History and evolutionary trajectory of the Iranian nuclear program

What actors and processes at what levels of analysis and through what mechanisms have pushed Iran's nuclear program (INP) towards being designated as a proliferation threat (securitization)? What actors and processes at what levels of analysis and through what mechanisms have pushed Iran's nuclear program away from being designated as an existential threat (de-securitization)? What has been the overall balance of power and interaction dynamics of these opposing forces over the last half-century and what is their most likely future trajectory? ^ Iran's nuclear story can be told as the unfolding of constant interaction between state and non-state forces of "nuclear securitization" and "nuclear de-securitization." Tracking the crisscrossing interaction between these different securitizing and de-securitizing actors in a historical context constitutes the central task of this project. ^ A careful tracing of "security events" on different analytical levels reveals the broad contours of the evolutionary trajectory of INP and its possible future path(s). Out of this theoretically conscious historical narrative, one can make informed observations about the overall thrust of INP along the securitization - de-securitization continuum. ^ The main contributions of this work are three fold: First, it brings a fresh theoretical perspective on Iran's proliferation behavior by utilizing the "securitization" theory tracing the initial indications of the threat designation of INP all the way back to the mid 1970s. Second, it gives a solid and thematically grounded historical texture to INP by providing an intimate engagement with the persons, processes, and events of Tehran's nuclear pursuit over half a century. Third, it demonstrates how INP has interacted with and even at times transformed the NPT as the keystone of the non-proliferation regime, and how it has affected and injected urgency to the international discourse on nuclear proliferation specifically in the Middle East.^

Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions

Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to reactive nuclear weapons programs. Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela lacks any serious nuclear expertise. Even if it had the managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from international sources would be difficult because members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place. While South American states have historically opposed nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation. Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security community. On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of the international system. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a Venezuelan threat.