Hazard mitigation element quality in coastal comprehensive plans in a state with strong requirements for hazard mitigation plan elements

This dissertation examines the quality of hazard mitigation elements in a coastal, hazard prone state. I answer two questions. First, in a state with a strong mandate for hazard mitigation elements in comprehensive plans, does plan quality differ among county governments? Second, if such variation exists, what drives this variation? My research focuses primarily on Florida's 35 coastal counties, which are all at risk for hurricane and flood hazards, and all fall under Florida's mandate to have a comprehensive plan that includes a hazard mitigation element. Research methods included document review to rate the hazard mitigation elements of all 35 coastal county plans and subsequent analysis against demographic and hazard history factors. Following this, I conducted an electronic, nationwide survey of planning professionals and academics, informed by interviews of planning leaders in Florida counties. I found that hazard mitigation element quality varied widely among the 35 Florida coastal counties, but were close to a normal distribution. No plans were of exceptionally high quality. Overall, historical hazard effects did not correlate with hazard mitigation element quality, but some demographic variables that are associated with urban populations did. The variance in hazard mitigation element quality indicates that while state law may mandate, and even prescribe, hazard mitigation in local comprehensive plans, not all plans will result in equal, or even adequate, protection for people. Furthermore, the mixed correlations with demographic variables representing social and disaster vulnerability shows that, at least at the county level, vulnerability to hazards does not have a strong effect on hazard mitigation element quality. From a theory perspective, my research is significant because it compares assumptions about vulnerability based on hazard history and demographics to plan quality. The only vulnerability-related variables that appeared to correlate, and at that mildly so, with hazard mitigation element quality, were those typically representing more urban areas. In terms of the theory of Neo-Institutionalism and theories related to learning organizations, my research shows that planning departments appear to have set norms and rules of operating that preclude both significant public involvement and learning from prior hazard events.

Decision-making under extreme *uncertainty: Rethinking hazard -related perceptions and action

Understanding who evacuates and who does not has been one of the cornerstones of research on the pre-impact phase of both natural and technological hazards. Its history is rich in descriptive illustrations focusing on lists of characteristics of those who flee to safety. Early models of evacuation focused almost exclusively on the relationship between whether warnings were heard and ultimately believed and evacuation behavior. How people came to believe these warnings and even how they interpreted the warnings were not incorporated. In fact, the individual seemed almost removed from the picture with analysis focusing exclusively on external measures. ^ This study built and tested a more comprehensive model of evacuation that centers on the decision-making process, rather than decision outcomes. The model focused on three important factors that alter and shape the evacuation decision-making landscape. These factors are: individual level indicators which exist independently of the hazard itself and act as cultural lenses through which information is heard, processed and interpreted; hazard specific variables that directly relate to the specific hazard threat; and risk perception. The ultimate goal is to determine what factors influence the evacuation decision-making process. Using data collected for 1998's Hurricane Georges, logistic regression models were used to evaluate how well the three main factors help our understanding of how individuals come to their decisions to either flee to safety during a hurricane or remain in their homes. ^ The results of the logistic regression were significant emphasizing that the three broad types of factors tested in the model influence the decision making process. Conclusions drawn from the data analysis focus on how decision-making frames are different for those who can be designated “evacuators” and for those in evacuation zones. ^

Does the Pareto Distribution of Hurricane Damage Inherit its Fat Tail from a Zipf Distribution of Assets at Hazard?

Tropical Cyclones are a continuing threat to life and property. Willoughby (2012) found that a Pareto (power-law) cumulative distribution fitted to the most damaging 10% of US hurricane seasons fit their impacts well. Here, we find that damage follows a Pareto distribution because the assets at hazard follow a Zipf distribution, which can be thought of as a Pareto distribution with exponent 1. The Z-CAT model is an idealized hurricane catastrophe model that represents a coastline where populated places with Zipf- distributed assets are randomly scattered and damaged by virtual hurricanes with sizes and intensities generated through a Monte-Carlo process. Results produce realistic Pareto exponents. The ability of the Z-CAT model to simulate different climate scenarios allowed testing of sensitivities to Maximum Potential Intensity, landfall rates and building structure vulnerability. The Z-CAT model results demonstrate that a statistical significant difference in damage is found when only changes in the parameters create a doubling of damage.

Hazard Mitigation Element Quality in Coastal Comprehensive Plans in a State with Strong Requirements for Hazard Mitigation Plan Elements

This dissertation examines the quality of hazard mitigation elements in a coastal, hazard prone state. I answer two questions. First, in a state with a strong mandate for hazard mitigation elements in comprehensive plans, does plan quality differ among county governments? Second, if such variation exists, what drives this variation? My research focuses primarily on Florida’s 35 coastal counties, which are all at risk for hurricane and flood hazards, and all fall under Florida’s mandate to have a comprehensive plan that includes a hazard mitigation element. Research methods included document review to rate the hazard mitigation elements of all 35 coastal county plans and subsequent analysis against demographic and hazard history factors. Following this, I conducted an electronic, nationwide survey of planning professionals and academics, informed by interviews of planning leaders in Florida counties. I found that hazard mitigation element quality varied widely among the 35 Florida coastal counties, but were close to a normal distribution. No plans were of exceptionally high quality. Overall, historical hazard effects did not correlate with hazard mitigation element quality, but some demographic variables that are associated with urban populations did. The variance in hazard mitigation element quality indicates that while state law may mandate, and even prescribe, hazard mitigation in local comprehensive plans, not all plans will result in equal, or even adequate, protection for people. Furthermore, the mixed correlations with demographic variables representing social and disaster vulnerability shows that, at least at the county level, vulnerability to hazards does not have a strong effect on hazard mitigation element quality. From a theory perspective, my research is significant because it compares assumptions about vulnerability based on hazard history and demographics to plan quality. The only vulnerability-related variables that appeared to correlate, and at that mildly so, with hazard mitigation element quality, were those typically representing more urban areas. In terms of the theory of Neo-Institutionalism and theories related to learning organizations, my research shows that planning departments appear to have set norms and rules of operating that preclude both significant public involvement and learning from prior hazard events.