Illicit interest groups: The political impact of the Medellin drug trafficking organizations in Colombia

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the "Medellin Cartel." In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study's findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government's push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

The political economy of sovereign debt

This dissertation examines international lending arrangements between a competitive foreign investor and a less-developed country. Given that the benefits and costs of borrowing are distributed unequally across society, it is of interest to examine the conditions under which borrowing occurs and how the borrowed funds are allocated. Three theoretical models are developed to consider optimal lending arrangements in the presence of sovereign risk. The models show how a society's level and distribution of wealth influences its access to loans and the terms of the loan agreements. Optimal loan contracts are established, which place either a debt ceiling or a debt floor on the amount of the loan that, will be offered. ^

The political economy of poverty alleviation strategies. The initiative for heavily indebted poor countries in Bolivia: More of the same

In the year 2000, approximately 1.1 billion people lived in extreme poverty while developed countries spent US$600 billion a year on defense. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative is a recent component of a larger poverty reduction strategy supported by the International Financial Institutions, as well as many developed and developing countries. By implementing lessons of the past fifty years, this program attempts to diminish misery around the globe. As such, it provides debt relief while seeking to enable the poorest countries to simultaneously attain sustainable debt and promote human development. Interest in poverty reduction around the globe reemerged in the 1990s. This study contributes directly to this recent effort by presenting a nuanced approach that builds on the stepping-stones generated by other poverty scholars. To fulfill its goal, this investigation applies a political economy framework. Within this framework, the author conducts an actor-specific analysis. This dissertation addresses the following question: How do domestic and international actors respond to the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies? The author assumes actors desire to maximize their utility calculation and suggests these calculations are based on the player's motivations and external influences. Based on their motivations, the external influences, and the initiative's guidelines, each actor develops a set of expectations. To fulfill those expectations, stake holders utilize one or several strategies. Finally, the actors' ability to achieve their expectations determines each player's assessment of the initiative. The framework described is applied in an in-depth, actor-specific analysis of the HIPC in Bolivia. Bolivia's National Revolution represents the country's first attempt at reducing poverty. Since then, all governments have taken specific steps to combat poverty at the local and national levels. The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is one of the most recent macro strategies of this kind. The case study demonstrated that three factors (national ownership, effective sponsorship and the local context) determine the success levels of poverty reduction strategies from abroad. In addition, the investigation clearly shows that poverty reduction is not the sole motivation in the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies. All actors, however, share the dream of poverty reduction.

Secondary stakeholders as agents of influence: Three essays on political risk, reputation, and multinational performance

Organizational researchers have recently taken an interest in the ways in which social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other secondary stakeholders attempt to influence corporate behavior. Scholars, however, have yet to carefully probe the link between secondary stakeholder legal action and target firm stock market performance. This is puzzling given the sharp rise in NGO-initiated civil lawsuits against corporations in recent years for alleged overseas human rights abuses and environmental misconduct. Furthermore, few studies have considered how such lawsuits impact a target firm’s intangible assets, namely its image and reputation. Structured in the form of three essays, this dissertation examined the antecedents and consequences of secondary stakeholder legal activism in both conceptual and empirical settings. ^ Essay One argued that conventional approaches to understanding political risk fail to account for the reputational risks to multinational enterprises (MNEs) posed by transnational networks of human rights NGOs employing litigation-based strategies. It offered a new framework for understanding this emerging challenge to multinational corporate activity. Essay Two empirically tested the relationship between the filing of human rights-related civil lawsuits and corporate stock market performance using an event study methodology and regression analysis. The statistical analysis performed showed that target firms experience a significant decline in share price upon filing and that both industry and nature of the lawsuit are significantly and negatively related to shareholder wealth. Essay Three drew upon social movement and social identity theories to develop and test a set of hypotheses on how secondary stakeholder groups select their targets for human rights-related civil lawsuits. The results of a logistic regression model offered support for the proposition that MNE targets are chosen based on both interest and identity factors. The results of these essays suggest that legal action initiated by secondary stakeholder groups is a new and salient threat to multinational business and that firms doing business in countries with weak political institutions should factor this into corporate planning and take steps to mitigate their exposure to such risks.^

Essays on the political economy of trade policy and economic *development

This dissertation studies the political economy of trade policy in a developing country, namely Turkey, under different economic and political regimes. The research analyzes the effects of these different regimes on the import structure, the trade policy and the industrialization process in Turkey and derives implications for aggregate welfare. ^ In the second chapter, the effects of trade liberalization policies on import demand are examined. Using disaggregated industry-level data, import demand elasticities for various sectors have been computed, analyzed under different economic regimes, and compared with those of developed countries. The results are statistically significant and reliable, and conform to the predictions of economic theory. Estimation of these elasticities is also a necessary ingredient for the third chapter of the dissertation. ^ The third chapter examines the predictions of the state-of-the-art “Protection For Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Employing advanced econometric methods and a unique data set, strong support is found for the fundamental predictions of the model in the context of Turkey. Specifically, the government is found to attach a much higher weight to social welfare than to political contributions. This weight is higher under the democratic regime than under the dictatorship, a result potentially of interest to all researchers in the area of political economy. ^ The fourth chapter looks at the effects of industry concentration and import price shocks on protection, promotion and the choice of policy instruments in Turkey. In this context, it examines and finds support for the predictions of some well-known models in the literature. ^