Jurors' use of social framework evidence

Monahan and Walker (1988) delineated three uses of social science evidence within the courts: social authority, social fact, and social framework. Social authority evidence is social science evidence used in making policy or law. Social fact evidence is social science evidence that describes research undertaken expressly for the case at hand. Social framework evidence involves providing conclusions from previously conducted social science research to assist jurors in evaluating the other evidence in the case. Although this type of evidence has traditionally been presented via expert testimony, Monahan and Walker (1988) have suggested that, because the social science research involved comes from the extant literature and is not the province of any particular expert, it would be more economical to have the judge present this information as part of the judicial instructions to the jury. This study tested the implicit assumption that the presentation of the social framework evidence by the judge will have the same impact on juror verdicts as presentation of this evidence by an expert. ^ Two hundred mock jurors watched a videotaped hostile work environment sexual harassment trial. The social framework evidence consisted of the discussion of factors that have been found to increase the likelihood of sex stereotyping of women by men. The trial included either no social framework evidence, social framework evidence presented by the expert, or social framework evidence presented in judicial instructions. ^ Results indicated that men who heard the social framework evidence from the judge were more likely to vote for the defendant than men who heard no social framework evidence. Men who heard the judicial instruction with the social framework evidence also rated the plaintiff as less credible than the other men and women in the study. Thus, it appears that, for men, social framework evidence presented by the judge harms the plaintiff's case by reducing ratings of her credibility, but the same evidence presented by an expert does not affect men's verdicts. For women, however, social framework evidence, irrespective of who presents it, enhances the plaintiff's case. ^

Predicting jurors' decisions: The effects of repeated expression and forewarning in civil voir dire

To help lawyers uncover jurors' attitudes and predict verdict, litigation experts recommend that attorneys encourage jurors to repeatedly express their attitudes during voir dire. While social cognitive literature has established that repeated expression of attitudes increases accessibility and behavior predictability, the persuasive twist on the method exercised in trials deserves empirical investigation. Only one study has examined the use of repeated expression within a legal context with the results finding that the tactic increased accessibility, but did not influence the attitude verdict relationship. This dissertation reexamines the ability of civil attitudes to predict verdict in a civil trial and investigates the use of repeated expression as a persuasive tactic utilized by both parties (Plaintiff and Defense) within a civil voir dire in an attempt to increase attitudinal strength, via accessibility, and change attitudes to better predict verdict. This project also explores potential moderators, repetition by the opposing party and the use of a forewarning, to determine their ability to counter the effects of repeated expression on attitudes and verdict.^ This dissertation project asked subjects to take on the role of jurors in a civil case. During the voir dire questioning session, the number of times the participants were solicited to express their attitudes towards litigation crisis by both parties was manipulated (one vs. five). Also manipulated was the inclusion of a forewarning statement from the plaintiff, within which mock jurors were cautioned about the repeated tactics that the defense may use to influence their attitudes. Subsequently, participants engaged in a response latency task which measured the accessibility of their attitudes towards various case-related issues. After reading a vignette of a fictitious personal injury case, participants rendered verdict decisions and responded to an attitude evaluation scale. Exploratory factor analyses, Probit regressions, and path analyses were used to analyze the data. Results indicated that the act of repeated expression influenced both the accessibility and value of litigation crisis attitudes thus increasing the attitude-verdict relationship, but only when only one party engaged in it. Furthermore, the forewarning manipulation did moderate the effect of repeated expression on attitude change and verdict, supporting our hypothesis.^

Does expert psychological testimony improve juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness?

