thus, the security issues in WSNs are kept in the foreground among research areas. Compared with other wireless networks, such as ad hoc, and cellular networks, security in WSNs is more complicated due to the constrained capabilities of sensor nodes and the properties of the deployment, such as large scale, hostile environment, etc. Security issues mainly come from attacks. In general, the attacks in WSNs can be classified as external attacks and internal attacks. In an external attack, the attacking node is not an authorized participant of the sensor network. Cryptography and other security methods can prevent some of external attacks. However, node compromise, the major and unique problem that leads to internal attacks, will eliminate all the efforts to prevent attacks. Knowing the probability of node compromise will help systems to detect and defend against it. Although there are some approaches that can be used to detect and defend against node compromise, few of them have the ability to estimate the probability of node compromise. Hence, we develop basic uniform, basic gradient, intelligent uniform and intelligent gradient models for node compromise distribution in order to adapt to different application environments by using probability theory. These models allow systems to estimate the probability of node compromise. Applying these models in system security designs can improve system security and decrease the overheads nearly in every security area. Moreover, based on these models, we design a novel secure routing algorithm to defend against the routing security issue that comes from the nodes that have already been compromised but have not been detected by the node compromise detecting mechanism. The routing paths in our algorithm detour those nodes which have already been detected as compromised nodes or have larger probabilities of being compromised. Simulation results show that our algorithm is effective to protect routing paths from node compromise whether detected or not.

Defense Against Node Compromise in Sensor Network Security

Recent advances in electronic and computer technologies lead to wide-spread deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSNs have wide range applications, including military sensing and tracking, environment monitoring, smart environments, etc. Many WSNs have mission-critical tasks, such as military applications. Thus, the security issues in WSNs are kept in the foreground among research areas. Compared with other wireless networks, such as ad hoc, and cellular networks, security in WSNs is more complicated due to the constrained capabilities of sensor nodes and the properties of the deployment, such as large scale, hostile environment, etc. Security issues mainly come from attacks. In general, the attacks in WSNs can be classified as external attacks and internal attacks. In an external attack, the attacking node is not an authorized participant of the sensor network. Cryptography and other security methods can prevent some of external attacks. However, node compromise, the major and unique problem that leads to internal attacks, will eliminate all the efforts to prevent attacks. Knowing the probability of node compromise will help systems to detect and defend against it. Although there are some approaches that can be used to detect and defend against node compromise, few of them have the ability to estimate the probability of node compromise. Hence, we develop basic uniform, basic gradient, intelligent uniform and intelligent gradient models for node compromise distribution in order to adapt to different application environments by using probability theory. These models allow systems to estimate the probability of node compromise. Applying these models in system security designs can improve system security and decrease the overheads nearly in every security area. Moreover, based on these models, we design a novel secure routing algorithm to defend against the routing security issue that comes from the nodes that have already been compromised but have not been detected by the node compromise detecting mechanism. The routing paths in our algorithm detour those nodes which have already been detected as compromised nodes or have larger probabilities of being compromised. Simulation results show that our algorithm is effective to protect routing paths from node compromise whether detected or not.

Enhanced skip -list search algorithm in 3-layer mediator framework

The Three-Layer distributed mediation architecture, designed by Secure System Architecture laboratory, employed a layered framework of presence, integration, and homogenization mediators. The architecture does not have any central component that may affect the system reliability. A distributed search technique was adapted in the system to increase its reliability. An Enhanced Chord-like algorithm (E-Chord) was designed and deployed in the integration layer. The E-Chord is a skip-list algorithm based on Distributed Hash Table (DHT) which is a distributed but structured architecture. DHT is distributed in the sense that no central unit is required to maintain indexes, and it is structured in the sense that indexes are distributed over the nodes in a systematic manner. Each node maintains three kind of routing information: a frequency list, a successor/predecessor list, and a finger table. None of the nodes in the system maintains all indexes, and each node knows about some other nodes in the system. These nodes, also called composer mediators, were connected in a P2P fashion. ^ A special composer mediator called a global mediator initiates the keyword-based matching decomposition of the request using the E-Chord. It generates an Integrated Data Structure Graph (IDSG) on the fly, creates association and dependency relations between nodes in the IDSG, and then generates a Global IDSG (GIDSG). The GIDSG graph is a plan which guides the global mediator how to integrate data. It is also used to stream data from the mediators in the homogenization layer which connected to the data sources. The connectors start sending the data to the global mediator just after the global mediator creates the GIDSG and just before the global mediator sends the answer to the presence mediator. Using the E-Chord and GIDSG made the mediation system more scalable than using a central global schema repository since all the composers in the integration layer are capable of handling and routing requests. Also, when a composer fails, it would only minimally affect the entire mediation system. ^