Social service provision, efficiency labor and economic development

This dissertation provides a theory of the effects and determinants of an economy's level of social services. The dissertation focuses on how the provision of social services will affect the effort decisions of workers, which will ultimately determine the economy's level of output. A worker decides on how much effort to contribute in relation to the level of social services he/she receives. The higher the level of social services received, the lower the cost—disutility—from providing effort will be. The government provides public infrastructure and social services (i.e. health services) in accordance with the economy's endowment of effort. In doing so, the government takes the aggregate effort endowment as given. Since, with higher individual work effort the higher the economy's total level of effort, failure by workers to coordinate effort levels will result in possible instances of low effort, low social services and low output; and, other instances of high effort, high social services and high output. Therefore, this dissertation predicts that in the context of social services, coordination failures in effort levels can lead to development traps. ^