Women-led community development organizations (CDOs) in Miami-Dade County: A model of community development efforts impacting the economic security of women

Recent studies on the economic status of women in Miami-Dade County (MDC) reveal an alarming rate of economic insecurity and significant obstacles for women to achieve economic security. Consistent barriers to women's economic security affect not only the health and wellbeing of women and their families, but also economic prospects for the community. A key study reveals in Miami-Dade County, "Thirty-nine percent of single female-headed families with at least one child are living at or below the federal poverty level" and "over half of working women do not earn adequate income to cover their basic necessities" (Brion 2009, 1). Moreover, conventional measures of poverty do not adequately capture women's struggles to support themselves and their families, nor do they document the numbers of women seeking basic self-sufficiency. Even though there is lack of accurate data on women in the county, which is a critical problem, there is also a dearth of social science research on existing efforts to enhance women's economic security in Miami-Dade County. My research contributes to closing the information gap by examining the characteristics and strategies of women-led community development organizations (CDOs) in MDC, working to address women's economic insecurity. The research is informed by a framework developed by Marilyn Gittell, who pioneered an approach to study women-led CDOs in the United States. On the basis of research in nine U.S. cities, she concluded that women-led groups increased community participation and "by creating community networks and civic action, they represent a model for community development efforts" (Gittell, et al. 2000, 123). My study documents the strategies and networks of women-led CDOs in MDC that prioritize women's economic security. Their strategies are especially important during these times of economic recession and government reductions in funding towards social services. The focus of the research is women-led CDOs that work to improve social services access, economic opportunity, civic participation and capacity, and women's rights. Although many women-led CDOs prioritize building social infrastructures that promote change, inequalities in economic and political status for women without economic security remain a challenge (Young 2004). My research supports previous studies by Gittell, et al., finding that women-led CDOs in Miami-Dade County have key characteristics of a model of community development efforts that use networking and collaboration to strengthen their broad, integrated approach. The resulting community partnerships, coupled with participation by constituents in the development process, build a foundation to influence policy decisions for social change. In addition, my findings show that women-led CDOs in Miami-Dade County have a major focus on alleviating poverty and economic insecurity, particularly that of women. Finally, it was found that a majority of the five organizations network transnationally, using lessons learned to inform their work of expanding the agency of their constituents and placing the economic empowerment of women as central in the process of family and community development.

Women-led Community Development Organizations (CDOs) in Miami-Dade County: A Model of Community Development Efforts Impacting the Economic Security of Women

Recent studies on the economic status of women in Miami-Dade County (MDC) reveal an alarming rate of economic insecurity and significant obstacles for women to achieve economic security. Consistent barriers to women’s economic security affect not only the health and wellbeing of women and their families, but also economic prospects for the community. A key study reveals in Miami-Dade County, “Thirty-nine percent of single female-headed families with at least one child are living at or below the federal poverty level” and “over half of working women do not earn adequate income to cover their basic necessities” (Brion 2009, 1). Moreover, conventional measures of poverty do not adequately capture women’s struggles to support themselves and their families, nor do they document the numbers of women seeking basic self-sufficiency. Even though there is lack of accurate data on women in the county, which is a critical problem, there is also a dearth of social science research on existing efforts to enhance women’s economic security in Miami-Dade County. My research contributes to closing the information gap by examining the characteristics and strategies of women-led community development organizations (CDOs) in MDC, working to address women’s economic insecurity. The research is informed by a framework developed by Marilyn Gittell, who pioneered an approach to study women-led CDOs in the United States. On the basis of research in nine U.S. cities, she concluded that women-led groups increased community participation and “by creating community networks and civic action, they represent a model for community development efforts” (Gittell, et al. 2000, 123). My study documents the strategies and networks of women-led CDOs in MDC that prioritize women’s economic security. Their strategies are especially important during these times of economic recession and government reductions in funding towards social services. The focus of the research is women-led CDOs that work to improve social services access, economic opportunity, civic participation and capacity, and women’s rights. Although many women-led CDOs prioritize building social infrastructures that promote change, inequalities in economic and political status for women without economic security remain a challenge (Young 2004). My research supports previous studies by Gittell, et al., finding that women-led CDOs in Miami-Dade County have key characteristics of a model of community development efforts that use networking and collaboration to strengthen their broad, integrated approach. The resulting community partnerships, coupled with participation by constituents in the development process, build a foundation to influence policy decisions for social change. In addition, my findings show that women-led CDOs in Miami-Dade County have a major focus on alleviating poverty and economic insecurity, particularly that of women. Finally, it was found that a majority of the five organizations network transnationally, using lessons learned to inform their work of expanding the agency of their constituents and placing the economic empowerment of women as central in the process of family and community development.

Raúl Castro's Government: Recent Economic Reforms and Some Political Considerations.

Four years after calling for structural and conceptual changes, Raúl Castro finally unveiled a roadmap of substantive economic reforms. Over the next 18 months, at least a million workers will be laid off from the bloated state sector. Alternative forms of earning a living – self-employment, cooperatives, leasing of land or physical space, among others – are being authorized as old constraints on these alternatives are rescinded. From the perspective of ordinary Cubans, these reforms – called an actualizaciόn, or an update of the economic model – were long overdue. Yet, in hindsight, the slow-paced process can be explained, not in terms of the need for time to “identify” Cuba’s economic problems which have been known for decades, but by Raúl Castro’s emphasis on la institucionalidad, the need to channel decision making through institutions. His brother left a chaotic state apparatus which first needed mending before an elite consensus on the reform package could be forged. Cuba is entering a situation without precedent: this package is likely to run its own course without the Comandante (Fidel Castro) stopping it. By 2015, Cuban society will probably look different than today, featuring unprecedented inequality and living standards that are on the rise.

