Three essays on corporate governance and meeting-beating or missing analyst forecasts

The beginning of the 21st century was plagued with unprecedented instances of corporate fraud. In an attempt to address apparent non-existent or “broken” corporate governance policies, sweeping measures of financial reporting reform ensued, having specific requirements relating to the composition of audit committees, the interaction between audit committees and external auditors, and procedures concerning auditors’ assessment of client risk. The purpose of my dissertation is to advance knowledge about “good” corporate governance by examining the association between meeting-or-beating analyst forecasts and audit fees, audit committee compensation, and audit committee tenure and “busyness”. Using regression analysis, I found the following: (1) the frequency of meeting-or-just beating (just missing) analyst forecasts is negatively (positively) associated with audit fees, (2) the extent by which a firm exceeds analysts’ forecasts is positively (negatively) associated with audit committee compensation that is predominately equity-based (cash-based), and (3) the likelihood of repeatedly meeting-or-just beating analyst forecasts is positively associated with audit committee tenure and “busyness”. These results suggest that auditors consider clients who frequently meet-or-just beat forecasts as being less “risky”, and clients that frequently just miss as being more “risky”. The results also imply that cash-based director compensation is more successful in preserving the effectiveness of the audit committee’s financial reporting oversight role, that equity-based compensation motivates independent audit committee directors to focus on short-term performance thereby aligning their interests with management, and that audit committee director tenure and the degree of director “busyness” can affect an audit committee member’s effectiveness in providing financial reporting oversight. Collectively, my dissertation provides additional insights regarding corporate governance practices and informs policy-makers for future relevant decisions.^

Three essays on the interrelationships among financial restatements, corporate governance, market microstructure and the firm's rate of return

The increase in the number of financial restatements in recent years has resulted in a significant decrease in the amount of market capitalization for restated companies. Prior literature did not differentiate between single and multiple restatements announcements. This research investigated the inter-relationships among multiple financial restatements, corporate governance, market microstructure and the firm’s rate of return in the form of three essays by differentiating between single and multiple restatement announcement companies. First essay examined the stock performance of companies announcing the financial restatement multiple times. The postulation is that prior research overestimates the abnormal return by not separating single restatement companies from multiple restatement companies. This study investigated how market penalizes the companies that announce restatement more than once. Differentiating the restatement announcement data based on number of restatement announcements, the results supported the non persistence hypothesis that the market has no memory and negative abnormal returns obtained after each of the restatement announcements are completely random. Second essay examined the multiple restatement announcements and its perceived resultant information asymmetry around the announcement day. This study examined the pattern of information asymmetry for these announcements in terms of whether the bid-ask spread widens around the announcement day. The empirical analysis supported the hypotheses that the spread does widen not only around the first restatement announcement day but around every subsequent announcement days as well. The third essay empirically examined the financial and corporate governance characteristics of single and multiple restatement announcements companies. The analysis showed that corporate governance variables influence the occurrence of multiple restatement announcements and can distinguish multiple restatements announcement companies from single restatement announcement companies.

Three Essays on the Interrelationships Among Financial Restatements, Corporate Governance, Market Microstructure and the Firm's Rate of Return

The increase in the number of financial restatements in recent years has resulted in a significant decrease in the amount of market capitalization for restated companies. Prior literature does not differentiate between single and multiple restatements announcements. This research investigates the inter-relationships among multiple financial restatements, corporate governance, market microstructure and the firm's rate of return in the form of three essays by differentiating between single and multiple restatement announcement companies. First essay examines the stock performance of companies announcing the financial restatement multiple times. The postulation is that prior research overestimates the abnormal return by not separating single restatement companies from multiple restatement companies. This study investigates how market penalizes the companies that announce restatement more than once. Differentiating the restatement announcement data based on number of restatement announcements, the results support for non persistence hypothesis that the market has no memory and negative abnormal returns obtained after each of the restatement announcements are completely random. Second essay examines the multiple restatement announcements and its perceived resultant information asymmetry around the announcement day. This study examines the pattern of information asymmetry for these announcements in terms of whether the bid-ask spread widens around the announcement day. The empirical analysis supports the hypotheses that the spread does widen not only around the first restatement announcement day but around every subsequent announcement days as well. The third essay empirically examines the financial and corporate governance characteristics of single and multiple restatement announcements companies. The analysis shows that corporate governance variables influence the occurrence of multiple restatement announcements and can distinguish multiple restatements announcement companies from single restatement announcement companies.

Essays on corporate reputation: Antecedents and consequences

This dissertation studied the determinants and consequences of corporate reputation. It explored how firm-, industry-, and country-level factors influence the general public’s assessment of a firm’s reputation and how this reputation assessment impacted the firm’s strategic actions and organizational outcomes. The three empirical essays are grounded on separate theoretical paradigms in strategy, organizational theory, and corporate governance. The first essay used signaling theory to investigate firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants of individual-level corporate reputation assessments. Using a hierarchical linear model, it tested the theory based on individual evaluations of the largest companies across countries. Results indicated that variables at multiple analysis levels simultaneously impact individual level reputation assessments. Interactions were also found between industry- and country-level factors. Results confirmed the multi-level nature of signaling influences on reputation assessments. Building on a stakeholder-power approach to corporate governance, the second essay studied how differences in the power and preferences of three stakeholder groups—shareholders, creditors, and workers—across countries influence the general public’s reputation assessments of corporations. Examining the largest companies across countries, the study found that while the influence of stock market return is stronger in societies where shareholders have more power, social performance has a more significant role in shaping reputation evaluations in societies with stronger labor rights. Unexpectedly, when creditors have greater power, the influence of financial stability on reputation assessment becomes weaker. Exploring the consequences of reputation, the third essay investigated the specific effects of intangible assets on strategic actions and organizational outcomes. Particularly, it individually studied the impacts of acquirer acquisition experience, corporate reputation, and approach toward social responsibilities as well as their combined effect on market reactions to acquisition announcements. Using an event study of acquisition announcements, it confirmed the significant impacts of both action-specific (acquisition experience) and general (reputation and social performance) intangible assets on market expectations of acquisition outcomes. Moreover, the analysis demonstrated that reputation magnifies the impact of acquisition experience on market response to acquisition announcements. In conclusion, this dissertation tried to advance and extend the application of management and organizational theories by explaining the mechanisms underlying antecedents and consequences of corporate reputation.