The United States Congress and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez

The Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991 marks the end of the Cold War and the elimination of the United States' main rival for global political-economic leadership. For decades U.S. foreign policymakers had formulated policies aimed at containing the spread of Soviet communism and Moscow's interventionist policies in the Americas. They now assumed that Latin American leftist revolutionary upheavals could also be committed to history. This study explores how Congress takes an active role in U.S. foreign policymaking when dealing with revolutionary changes in Latin America. This study finds that despite Chávez's vitriolic statements and U.S. economic vulnerability due to its dependence on foreign oil sources, Congress today sees Chávez as a nuisance and not a threat to U.S. vital interests. Devoid of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American patron intent on challenging the United States for regional leadership, Chávez is seen by Congress largely as a threat to the stability of Venezuela's institutions and political-economic stability. Today both the U.S. executive and the legislative branches largely see Bolivarianism a distraction and not an existential threat. The research is based on an examination of Bolivarian Venezuela compared to revolutionary upheaval and governance in Nicaragua over the course of the twentieth century. This project is largely descriptive, qualitative in approach, but quantitative data are used when appropriate. To analyze both the U.S. executive and legislative branches' reaction to revolutionary change, Cole Blasier's theoretical propositions as developed in the Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-1985 are utilized. The present study highlights the fact that Blasier's propositions remain a relevant means for analyzing U.S. foreign policymaking.

The United States Congress and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez

The Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991 marks the end of the Cold War and the elimination of the United States' main rival for global political-economic leadership. For decades U.S. foreign policymakers had formulated policies aimed at containing the spread of Soviet communism and Moscow's interventionist policies in the Americas. They now assumed that Latin American leftist revolutionary upheavals could also be committed to history. This study explores how Congress takes an active role in U.S. foreign policymaking when dealing with revolutionary changes in Latin America. This study finds that despite Chavez's vitriolic statements and U.S. economic vulnerability due to its dependence on foreign oil sources, Congress today sees Chavez as a nuisance and not a threat to U.S. vital interests. Devoid of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American patron intent on challenging the United States for regional leadership, Chavez is seen by Congress largely as a threat to the stability of Venezuela's institutions and political-economic stability. Today both the U.S. executive and the legislative branches largely see Bolivarianism a distraction and not an existential threat. The research is based on an examination of Bolivarian Venezuela compared to revolutionary upheaval and governance in Nicaragua over the course of the twentieth century. This project is largely descriptive, qualitative in approach, but quantitative data are used when appropriate. To analyze both the U.S. executive and legislative branches' reaction to revolutionary change, Cole Blasier's theoretical propositions as developed in the Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910- 1985 are utilized. The present study highlights the fact that Blasier's propositions remain a relevant means for analyzing U.S. foreign policymaking.

Inter-subjective and transnational racial effects: The role of the United States in the formation and evolution of the collective perception and racial relations in Cuba, 1898–1902

Since the arrival of the first African slaves to Cuba in 1524, the issue of race has had a long-lived presence in the Cuban national discourse. However, despite Cuba’s colonial history, it has often been maintained by some historians that race relations in Cuba were congenial with racism and racial discrimination never existing as deep or widespread in Cuba as in the United States (Cannon, 1983, p. 113). In fact, it has been argued that institutionalized racism was introduced into Cuban society with the first U.S. occupation, during 1898–1902 (Cannon, 1983, p. 113). This study of Cuba investigates the influence of the United States on the development of race relations and racial perceptions in post-independent Cuba, specifically from 1898-1902. These years comprise the time period immediately following the final fight for Cuban Independence, culminating with the Cuban-Spanish-American War and the first U.S. occupation of Cuba. By this time, the Cuban population comprised Africans as well as descendants of Africans, White Spanish people, indigenous Cubans, and offspring of the intermixing of the groups. This research studies whether the United States’ own race relations and racial perceptions influenced the initial conflicting race relations and racial perceptions in early and post-U.S. occupation Cuba. This study uses a collective interpretative framework that incorporates a national level of analysis with a race relations and racial perceptions focus. This framework reaches beyond the traditionally utilized perspectives when interpreting the impact of the United States during and following its intervention in Cuba. Attention is given to the role of the existing social, political climate within the United States as a driving influence of the United States’ involvement with Cuba. This study reveals that emphasis on the role of the United States as critical to the development of Cuba’s race relations and racial perceptions is credible given the extensive involvement of the U.S. in the building of the early Cuban Republic and U.S. structures serving as models for reconstruction. U.S. government formation in Cuba aligned with a governing system reflecting the existing governing codes of the U.S. during that time period.