Venezuela and Chile: Two Opposite Paths of Democratic Consolidation and Economic Development.

In the past 20 years, Chile and Venezuela have followed divergent paths of democratic and economic development. When the Cold War ended, Venezuela was one of the few Latin American countries where democracy had survived the authoritarian wave of the 1960 and 1970s. Heralded in the late 1980s as the most stable democracy and one of the most developed and globalized economies in the region, Venezuela has since experienced deterioration of democratic institutions, political polarization, economic stagnation, and instability. In contrast, Chile has experienced a democratic renaissance since 1990. Rapid economic growth, an increasingly efficient public sector, significant reductions in poverty, and improvements in social programs have all made Chile a regional leader in democratic consolidation and sustainable development. Chile emerges as a success story and Venezuela as a country lagging behind in terms of making progress in economic development and poverty reduction. While Chile has developed a democratic system based on institutions, Venezuela has seen its democracy evolve towards increasing concentration of power on the hands of President Hugo Chávez.

Rio and the Reds: The Comando Vermelho, Organized Crime and Brazil’s Economic Ascent [Student’s Paper Series]

Brazil’s growing status as a potential world power cannot obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio’s favela slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the State’s control of parts of Rio territory. As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate. The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.

Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

The Transitioning Economic Dynamics of the Military in Communist Regimes: A Comparison of Cuba, China and Vietnam [Student's Paper Series]

Several factors can increase or decrease military-economic involvement in communist regimes. This anomalous form of military behavior, labeled as the Military Business Complex (MBC), emerged in various communist regimes in the 1980s. However, in early 2000s, the communist governments of China and Vietnam began to decrease the number of military-managed industries, while similar industries increased in Cuba. This paper explains why military industries in Cuba have increased over the last two decades, while they decreased in the Chinese and Vietnamese examples. This question is answered by comparatively testing two hypotheses: the Communist Party and the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian (BA) Hypotheses. The Communist Party hypotheses helps explain how the historical and current structures of Party oversight of the military have been lacking in strength and reliability in Cuba, while they traditionally have been more robust in China and Vietnam. The BA hypotheses helps explain how, due to the lack of a strong civilian institutional oversight, the Cuban military has grown into a bureaucratic entity with many political officers holding autonomous positions of power, an outcome that is not prevalent in the Chinese and Vietnamese examples. Thus, with the establishment of a bureaucratic military government and with the absence of a strong party oversight, the Cuban military has been able to protect its economic endeavors while the Chinese and Vietnamese MBC regimes have contracted.

Building Regional Security: Cooperation in the 21st Century: The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security System [RSS]

Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

China's Relations with Brazil and Argentina and Implications for U.S. Security Concerns [Student's Paper Series]

This study on China’s relations with Brazil and Argentina, as well as its implications for U.S. concerns examines two main questions: Why China’s increasing influence on Brazil and Argentina may be considered a cause for U.S. security concerns? And if this is the case, how do China’s strategic alliances with the two countries has impacted U.S. leadership? In an effort to look at China’s influence from multidimensional angles and beyond China’s visible economic influence in these two countries, this paper argues that China’s interest in the Latin American region, with a focus on brazil and Argentina, responds to a more crafted, pragmatic and tailored vision with long-term strategic and political goals. The results of this study reveal that China – avoiding intra-regional competition through a strategic diversification of sectors – has been able to secure critical resources for its population as well as promote enduring alliances in the region that could represent a plausible cause of concern for U.S. interests. In this regard, China’s avoidance of a direct challenge to traditional partners’ influence has responded to the gaps left by a gradual, but steady lack of U.S. involvement.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

Independent Monitoring the Cuban Economic Zone Oil Development

The extensive impact and consequences of the 2010 Deep Water Horizon oil drilling rig failure in the Gulf of Mexico, together with expanding drilling activities in the Cuban Exclusive Economic zone, have cast a spotlight on Cuban oil development. The threat of a drilling rig failure has evolved from being only hypothetical to a potential reality with the commencement of active drilling in Cuban waters. The disastrous consequences of a drilling rig failure in Cuban waters will spread over a number of vital interests of the US and of nations in the Caribbean in the general environs of Cuba. The US fishing and tourist industries will take major blows from a significant oil spill in Cuban waters. Substantial ecological damage and damage to beaches could occur for the US, Mexico, Haiti and other countries as well. The need exists for the US to have the ability to independently monitor the reality of Cuban oceanic oil development. The advantages of having an independent US early warning system providing essential real-time data on the possible failure of a drilling rig in Cuban waters are numerous. An ideal early warning system would timely inform the US that an event has occurred or is likely to occur in, essentially, real-time. Presently operating monitoring systems that could provide early warning information are satellite-based. Such systems can indicate the locations of both drilling rigs and operational drilling platforms. The system discussed/proposed in this paper relies upon low-frequency underwater sound. The proposed system can complement existing monitoring systems, which offer ocean-surface information, by providing sub-ocean surface, near-real time, information. This “integrated system” utilizes and combines (integrates) many different forms of information, some gathered through sub-ocean surface systems, and some through electromagnetic-based remote sensing (satellites, aircraft, unmanned arial vehicles), and other methods as well. Although the proposed integrated system is in the developmental stage, it is based upon well-established technologies.

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.