Soil carbon dynamics in primary and secondary tropical forests in Colombia

Soils play a central role in the dynamics of biospheric carbon and in climate change. They contain the largest carbon stock of terrestrial ecosystems and return to the atmosphere a significant proportion of carbon fixed by photosynthesis. Soils of tropical forests are tremendously important in the carbon cycle because they receive the largest organic matter inputs, they have the largest respiration rates, and they are among the largest carbon reservoirs among world soils. This research assesses the main components of the soil carbon dynamics in primary (PF) and secondary (SF) tropical forests in Colombia. I evaluated the production, stocks, and decomposition rates of aboveground detritus as well as the stocks, growth, mortality, and decomposition of fine roots in these two forest types. Soil carbon outputs were evaluated as total soil, heterotrophic, and root respiration. The stocks of soil organic carbon down to 4 m deep in these two cover types and in degraded pastures (PAS) were also evaluated. ^ Soil inputs of organic carbon from above and belowground sources were lower in SF than in PF. Litterfall in SF was 58% and production of fine root detritus was 60% of that in PF. When production of woody detritus and palm fronds was considered, the difference between these forest types was even larger. However, outputs of mineral carbon through heterotrophic soil respiration were similar; in SF they equaled 97% of those in PF. As a result, soil carbon balance was positive in PF and negative in SF. Despite that soil carbon balances suggest that soils of SF are losing carbon, soil carbon stocks of SF were higher than of degraded pastures, suggesting that they have already started to recover soil carbon stocks lost under degraded pastures. This discrepancy can be partially explained by the effect of drier conditions on heterotrophic soil respiration as a consequence of a moderate El Niño event during the period of soil respiration measurements. The positive carbon balance in soils of PF despite the El Niño event, suggests that soils of PF accumulated about 664 Kg C ha−1 yr−1. Therefore, soil carbon dynamics mainly depended on successional status of vegetation and on climatic conditions. ^

Illicit interest groups: The political impact of the Medellin drug trafficking organizations in Colombia

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the "Medellin Cartel." In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study's findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government's push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.

Foreign Language Education in Colombia: A Qualitative Study of Escuela Nueva

Since 2004 the Colombian Ministry of Education has been implementing the Programa Nacional de Bilingüismo (PNB) with the goal of having bilingual high school graduates in English and Spanish by 2019. However, implementation of the PNB has been criticized by English Language Teaching (ELT) specialists in the country who say, among other things, that the PNB introduced a discourse associated exclusively with bilingualism in English and Spanish. This study analyzed interviews with 15 participants of a public school of the Colombian Escuela Nueva, a successful model of community-based education that has begun a process of internationalization, regarding the participants’ perceptions of foreign language education and the policies of the PNB. Six students, five teachers, and four administrators were each interviewed twice using semi-structured interviews. To offer a critique of the PNB, this study tried to determine to what extent the school implemented the elements of Responsible ELT, a model developed by the researcher incorporating the concepts of hegemony of English, critical language-policy research, and resistance in ELT. Findings included the following: (a) students and teachers saw English as the universal language whereas most administrators saw English imposed due to political and economic reasons; (b) some teachers misinterpreted the 1994 General Law of Education mandating the teaching of a foreign language as a law mandating English; and (c) some teachers and administrators saw the PNB’s adoption of competence standards based on the Common European Framework of Reference for languages as beneficial whereas others saw it as arbitrary. Conclusions derived from this study of this Escuela Nueva school were: (a) most participants found the goal of the PNB unrealistic; (b) most teachers and administrators saw the policies of the PNB as top-down policies without assessment or continuity; and (c) teachers and administrators mentioned a disarticulation between elementary and high school ELT policies that may be discouraging students in public schools from learning English. Thus, this study suggests that the policies of the PNB may be contributing to English becoming a gatekeeper for higher education and employment thereby becoming a tool for sustaining inequality in Colombia.

