Protecting Your Assets: A Well-Defined Credit Policy Is The Key

In - Protecting Your Assets: A Well-Defined Credit Policy Is The Key – an essay by Steven V. Moll, Associate Professor, The School of Hospitality Management at Florida International University, Professor Moll observes at the outset: “Bad debts as a percentage of credit sales have climbed to record levels in the industry. The author offers suggestions on protecting assets and working with the law to better manage the business.” “Because of the nature of the hospitality industry and its traditional liberal credit policies, especially in hotels, bad debts as a percentage of credit sales have climbed to record levels,” our author says. “In 1977, hotels showing a net income maintained an average accounts receivable ratio to total sales of 3.4 percent. In 1983, the accounts receivable ratio to total sales increased to 4.1 percent in hotels showing a net income and 4.4 percent in hotels showing a net loss,” he further cites. As the professor implies, there are ways to mitigate the losses from bad credit or difficult to collect credit sales. In this article Professor Moll offers suggestions on how to do that. Moll would suggest that hotels and food & beverage operations initially tighten their credit extension policies, and on the following side, be more aggressive in their collection-of-debt pursuits. There is balance to consider here and bad credit in and of itself as a negative element is not the only reflection the profit/loss mirror would offer. “Credit managers must know what terms to offer in order to compete and afford the highest profit margin allowable,” Moll says. “They must know the risk involved with each guest account and be extremely alert to the rights and wrongs of good credit management,” he advocates. A sound profit policy can be the result of some marginal and additional credit risk on the part of the operation manager. “Reality has shown that high profits, not small credit losses, are the real indicator of good credit management,” the author reveals. “A low bad debt history may indicate that an establishment has an overly conservative credit management policy and is sacrificing potential sales and profits by turning away marginal accounts,” Moll would have you believe, and the science suggests there is no reason not to. Professor Moll does provide a fairly comprehensive list to illustrate when a manager would want to adopt a conservative credit policy. In the final analysis the design is to implement a policy which weighs an acceptable amount of credit risk against a potential profit ratio. In closing, Professor Moll does offer some collection strategies for loose credit accounts, with reference to computer and attorney participation, and brings cash and cash discounts into the discussion as well. Additionally, there is some very useful information about what debt collectors – can’t – do!

Effect of child care subsidies on price and quality of care for low -income families

This dissertation examines the effect of regulations, resource and referral agencies, and subsidies on price and quality of care in child care centers. This research is based on a carefully developed conceptual framework that incorporates the factors affecting the demand and supply of child care. The first step in developing this framework is sketching out the structural equations. The structural equations help us understand the underlying behavior of individuals and firms making a decision. The exogenous variables are vector of attributes relating to family characteristics, child characteristics, regulations, subsidy, community characteristics and prices of inputs. Based on the structural equations, reduced form equations are estimated to find the effect of each of the exogenous variables on each of the endogenous variables. Reduced form equations help us answer public policy questions. The sample for this study is from the 1990 Profile of Child Care Settings (PCCS) data in which 2,089 center based programs were interviewed.^ Child/Staff Ratio (Group Level). Results indicate that among subsidies, only the state subsidy per child in poverty has a significant effect on the child/staff ratio at the group level. Presence of resource and referral agencies also increase the child/staff ratio at the group level. Also when the maximum center group size regulation for 25-36 months becomes more stringent, the child/staff ratio at the group level decreases.^ Child/Staff Ratio (Center Level). When the regulations for the maximum child/staff ratio for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months become lax, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. As the regulation for maximum group size for infants becomes stringent, the child/staff ratio decreases. An interesting finding is that as the regulations for maximum group size for age groups 13-24 months and 25-36 months become stringent, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. Another significant finding is that when a center is located in a rural area the child/staff ratio is significantly lower.^ Center Weighted Average Hourly Fees. Maximum group size regulations for age groups 25-36 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 0-12 months and 25-36 months have a positive effect on center hourly fee. Findings also indicate that the center average hourly price is lower when there is a resource and referral agency present. Cost adjusted prekindergarten funds and JOBS child care subsidies have a negative effect on average hourly fee. Cost adjusted social services block grant and state subsidy per child in poverty have a positive effect on the average hourly price. A major finding of this dissertation is the interaction of subsidy and regulatory variables.^ Another major finding is that child/staff ratio at the group level is lower when there is an interaction between geographic location and nature of center sponsorship. ^

