An assessment of legal knowledge of preservice teachers completing accredited teacher education programs in South Florida

The purpose of the study was to assess the legal knowledge of preservice teachers completing their educational training at accredited South Florida universities. The population consisted of 372 preservice kindergarten through twelfth grade teachers completing their educational training in any area of public school education.^ The researcher selected areas of school law to assess based on nationwide studies of litigation involving teachers and school boards, the areas most pertinent to the teachers' daily activities and responsibilities. A forty-item instrument was developed and administered to preservice teachers at six South Florida public and private universities. The areas of school law surveyed were tort liability, teachers' rights as instructors and employees, and students' rights. The research questions asked if preservice teachers possess a fundamental knowledge of school law in any of the identified areas and if a significant difference of legal knowledge existed when comparing preservice teachers by university and comparing preservice elementary and preservice secondary teachers. The criteria for a fundamental knowledge of school law was established as scoring 80% or above on the total survey or any area of school law.^ Conclusions. (1) On the overall survey, the preservice teachers did not exhibit a fundamental knowledge of school law. The mean score was 64.2%, with 11.6% of the respondents scoring at or above the 80% level. (2) The preservice teachers did not possess a fundamental knowledge of school law in any of the three areas of school law, though the survey revealed a difference in the preservice teachers' knowledge in the specific areas. The scores were tort liability, 71.9%; teachers' rights, 65%; and students' rights, 52.3%. (3) A significant difference did not exist between elementary and secondary preservice teachers' knowledge of school law. (4) A significant difference did not exist among the preservice teachers' knowledge of school law when compared by university.^ The study suggested a need for increased instruction in these areas of school law to preservice teachers prior to the beginning of their teaching careers. ^

Elementary classroom teachers' knowledge of tort liability for negligence

The purpose of this research study was to investigate the legal knowledge of Florida's public elementary classroom teachers in the area of tort liability for negligence. A second purpose of the study was to assess the knowledge of school law in the area of negligence according to specific variables to determine if significant differences in knowledge existed among groups of teachers classified by: years of teaching experience, whether or not teachers took a school law course or inservice, college degree held and whether or not teachers had administrative experience. A validated survey instrument consisting of 22 scenarios based on decided court cases in the United States was utilized. These cases included court decisions ranging from 1938–1994, and represented the categories of duty and standard of care, proper instruction, proper supervision, proper maintenance, field trips, and post-injury treatment. ^ A random sample of 420 elementary classroom teachers were sent the survey instrument to complete, and a total of 309 surveys were returned producing a return rate of 77%. The results of this research study revealed that the overall level of legal knowledge of public elementary classroom teachers in the State of Florida produced a mean percent correct of 53%. The range of scores varied from 18%–82%, with the approximate average of correct answers of 12 out of 22. The category of proper instruction produced the lowest mean percent correct of 35%, and the area of post-injury treatment yielded the highest mean percent correct of 78%. ^ The findings of this study emphasize the necessity of preparing teachers regarding their legal rights, duties and responsibilities. The need for teachers to receive training at the preservice and inservice levels has become clear by this study. ^

Examining moderators of the hindsight bias in the context of civil legal decision -making: Counterfactuals, causal proximity, and self -referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. ^ In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. ^ Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.^

Examining Moderators of the Hindsight Bias in the Context of Civil Legal Decision-Making: Counterfactuals, Causal Proximity, and Self-Referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.