World coffee markets and national coffee parastatals since 1989: A comparative study of Colombia and Cote d'Ivoire

The International Coffee Agreements (ICA) involved the majority of nations producing and consuming coffee and provided relative economic stability to the coffee sectors of the exporting Third World countries. This study focuses on the serious impact of the 1989 collapse of the ICA on the domestic coffee sectors of Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire. In particular, the dissertation examines the role of the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee parastatals, the Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia and the Caisse de Stabilisation et Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles, during the crisis and their transformation by it. ^ The theoretical framework employed in this study is borrowed from the literature on state-society relations. The methodology includes: in-depth analysis of the historical roles of the parastatal agencies in coffee production, state-society relations and economic development in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire; interviews with parastatal administrators, producers and other knowledgeable informants in both countries; and a comprehensive review of newspaper articles and official statements of coffee policy published in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire. prior to, during, and after the crisis. ^ The Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors and their producers faced serious economic and social problems following the drop in coffee prices. The coffee parastatals in Colombia and Côte d'lvoire first lost some of their responsibilities following the world coffee crisis. The Caisse was in the end eliminated while FEDECAFE struggled to remain in existence. Along the way, both entities faced protests from disgruntled coffee producers, who organized politically for the first time in their nations' histories. I argue that the outcome for the parastatals depended in part on the conditions of their formation, particularly the level of societal involvement in their creation. I also posit that the country's dependence on foreign aid played a key role in the fate of the parastatals. ^ This dissertation concludes that developments in the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors have significantly contributed to the creation of the difficult political and economic conditions of both countries today. ^

The effect of domestic credit in the economic *development process

A commonly held view is that creation of excessive domestic credit may lead to inflation problems, however, many economists uphold the possibility that, generous domestic credit under appropriate conditions will result in increases of output. This hypothesis is examined for Japan and Colombia for the period 1950-1993.^ Domestic credit theories are reviewed since the times of Thornton and Smith, until the recent times of Lewis, McKinnon, Stiglitz and of Japanese economists like K. Emi, Tachi R. and others. It is found that in Japan of the Post-War period, efficient financial markets and the decisive role of the government in orienting investment decisions seem to have influenced positively the effectiveness of domestic credit as an output-stimulating variable. On the contrary, in Colombia the absence of the above features seems to explain why domestic credit is not very effective as an output-stimulating variable.^ Multiple regression analyses show that domestic credit is a strong explanatory variable for output increases in Japan and a weak one for Colombia's case in the studied period. For Japan the correlation depicts a positive relationship between the two variables with a decreasing rate very similar to a typical production function. Moreover, the positive decreasing rate is confirmed if net domestic credit is used in the correlations. For Colombia a positive relationship is also found when accumulated domestic credit is used, but, if net domestic credit is the source of correlations, the positive decreasing rate is not obtained.^ Granger causality tests determined causality from domestic credit to output for Japan and no-causality for Colombia at the 1% significance level; the differences are explained by: (1) The low development level of the financial system in Colombia. (2) The nonexistence of consistent domestic credit policy to foster economic development. (3) The lack of an authoritative orientation in the allocation of financial resources and the nonexistence of long range industrialization programs in Colombia that could channel productively credit resources. For the system of equations relating domestic credit and exports, the Granger causality tests determined no-causality between domestic credit and exports for both Japan and Colombia also at the 1% significance level. ^

World coffee markets and national coffee parastatals since 1989: a comparative study of Colombia and Cote D'ivoire

The International Coffee Agreements (ICA) involved the majority of nations producing and consuming coffee and provided relative economic stability to the coffee sectors of the exporting Third World countries. This study focuses on the serious impact of the 1989 collapse of the ICA on the domestic coffee sectors of Colombia and Cote d'Ivoire. In particular, the dissertation examines the role of the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee parastatals, the Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia and the Caisse de Stabilisation et Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles, during the crisis and their transformation by it. The theoretical framework employed in this study is borrowed from the literature on state-society relations. The methodology includes: in-depth analysis of the historical roles of the parastatal agencies in coffee production, state-society relations and economic development in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire; interviews with parastatal administrators, producers and other knowledgeable informants in both countries; and a comprehensive review of newspaper articles and official statements of coffee policy published in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire prior to, during, and after the crisis. The Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors and their producers faced serious economic and social problems following the drop in coffee prices. The coffee parastatals in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire first lost some of their responsibilities following the world coffee crisis. The Caisse was in the end eliminated while FEDECAFE struggled to remain in existence. Along the way, both entities faced protests from disgruntled coffee producers, who organized politically for the first time in their nations' histories. I argue that the outcome for the parastatals depended in part on the conditions of their formation, particularly the level of societal involvement in their creation. I also posit that the country's dependence on foreign aid played a key role in the fate of the parastatals. This dissertation concludes that developments in the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors have significantly contributed to the creation of the difficult political and economic conditions of both countries today.