Closing the productivity gap and trade *policy

The relationship between trade policy and productivity growth is regarded as ambiguous in the literature. This dissertation examines under what condition the relationship would be positive (or negative). Through the use of static and dynamic analysis, we find two conflicting effects (the pro-protection effect and the pro-competitive effect) that cause the relationship to be ambiguous. If there exists a productivity gap between the import-competing and foreign industries, and if the level of protection is low (high), the relationship is positive (negative). We also show that the import-competing firm responds to a change in the protection level by choosing a level of investment in innovation which yields a different rate of productivity growth. The policy implication, therefore, is that a trade-policy maker should set the trade protection at a level which induces the firm to choose the highest rate of productivity growth, and, as a result, leading the firm to close the initial productivity gap in the most efficient way. ^

Essays on the political economy of trade policy and economic *development

This dissertation studies the political economy of trade policy in a developing country, namely Turkey, under different economic and political regimes. The research analyzes the effects of these different regimes on the import structure, the trade policy and the industrialization process in Turkey and derives implications for aggregate welfare. ^ In the second chapter, the effects of trade liberalization policies on import demand are examined. Using disaggregated industry-level data, import demand elasticities for various sectors have been computed, analyzed under different economic regimes, and compared with those of developed countries. The results are statistically significant and reliable, and conform to the predictions of economic theory. Estimation of these elasticities is also a necessary ingredient for the third chapter of the dissertation. ^ The third chapter examines the predictions of the state-of-the-art “Protection For Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Employing advanced econometric methods and a unique data set, strong support is found for the fundamental predictions of the model in the context of Turkey. Specifically, the government is found to attach a much higher weight to social welfare than to political contributions. This weight is higher under the democratic regime than under the dictatorship, a result potentially of interest to all researchers in the area of political economy. ^ The fourth chapter looks at the effects of industry concentration and import price shocks on protection, promotion and the choice of policy instruments in Turkey. In this context, it examines and finds support for the predictions of some well-known models in the literature. ^

Effect of child care subsidies on price and quality of care for low -income families

This dissertation examines the effect of regulations, resource and referral agencies, and subsidies on price and quality of care in child care centers. This research is based on a carefully developed conceptual framework that incorporates the factors affecting the demand and supply of child care. The first step in developing this framework is sketching out the structural equations. The structural equations help us understand the underlying behavior of individuals and firms making a decision. The exogenous variables are vector of attributes relating to family characteristics, child characteristics, regulations, subsidy, community characteristics and prices of inputs. Based on the structural equations, reduced form equations are estimated to find the effect of each of the exogenous variables on each of the endogenous variables. Reduced form equations help us answer public policy questions. The sample for this study is from the 1990 Profile of Child Care Settings (PCCS) data in which 2,089 center based programs were interviewed. Child/Staff Ratio (Group Level): Results indicate that among subsidies, only the state subsidy per child in poverty has a significant effect on the child/staff ratio at the group level. Presence of resource and referral agencies also increase the child/staff ratio at the group level. Also when the maximum center group size regulation for 25-36 months becomes more stringent, the child/staff ratio at the group level decreases. Child/Staff Ratio (Center Level): When the regulations for the maximum child/staff ratio for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months become lax, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. As the regulation for maximum group size for infants becomes stringent, the child/staff ratio decreases. An interesting finding is that as the regulations for maximum group size for age groups 13-24 months and 25-36 months become stringent, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. Another significant finding is that when a center is located in a rural area the child/staff ratio is significantly lower. Center Weighted Average Hourly Fees: Maximum group size regulations for age groups 25-36 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 0-12 months and 25-36 months have a positive effect on center hourly fee. Findings also indicate that the center average hourly price is lower when there is a resource and referral agency present. Cost adjusted prekindergarten funds and JOBS child care subsidies have a negative effect on average hourly fee. Cost adjusted social services block grant and state subsidy per child in poverty have a positive effect on the average hourly price. A major finding of this dissertation is the interaction of subsidy and regulatory variables. Another major finding is that child/staff ratio at the group level is lower when there is an interaction between geographic location and nature of center sponsorship.