Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

Time, Cost, and Environmental Impact Analysis for Sustainable Design at Multiple Building Levels

Construction projects are complex endeavors that require the involvement of different professional disciplines in order to meet various project objectives that are often conflicting. The level of complexity and the multi-objective nature of construction projects lend themselves to collaborative design and construction such as integrated project delivery (IPD), in which relevant disciplines work together during project conception, design and construction. Traditionally, the main objectives of construction projects have been to build in the least amount of time with the lowest cost possible, thus the inherent and well-established relationship between cost and time has been the focus of many studies. The importance of being able to effectively model relationships among multiple objectives in building construction has been emphasized in a wide range of research. In general, the trade-off relationship between time and cost is well understood and there is ample research on the subject. However, despite sustainable building designs, relationships between time and environmental impact, as well as cost and environmental impact, have not been fully investigated. The objectives of this research were mainly to analyze and identify relationships of time, cost, and environmental impact, in terms of CO2 emissions, at different levels of a building: material level, component level, and building level, at the pre-use phase, including manufacturing and construction, and the relationships of life cycle cost and life cycle CO2 emissions at the usage phase. Additionally, this research aimed to develop a robust simulation-based multi-objective decision-support tool, called SimulEICon, which took construction data uncertainty into account, and was capable of incorporating life cycle assessment information to the decision-making process. The findings of this research supported the trade-off relationship between time and cost at different building levels. Moreover, the time and CO2 emissions relationship presented trade-off behavior at the pre-use phase. The results of the relationship between cost and CO2 emissions were interestingly proportional at the pre-use phase. The same pattern continually presented after the construction to the usage phase. Understanding the relationships between those objectives is a key in successfully planning and designing environmentally sustainable construction projects.