Previous research has examined the validity of behavioral assumptions underlying the presumed effectiveness of safeguards against erroneous conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness identification. In keeping with this agenda, this study examined juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness in the form of foil, instruction, and presentation biases and whether expert psychological testimony further sensitizes jurors to the factors that influence the likelihood of false identifications. One hundred and sixty jury eligible citizens watched versions of a videotaped trial that included information about the identification of the defendant by an eyewitness and that varied the suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure. In addition, half of the mock-jurors heard the testimony of an expert psychologist regarding the factors that influence lineup suggestiveness. Mock-jurors rendered individual verdicts, rated the defendant's culpability and the suggestiveness and fairness of the identification procedure. Results indicated that jurors are somewhat sensitive to foil bias but are insensitive to instruction and presentation biases. No evidence was found to suggest that expert testimony leads to juror skepticism or juror sensitization. These results question the effectiveness of cross-examination and expert testimony as safeguards against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken identification. ^

The role of death qualification in venirepersons' evaluations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital trials

Death qualification is a part of voir dire that is unique to capital trials. Unlike all other litigation, capital jurors must affirm their willingness to impose both legal standards (either life in prison or the death penalty). Jurors who assert they are able to do so are deemed “death-qualified” and are eligible for capital jury service: jurors who assert that they are unable to do so are deemed “excludable” or “scrupled” and are barred from hearing a death penalty case. During the penalty phase in capital trials, death-qualified jurors weigh the aggravators (i.e., arguments for death) against the mitigators (i.e., arguments for life) in order to determine the sentence. If the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then the jury is to recommend death; if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, then the jury is to recommend life. The jury is free to weigh each aggravating and mitigating circumstance in any matter they see fit. Previous research has found that death qualification impacts jurors' receptiveness to aggravating and mitigating circumstances (e.g., Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988). However, these studies utilized the now-defunct Witherspoon rule and did not include a case scenario for participants to reference. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether death qualification affects jurors' endorsements of aggravating and mitigating circumstances when Witt, rather than Witherspoon, is the legal standard for death qualification. Four hundred and fifty venirepersons from the 11 th Judicial Circuit in Miami, Florida completed a booklet of stimulus materials that contained the following: two death qualification questions; a case scenario that included a summary of the guilt and penalty phases of a capital case; a 26-item measure that required participants to endorse aggravators, nonstatutory mitigators, and statutory mitigators on a 6-point Likert scale; and standard demographic questions. Results indicated that death-qualified venirepersons, when compared to excludables, were more likely to endorse aggravating circumstances. Excludable participants, when compared to death-qualified venirepersons, were more likely to endorse nonstatutory mitigators. There was no significant difference between death-qualified and excludable venirepersons with respect to their endorsement of 6 out of 7 statutory mitigators. It would appear that the Furman v. Georgia (1972) decision to declare the death penalty unconstitutional is frustrated by the Lockhart v. McCree (1986) affirmation of death qualification. ^

Juror need for cognition and sensitivity to methodological flaws in expert evidence

Two studies investigated the influence of juror need for cognition on the systematic and heuristic processing of expert evidence. U.S. citizens reporting for jury duty in South Florida read a 15-page summary of a hostile work environment case containing expert testimony. The expert described a study she had conducted on the effects of viewing sexualized materials on men's behavior toward women. Certain methodological features of the expert's research varied across experimental conditions. In Study 1 (N = 252), the expert's study was valid, contained a confound, or included the potential for experimenter bias (internal validity) and relied on a small or large sample (sample size) of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). When the expert's study included trucking employees, high need for cognition jurors in Study 1 rated the expert more credible and trustworthy than did low need for cognition jurors. Jurors were insensitive to variations in the study's internal validity or sample size. Juror ratings of plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. In Study 2 (N = 162), the expert's published or unpublished study (general acceptance) was either valid or lacked an appropriate control group (internal validity) and included a sample of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). High need for cognition jurors in Study 2 found the defendant liable more often and evaluated the expert evidence more favorably when the expert's study was internally valid than when an appropriate control group was missing. Low need for cognition jurors did not differentiate between the internally valid and invalid study. Variations in the study's general acceptance and ecological validity did not affect juror judgments. Juror ratings of expert and plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. The present research demonstrated that the need for cognition moderates juror sensitivity to expert evidence quality and that certain message-related heuristics influence juror judgments when ability or motivation to process systematically is low. ^

The National Institute of Justice guide for eyewitness identification evidence: Can it improve juror decision-making?

Mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent lead to more false convictions in the United States than any other cause. In response to concerns about the reliability of eyewitness evidence, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1999 published a Guide for the gathering and preservation of eyewitness evidence by law enforcement personnel. Previous research has shown that eyewitness identifications are more accurate when obtained using procedures recommended in the NIJ Guide. This experiment assessed whether informing jurors about the Guide can improve their ability to discriminate between eyewitness identifications likely to be accurate and those likely to be inaccurate and, if so, how to most effectively provide jurors with such information. ^ Seven hundred sixteen U.S. citizens who reported for criminal jury duty participated. Half of the participant jurors read a summary of an armed robbery trial in which the police followed the NIJ Guide when obtaining an eyewitness identification of the defendant. The other half read about an identical case in which the police did not follow the Guide. Jurors received information about the Guide from a court-appointed expert witness, one of the attorneys in the case, the trial judge, the judge in combination with one of the attorneys, or from no one (in the control groups). Jurors then rendered a verdict in the case and answered questions about the evidence in the case. ^ When an expert witness or the judge (either alone or in combination with one of the attorneys) informed jurors about the Guide, the jurors voted to convict defendants likely to be guilty and to acquit defendants likely to be innocent more often than did uninformed jurors assigned to a control group. These data suggest that informing jurors about the NIJ Guide using expert testimony or instructions from a judge will improve the quality and accuracy of jurors' verdict decisions in cases involving eyewitness identification evidence. However, more research is needed to determine whether the judge will remain an effective source of information about the Guide in a longer, more detailed trial scenario and to learn more about the underlying psychological processes governing the effects observed in this experiment. ^

The effects of defendant account on damage award decisions

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the manner in which civil defendants account for their behavior influences compensatory and punitive damage awards. Jurors read three civil trial summaries, in which I manipulated injury severity (high vs. low), defendant reprehensibility (high vs. low), defendant status (individual vs. corporate), and account (concession, excuse, justification or refusal) in a factorial design. I also included four control groups in which the defendant stipulated liability. In all other conditions, participants read that a jury had found the defendant negligent. Only defendant reprehensibility influenced punitive awards. Both plaintiff injury and defendant reprehensibility influenced compensatory awards. When individuals offered justifications and when corporations offered excuses, jurors awarded lower compensatory awards against low reprehensibility defendants than against high reprehensibility defendants. Negligence stipulations led to lower damage awards for individuals than for corporations. Additionally, concessions tended to produce lower awards when combined with a stipulation of negligence as opposed to a jury decision. These findings support the hypothesis that in cases in which the defendant is clearly negligent, circumstances exist in which stipulating negligence and offering an apologetic account will lead to reduced damage awards decisions. Results indicate that individual and corporate defendants offering justifications and refusals should first consider the reprehensibility of their actions. In a broader realm, findings demonstrate that the manner in which a jury perceives the explanation given by the defendant is dependent upon defendant characteristics and case-specific factors. ^

Evaluating and improving the opposing expert safeguard against junk science

In Daubert, the Supreme Court opined that opposing expert testimony is an effective safeguard against junk science in the courtroom. Although jurors maybe unable to identify flaws in scientific research without some assistance, social psychological research suggests that people can be trained to make more sophisticated judgments about scientific quality. Further, previous research demonstrated that an opposing expert who addresses the methodology of proffered expert testimony may not enable jurors to evaluate scientific validity. In three studies, I tested why this safeguard was ineffective using a variety of stimulus materials. In the first study, I examined the mediating effect of attitudes on juror decisions within the context of a sexual harassment trial. In the second study, I examined the moderating effect of the presentation of expert credentials on participant decisions regarding child suggestibility literature. In the third study, I tested several improvements to the safeguard using improvements designed to correct for the effects of attitudes and credential presentation on juror decisions within the context of a first-degree murder trial. I found that while opposing expert testimony may have potential as a safeguard, in its current form it is ineffective. That is, a traditional opposing expert caused jurors to be skeptical of all expert testimony rather than sensitizing them to the validity of the research presented at trial. Further, while the improvements tested in this study may have potential to assist jurors in making scientifically sound decisions, more research is needed to further test and refine these improvements. ^

