Essays on audit report lag

Audit reporting lag continues to remain an issue of significant interest to regulators, financial statement users, public companies, and auditors. The SEC has recently acted to reduce the deadline for filing annual and quarterly financial statements. Such focus on audit reporting lag arises because, as noted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, relevance and reliability are the two primary qualities of accounting information; and, to be relevant, information has to be timely. In my dissertation, I examine three issues related to the audit report lag. The first essay focuses on the association between audit report lag and the meeting or beating of earnings benchmarks. I do not find any association between audit report lag and just meeting or beating earnings benchmarks. However, I find that longer audit report lag is negatively associated with the probability of using discretionary accruals to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. We can infer from these results that audit effort, for which audit report lag is a proxy, reduces earnings management. The second part of my dissertation examines the association between types of auditor changes and audit report lag. I find that the resignation of an auditor is associated longer audit report lag compared to the dismissal of an auditor. I also find a significant positive association between the disclosure of a reportable event and audit report lag. The third part of my dissertation investigates the association between senior executive changes and audit report lag. I find that audit report lag is longer when client firms have a new CEO or CFO. Further, I find that audit report lag is longer when the new executive is someone from outside the firm. These results provide empirical evidence about the importance of senior management in the financial reporting process.

Audit pricing, reporting quality, and auditor switches in the post -SOX period

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents an important watershed event in the history and regulation of the accounting profession. In this dissertation, I develop arguments as to why we can expect differences in auditor behavior before and after SOX and empirically test if indeed there were differences in auditor behavior before and after SOX. My dissertation consists of three essays. For the three essays, I investigate issues related to auditor independence, audit pricing, the impact of auditor changes in the post-SOX period. The motivation for the first part of my research comes from the SEC's assertions that there are differences between types of non-audit services in terms of their potential to adversely impact auditor independence. The first part of my dissertation empirically validates the SEC's assertions that auditors would be more conservative in those instances where the tax and other non-audit services fee ratios are high but not when the audit-related fee ratio is high. The second part of my study examines if auditors are less likely to "low ball" their audit fees in the period after SOX than in the period preceding SOX. Legislators, regulators, and the media have expressed concerns that auditors "low ball" the fees for initial year audits and that such low-balling can lead to reduced audit quality. I find that there is significant initial year audit fee discount in pre-SOX period and but the fee discount does not hold in post-SOX periods. The third part of my dissertation examines the association between auditor switches and auditor conservatism. I find that a large portion of Big 4 clients switch to non-Big 4 auditors and there is no significant evidence indicating that successor auditors are more conservative in the post-SOX period.

An empirical analysis of the global audit market: International Financial Reporting Standards-related changes and differences within the Big 4 global networks

Ongoing debates within the professional and academic communities have raised a number of questions specific to the international audit market. This dissertation consists of three related essays that address such issues. First, I examine whether the propensity to switch between auditors of different sizes (i.e., Big 4 versus non-Big 4) changes as adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) becomes a more common phenomenon, arguing that smaller auditors have an opportunity to invest in necessary skills and training needed to enter this market. Findings suggest that clients are relatively less (more) likely to switch to (away from) a Big 4 auditor if the client's adoption of IFRS occurs in more recent years. ^ In the second essay, I draw on these inferences and test whether the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption changes over time. As the market becomes less concentrated, larger auditors becomes less able to demand a premium for their services. Consistent with my arguments, results suggest that the change in audit service fees declines over time, although this effect seems concentrated among the Big 4. I also find that this effect is partially attributable to a differential effect of the auditors' experience in pricing audit services related to IFRS based on the period in which adoption occurs. The results of these two essays offer important implications to policy debates on the costs and benefits of IFRS adoption. ^ In the third essay, I differentiate Big 4 auditors into three classifications—Parent firms, Brand Name affiliates, and Local affiliates—and test for differences in audit fee premiums (relative to non-Big 4 auditors) and audit quality. Results suggest that there is significant heterogeneity between the three classifications based on both of these characteristics, which is an important consideration for future research. Overall, this dissertation provides additional insights into a variety of aspects of the global audit market.^

Associations between SOX 404 opinions and auditors, audit committees, and executives

This dissertation examined three issues associated with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) that are of current interest to regulators and the accounting profession. For the first essay, I examined auditor changes from 2003 to 2005 for 2,454 non-financial firms that filed their initial SOX 404 opinions prior to July 1, 2005. My results showed that there is a significant association between the receipt of an adverse SOX 404 opinion and auditor resignations - both before and after the issuance of the SOX 404 opinion. The data related to auditor dismissals show that clients are not successful in opinion shopping, since clients dismissing the auditor before the SOX 404 report also are more likely to receive an adverse SOX 404 opinion than clients not changing auditors. My second essay examined the relation between audit committee characteristics and changes in material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting under the new SOX regime. My results showed that improvements in internal control in the second year of SOX are associated with: (1) the number of audit committee members and (2) financial expertise of audit committee members. My third essay examined the relation between the appointment of the new executives and the subsequent receipt of initial section 404 of SOX opinions. My results showed that adverse SOX 404 reports will be more likely at firms that recently hired a new chief financial officer (CFO).

Internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers

I examine three issues related to internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers. Motivation for the three studies comes from the fact that Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) continues to be controversial, as evidenced by the permanent exemption from Section 404(b) of SOX granted to non-accelerated filers by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the SEC to study compliance costs associated with smaller accelerated filers. In the first part of my dissertation, I document that the audit fee premium for non-accelerated filers disclosing a material weakness in internal controls (a) is significantly lower than the corresponding premium for accelerated filers, and (b) declines significantly over time. I also find that in the case of accelerated filers remediating clients pay lower fees compared to clients continuing to report internal control problems; however, such differences are not observed in the case of non-accelerated filers. The second essay focuses on audit report lag. The results indicate that presence of material weaknesses are associated with increased audit report lags, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results also indicate that the decline in report lag following remediation of problems is greater for accelerated filers than for non-accelerated filers. The third essay examines early warnings (pursuant to Section 302 disclosures) for firms that subsequently disclosed internal control problems in their 404 reports. The analyses indicate that non-accelerated firms with shorter CFO tenure, presence of accounting experts on the audit committee, and more frequent audit committee meetings are more likely to provide prior Section 302 warnings. Overall the results suggest that there are differences in internal control reporting between the accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results provide empirical grounding for the ongoing debate about internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers.

Audit committee director turnover

Actions by both private sector organizations and legislators in recent years have highlighted the importance of the audit committee of the board of directors of corporations in the financial reporting process. For example, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 has multiple sections that deal with the composition and functioning of audit committees. My dissertation examines multiple issues related to the composition of audit committees. In the first two parts of my dissertation, I examine the stock market reactions to disclosures of audit committee appointments and departures in the 8-Ks filed with the SEC during 2008 and 2009. I find that there is a positive stock market reaction to the appointment of audit committee directors who are financial experts. The second essay investigates the cumulative abnormal return to departure of audit committee directors. I find that when an accounting expert leaves the audit committee, the market reaction is significantly negative. These results are consistent with regulators’ concerns related to having directors with audit, accounting and other financial expertise on corporate audit committees. The third essay of my dissertation examines the changes in audit committee composition in the last decade. I find that while the increase in audit committee size is relatively modest, there has been a significant increase in the number of audit committee experts and the frequency of audit committee meetings over the past decade; interestingly, such increase in the number of meetings has persisted even after the media focus on the auditing profession, in the immediate aftermath of the Enron and Andersen failures, have waned. My results show that audit committee composition and its role continues to evolve with regulatory and other corporate governance related changes.