Politics at the water's edge: The presidency, Congress, and the North Korea policy of the United States

For all their efforts to avoid a nuclear North Korea, the Clinton and Bush administrations failed to achieve this goal, the most important policy objective of the United States in its relations with North Korea for decades, mainly because of inconsistencies in U.S. policy. This dissertation seeks to explain why both administrations ultimately failed to prevent North Korea from going nuclear. It finds the origins of this failure in the implementation of different U.S. policy options toward North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations. To explain the lack of policy consistency, the dissertation investigates how the relations between the executive and the legislative branches and, more specifically, different government types—unified government and divided government—have affected U.S. policy toward North Korea. It particularly emphasizes the role of Congress and partisan politics in the making of U.S. policy toward North Korea. This study finds that divided government played a pivotal role. Partisan politics are also central to the explanation: politics did not stop at the water’s edge. A divided U.S. government produced more status quo policies toward North Korea than a unified U.S. government, while a unified government produced more active policies than a divided government. Moreover, a unified government with a Republican President produced more aggressive policies toward North Korea, whereas a unified government with a Democratic President produced more conciliatory policies. This study concludes that the different government types and intensified partisan politics were the main causes of the inconsistencies in the United States’ North Korea policy that led to a nuclear North Korea.

The United States and the politics of trade: the banana war with Europe and the Caribbean

This thesis examines the involvement of the United States in the decade-long trade dispute before the World Trade Organization (WTO) over the European Union's preferential banana regime. Washington's justification for bringing this case to the WTO comes from Section 301 of the U.S. trade act, which allows for disputes to be undertaken if U.S. "interests" are violated; however, this is the first case ever undertaken by the United States that does not directly threaten any American banana industry, nor affect any American jobs. Why, then, would the United States involve itself in this European-Caribbean-Latin American dispute? It is the contention of this thesis that the United States thrust itself headlong into this debate for two reasons: domestically, the United States Trade Representative came under pressure, via the White House and Congress, from Chiquita CEO Carl Lindner, who in the past decade donated more than $7.1 million to American politicians to take the case to the WTO. Internationally, the United States used the case as an opportunity to assert its power over Europe, with the Eastern Caribbean islands being caught in the economic crossfire. According to existing literature, in undertaking this case, the United States did as any nation would: it operated within both domestic and international levels, satisfying at each level key interests, with the overall goal of maintaining the nation's best interests.

Two Decades Out of the Whirlpool: Past (and Possible Future) United States Interventions in Latin America [Student's Paper Series]

This paper examines the history of U.S. interventions in Latin America and attempts to explain their frequency by highlighting two factors – besides security and economic interests – that have made American interventions in Latin America so common. First, immense differences in size and influence between the United States and the States of Latin America have made interventions appear to be a low risk solution to crises that threaten American interests in the region. Second, when U.S government concerns and aspirations for Latin America converge with the general fears and aspirations of American foreign policy, interventions become much more likely. Such a convergence pushes Latin American issues high up the U.S. foreign policy agenda because of the region’s proximity to the United States and the perception that costs of intervening are low. The leads proponents of intervention to begin asking questions like “if we cannot stop communism/revolutions/drug-trafficking in Latin America, where can we stop it?” This article traces how these factors influenced the decision to intervene in Latin America during the era of Dollar Diplomacy and during the Cold War. It concludes with three possible scenarios that could lead to a reemergence of an American interventionist policy in Latin America. It makes the argument that even though the United Sates has not intervened in Latin America during the twenty-two years, it is far from clear that American interventions in Latin America will be consigned to the past.

The Modern State and the Re-Creation of the Indigenous Other: The Case of the Authentic Sámi in Sweden and the White Man’s Indian in the United States of America.

The present study comparatively examined the socio-political and economic transformation of the indigenous Sámi in Sweden and the Indian American in the United States of America occurring first as a consequence of colonization and later as a product of interaction with the modern territorial and industrial state, from approximately 1500 to 1900. The first colonial encounters of the Europeans with these autochthonous populations ultimately created an imagery of the exotic Other and of the noble savage. Despite these disparaging representations, the cross-cultural settings in which these interactions took place also produced the hybrid communities and syncretic life that allowed levels of cultural accommodation, autonomous space, and indigenous agency to emerge. By the nineteenth century, however, the modern territorial and industrial state rearranges the dynamics and reaches of power across a redefined territorial sovereign space, consequently, remapping belongingness and identity. In this context, the status of indigenous peoples, as in the case of Sámi and of Indian Americans, began to change at par with industrialization and with modernity. At this point in time, indigenous populations became a hindrance to be dealt with the legal re-codification of Indigenousness into a vacuumed limbo of disenfranchisement. It is, thus, the modern territorial and industrial state that re-creates the exotic into an indigenous Other. The present research showed how the initial interaction between indigenous and Europeans changed with the emergence of the modern state, demonstrating that the nineteenth century, with its fundamental impulses of industrialism and modernity, not only excluded and marginalized indigenous populations because they were considered unfit to join modern society, it also re-conceptualized indigenous identity into a constructed authenticity.