Improving civil jury decision-making: Evidentiary and procedural issues

The civil jury has been under attack in recent years for being unreliable and incompetent. Considering the myriad causes for poor civil juror decision-making, the current investigation explores both procedural and evidentiary issues that impact juror's decisions. Specifically, the first phase of this dissertation examines how jurors (mis)use evidence pertaining to the litigants when determining liability and awarding damages. After investigating how jurors utilize evidence, the focus shifts to exploring the utility of procedural reforms designed to improve decision-making (specifically revising the instructions on the laws in the case and bifurcating the damage phases of the trial). Using the results from the first two phases of the research, the final study involves manipulating pieces of evidence related to the litigants while exploring the effects that revising the judicial instructions have on the utilization of evidence in particular and on decision-making in general. ^ This dissertation was run on-line, allowing participants to access the study materials at their convenience. After giving consent, participants read the scenario of a fictitious product liability case with the litigant manipulations incorporated into the summary. Participants answered several attitudinal, case-specific, and comprehension questions, and were instructed to find in favor of one side and award any damages they felt warranted. Exploratory factor analyses, Probit and linear regressions, and path analyses were used to analyze the data (M-plus and SPSS were the software packages used to conduct the analyses). Results indicated that misuse of evidence was fairly frequent, though the mock jurors also utilized evidence appropriately. Although the results did not support bifurcation as a viable procedural reform, revising the judicial instructions did significantly increase comprehension rates. Trends in the data suggested that better decision-making occurred when the revised instructions were used, thus providing empirical support for this procedural reform as a means of improving civil jury decision-making. Implications for actual trials and attorneys are discussed. ^

Age differences and conformity in juror decision -making

The purpose of this experiment was to investigate whether older adults conform more than young and middle-aged adults on a juror decision making task. Degree of group pressure, personality characteristics, gender, and social influence processes were also examined.^ Registered voters (208 participants) completed a personality questionnaire. Several weeks later, groups of six participants listened to a robbery case that portrayed the defendant as guilty. Afterwards, participants completed the first of two ballots. On the first, participants rated the defendant's degree of guilt and scored their degree of certainty in this verdict rating. They also indicated in writing which piece of information (a statement of evidence) from the robbery case supported their verdict ratings. Next, participants reviewed photocopies of five contrived first ballots. Then participants completed second ballots, in which they again rated the defendant's degree of guilt and scored their degree of certainty in this verdict rating. Finally, participants rated the importance of the five contrived first ballot verdict ratings (normative social influence) and statements of evidence (informational social influence) in reaching their second ballot verdict ratings.^ The results demonstrated that not only did older adults conform as expected, but all age groups conformed; that is, all age groups changed their verdict ratings. After reviewing the other jurors' contrived first ballots (group pressure), participants rated the defendant as less guilty on their second ballot than on their first. However, only older adults significantly changed their level of certainty in their verdict ratings from first to second ballot compared to young and middle-aged adults. With regard to personality characteristics, only rigidity predicted conformity in young and middle-aged adults but not in older adults. It was also found that females conformed more than males. Finally, all three age groups reported that different social influence processes (normative vs. informational) were important in reaching their second ballot verdict ratings. The results of this research indicate that various factors can influence young, middle-aged, and older adults as they reach verdicts. Knowledge of these factors may help alter stereotypes of older adults in terms of conformity, rigidity, and desirability as jurors. ^

Effect of delay of first interview and repetition of interview on accuracy and confidence of recall of a flashbulb -type memory

Hearing of the news of the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in a traffic accident, is taken as an analogue for being a percipient but uninvolved witness to a crime, or a witness to another person's sudden confession to some illegal act. This event (known in the literature as a “reception event”) has previously been hypothesized to cause one to form a special type of memory commonly known as a “flashbulb memory” (FB) (Brown and Kulik, 1977). FB's are hypothesized to be especially resilient against forgetting, highly detailed including peripheral details, clear, and inspiring great confidence in the individual for their accuracy. FB's are dependent for their formation upon surprise, emotional valence, and impact, or consequentiality to the witness of the initiating event. FB's are thought to be enhanced by frequent rehearsal. FB's are very important in the context of criminal investigation and litigation in that investigators and jurors usually place great store in witnesses, regardless of their actual accuracy, who claim to have a clear and complete recollection of an event, and who express this confidently. Therefore, the lives, or at least the freedom, of criminal defendants, and the fortunes of civil litigants hang on the testimony of witnesses professing to have FB's. ^ In this study, which includes a large and diverse sample (N = 305), participants were surveyed within 2–4 days after hearing of the fatal accident, and again at intervals of 2 and 4 weeks, 6, 12, and 18 months. Contrary to the FB hypothesis, I found that participants' FB's degraded over time beginning at least as early as two weeks post event. At about 12 months the memory trace stabilized, resisting further degradation. Repeated interviewing did not have any negative affect upon accuracy, contrary to concerns in the literature. Analysis by correlation and regression indicated no effect or predictive power for participant age, emotionality, confidence, or student status, as related to accuracy of recall; nor was participant confidence in accuracy predicted by emotional impact as hypothesized. Results also indicate that, contrary to the notions of investigators and jurors, witnesses become more inaccurate over time regardless of their confidence in their memories, even for highly emotional events. ^

The differential effects of *American and British trial proceedings on juror decision-making

Seven basic elements differentiate British from American trial procedures: confining attorneys to their tables; dealing with objections outside the presence of the jury; resolving disagreements between attorneys prior to objections being made; presenting the defense opening statement at the close of the prosecution case; the judge directly questions witnesses and has a wider latitude in controlling the evidence; and the judge gives a summation of all the evidence presented to the jury (Fulero & Turner, 1997). The present experiment examined the influence of these different courtroom procedures, judges' non-verbal behavior, and evidence strength on juror decision-making. Using models of persuasion to understand how the varying elements may effect juror decision-making, it was predicted that trials following American courtroom procedures would be more distracting for jurors and as such, they would be more likely to rely on the peripheral cue of the judge's expectations for trial outcome as expressed in his nonverbal behavior. In trials following British procedures jurors should be less distracted and better able to scrutinize the strength of the evidence that in turn should minimize the influence of the judge's nonverbal behavior. Two hundred forty-five participants viewed a mock civil trial in which courtroom procedure, judge's nonverbal behavior, and evidence strength were varied. Analyses suggest that courtroom procedure and evidence strength influenced the direction of participants' verdicts, but that judge's nonverbal behavior did not have a direct impact on verdict preference. Judge's nonverbal behavior appeared to influence other measures related to verdict. Participants were more confident in their verdicts when they agreed with judge's nonverbal behavior and when they viewed British courtroom procedures. Participants were more likely to return estimates of the defendant's liability that reflected judge's nonverbal behavior and a congruency with evidence strength. Participants also recalled more facts in the British conditions than in the American conditions. These findings are interpreted as indicating the importance of the impact of trial procedures and of nonverbal influence. ^

Perceptions of alibi evidence as a function of the strength of incriminating *evidence

The current study investigated the exculpatory value of alibi evidence when presented together with various types of incriminating evidence. Previous research has reported that alibi evidence could weaken the effects of DNA evidence and eyewitness identification. The present study assessed the effectiveness of alibi evidence in counteracting defendant's confession (experiment 1) and eyewitness evidence (experiment 2). In experiment 1, three levels of alibi evidence (none, weak, strong) were combined with three levels of confession evidence (voluntary, elicited under low pressure, elicited under high pressure). Results indicated significant main effects of confession and alibi and an alibi by confession interaction. Of participants exposed to high-pressure confession, those in the strong alibi condition rendered lower guilt estimates than those in the no alibi condition. In experiment 2, three levels of alibi were combined with two levels of eyewitness evidence (bad view, good view). A main effect of alibi was obtained, but no interaction between alibi and eyewitness evidence. ^ An explanation of this pattern is based in part on the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) and a novel “culpability threshold” model of juror decision-making. The Story Model suggests that jurors generate verdict stories (interpretations of events consistent with a guilty or not guilty verdict) based on trial evidence. If the evidence in favor of guilt exceeds jurors' threshold for perceiving culpability, jurors will fail to properly consider exonerating evidence. However, when the strength of incriminating evidence does not exceed the jurors' threshold, they are likely to give appropriate consideration to exculpatory evidence in their decisions. ^ Presentation of a reliable confession in Experiment 1 exceeded jurors' culpability threshold and rendered alibi largely irrelevant. In contrast, presentation of a high-pressure confession failed to exceed jurors' culpability threshold, so jurors turned to alibi evidence in their decisions. Similarly, in the second experiment, eyewitness evidence (in general) was not strong enough to surpass the culpability threshold, and thus jurors incorporated alibi evidence in their decisions. A third study is planned to further test this “culpability threshold” model, further explore various types of alibi evidence, and clarify when exculpatory evidence will sufficiently weaken the prosecution's “story.” ^

A theoretical analysis of eyewitness identification: Dual -process theory, signal detection theory and eyewitness confidence

Given the growing number of wrongful convictions involving faulty eyewitness evidence and the strong reliance by jurors on eyewitness testimony, researchers have sought to develop safeguards to decrease erroneous identifications. While decades of eyewitness research have led to numerous recommendations for the collection of eyewitness evidence, less is known regarding the psychological processes that govern identification responses. The purpose of the current research was to expand the theoretical knowledge of eyewitness identification decisions by exploring two separate memory theories: signal detection theory and dual-process theory. This was accomplished by examining both system and estimator variables in the context of a novel lineup recognition paradigm. Both theories were also examined in conjunction with confidence to determine whether it might add significantly to the understanding of eyewitness memory. ^ In two separate experiments, both an encoding and a retrieval-based manipulation were chosen to examine the application of theory to eyewitness identification decisions. Dual-process estimates were measured through the use of remember-know judgments (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). In Experiment 1, the effects of divided attention and lineup presentation format (simultaneous vs. sequential) were examined. In Experiment 2, perceptual distance and lineup response deadline were examined. Overall, the results indicated that discrimination and remember judgments (recollection) were generally affected by variations in encoding quality and response criterion and know judgments (familiarity) were generally affected by variations in retrieval options. Specifically, as encoding quality improved, discrimination ability and judgments of recollection increased; and as the retrieval task became more difficult there was a shift toward lenient choosing and more reliance on familiarity. ^ The application of signal detection theory and dual-process theory in the current experiments produced predictable results on both system and estimator variables. These theories were also compared to measures of general confidence, calibration, and diagnosticity. The application of the additional confidence measures in conjunction with signal detection theory and dual-process theory gave a more in-depth explanation than either theory alone. Therefore, the general conclusion is that eyewitness identifications can be understood in a more complete manor by applying theory and examining confidence. Future directions and policy implications are discussed. ^

Examining moderators of the hindsight bias in the context of civil legal decision -making: Counterfactuals, causal proximity, and self -referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. ^ In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. ^ Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.^